NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

Synthesis and Intentional Objectivity

On Kant and Husserl

si

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHENOMENOLOGY

SYNTHESIS AND INTENTIONAL OBJECTIVITY

SYNTHESIS AND INTENTIONAL OBJECTIVITY

ON KANT AND HUSSERL

by

NATHAN ROTENSTREICH†
The Hebrew University,
Jerusalem, Israel

UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL
Biblioteca Comunitária
S. CARLOS

10224376

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS
DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Clas. G 193
Cult. R 843 si
e.1
Tombo 224376

ISBN 0-7923-4956-3

Data 08/11/2010
Proc. 2009/16573-4
Ems. FAP. LIVROS. VI
Liv. Empire Books
R$ 98,64
NF PO248
Solic. DFMC

Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada
by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A.

In all other countries, sold and distributed
by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved
© 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.

Printed in the Netherlands

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Author's Note vii

Introduction 1

Chapter I: Sensuality and Ideation 3

Chapter II: Conditions and Foundations 25

Chapter III: From Ideation to Constitution 41

Chapter IV: Fundamental Data and Their Exposition 59

Chapter V: From Exposition to Phenomenological Insight 81

Chapter VI: The Beginning and the Goal 101

Chapter VII: Science and Philosophy 117

Postscript 129

Index 131

Author's Note

The analysis presented here is concerned with some major works by Kant and Husserl. The theme of the analysis is the variations on the position and essence of intuition - *Anschauung*. This theme has central significance in Kant's system because of his conception of the structure of knowledge as a synthesis of intuition and reason or understanding. It has central importance in Husserl's system because of the discernment of data through the medium of intuition. The topic calls attention to the similarities and differences between the two systems. We must make a point about terminology: *Sinnlichkeit* is translated both as sensuality and as sensibility. Both these terms are employed in this book because both are present in the literature in English. The frequent reference to the term *Anschauung* is caused by the fact that the term intuition has two meanings: immediate non-discursive knowledge and seeing. The term *Anschauung* refers primarily to seeing. This nominal aspect is significant for the interpretation of the two systems.

The book tries to present a detailed analysis of the respective texts. This analysis has to be the basis for arriving at some systematic conclusions. Sometimes the original version of the quotations follows the reference to the English translation of the texts. This is done in order to preserve the nuances of the quotations for the reader.

Parts of the book, which have been published before, have been rewritten.

I wish to express my gratitude to the staff of Kluwer Academic Publishers for bringing this volume to press. In particular, I am indebted to Ms. Maja de Keijzer for all her help since the initial submission of the manuscript. I thank Mr. Sam Friedman for his work in editing the book. I am grateful to Ms. Naomi Gal who managed, early on, to transform my notes into a legible manuscript. With exemplary care to detail, Mrs. Esther Herskovics prepared a final camera-ready version of this manuscript. Last, my thanks to my colleague, Hayim Goldgraber, who contributed in innumerable ways to this project.

Nathan Rotenstreich
Jerusalem, 1992

Postscript:
Professor Nathan Rotenstreich passed away in October 1993.
The manuscript of this book was left in his estate, fully prepared for publication.
We wish to thank again Kluwer Academic Publishers and the Editors of the Series on Phenomenology for their continuous interest and goodwill which enabled us to bring this book to print.

The Rotenstreich Foundation
Jerusalem, 1997

INTRODUCTION

We shall be concerned in the following pages with some issues common to the systems of both Kant and Husserl. Given the structured nature of philosophical systems, however, the topics cannot be isolated from the systems in which they function, imbuing them in each case with a specific direction.

An examination of the basic concept of *Anschauung* will indicate the difference between the two systems. To be sure, *Anschauung* points in both to the visual aspect of knowledge, an element inherent in the classical concept of *theoria*, which is related to the word *horao*, to see. In Kant, however, the visual aspect is not the highest component of cognition, since it is related to sensuality. *Anschauung* belongs to the synthesis and not the summit of knowledge. It is given before thinking, and is present in the ongoing search for relations between data. In Kant's understanding, pure reason can be related to data only through the medium of understanding. In this sense, we could say that *Anschauung*, being a variation of *Schau*, is that which can be perceived with the eyes. In Kant's system, it points to the presence of that which is given and thus to reception, whereas knowledge proper is a synthesis of reception and spontaneity.

Husserl, by contrast, describes *Anschauung* as a categorial form related to what he calls "self-givenness." As such, it leads not to knowledge as construction, but to the identity between the content and that which is present or given. It is purely intuitive, referring to the essence and not to the sensuous datum, and it is inherent in ideation.

Programmatically, Husserl views the logical concept as having its origin in *Anschauung*. Thus, he describes the primary synthesis as "ideative universality." In a sense, Husserl returns to the concept of *theoria*; however, his ideative universality is grounded in ideas not as universal objects of knowledge, but as they are to be discerned in the subject or the ego, which for Husserl is the basic or primary stratum of knowledge. It is last from the point of view of our coming to it, but primary from the point of view of that which is the presupposition of all knowledge.

To be sure, Kant introduces the concept of intellectual *Anschauung*, but the very presence of the adjective "intellectual" in this synthesis makes it manifest that*Anschau-ung* as such does not have an intellectual connotation. He applies the same term to the "I" or to the intellectual substance as the soul or to freedom. These applications reflect the systematic notion that *Anschauung* as such has an empirical connotation. Thus, Kant's conjunction of "intellectual" and *Anschauung* is an additional expression of the direction of his system, again highlighting its distinctiveness from that of Husserl.

The basic issue will become more explicit in the detailed analysis which follows.

Chapter I

SENSUALITY AND IDEATION

We shall explore the different texts of Kant and Husserl on the structure of knowledge. The distinction between acts of knowing and knowledge as such is one of the distinctions with which we are concerned. We shall refer to the texts dealing with these aspects, taking into account the component of sensuality and the sensuous data that are central in this context.

We begin our comparative study with an analysis of the position of the forms of sensuality. In structuring this analysis in this way we do not only follow the architectonics of Kant's system. We assume that the forms of *Anschauung* as forms of sensuality occupy a special position as *a priori* forms and still relate to the data presented by sensuality. Hence we are concerned with the intermediate position of the forms and explore Husserl's attitude to the topic - regardless of the terminology employed by him.

1

One of the appendices of Husserl's *Erste Philosophie* bears the title: "Gegen Kants anthropologische Theorie." While Husserl probably did not compose this title, it adequately expresses the aspects with respect to which he saw his philosophy as differing from that of Kant, particularly with respect to sensuality (*Sinnlichkeit*) and its forms.

Husserl's basic contention is that the known as known is constituted in subjective processes. However, a theory is a genuine elucidation and a strictly scientific solution to the problem of knowledge only when it takes into account the totality of subjectivity, the whole performance (*Leistung*) of cognition, with all of its essential components. Kant, in Husserl's view, falls short of this thoroughness; he begins his exposition in the Transcendental Deduction, but he

does not deal with the somatic, psychic and physical rootedness of intuiting and thinking as transcendental themes. Rather, Kant always sees this rootedness as something to be taken for granted. Thus Kant is guilty of a glaring (*schillernd*) anthropologism.[1]

Husserl points out that Kant assumes the given empirical structure of the human being and takes it as an unquestioned *a priori* stratum of cognition. Instead of engaging in a genuinely transcendental study of subjectivity, Kant is content with the description of the facts; he thus pushes the problem of the *a priori* into "unscientific darkness."[2] He does not carry the transcendental approach to the origins of subjectivity, or to subjectivity in its fundamental status. Rather, he resigns himself to accepting man's anthropological equipment. Referring to the Transcendental Deduction of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Husserl says that, while Kant carries out his deduction on the phenomenological plane, he misperceives this plane as psychological and thus loses it.[3] The anthropological and the psychological misinterpretations of transcendental subjectivity in Kant are two sides of the same coin.

Husserl does not accept Kant's metaphysical exposition of space and time as conforming to the project of tracing concepts -and intuitions (*Anschauungen*), if we distinguish between the two. Kant's metaphysical exposition is concerned with exhibiting the concepts or contents of space and time as given *a priori*. Husserl stresses in particular that Kant takes these concepts or contents as given; they are not constituted. Kant accomplishes the elimination of objects from space and time. They are, as it were, "*weggedacht*." If the metaphysical exposition does not satisfy Husserl, one may assume that the transcendental exposition satisfies him even less. After all, the transcendental exposition is the explanation of space and time as principles in which we can see the possibility of other synthetic knowledge. To look for additional knowledge on the basis of space and time presupposes that space and time are given. Hence the transcendental exposition takes for granted the findings of the metaphysical exposition. The metaphysical exposition is a sort of reading of what is inherent in the human subject. Kant's elimination of the empirical is a purification of that which is already pure.

Husserl seems to think that the method of constitution should replace the method of elimination. The method of constitution, although it is a method, is not only a method. It is a description of the actual process that takes place in subjectivity. Speaking of the pure ego, Husserl says that it lives and expresses itself in each actual *cogito*; all background experiences (*Hintergrunderlebnisse*) belong to it, and it belongs to all background experience. All these experiences, belonging to *one* stream of experience (*Erlebnisstrom*) - which is mind - must be capable of becoming actual *cogitationes*. In Kant's terms (and it remains to be seen whether it is also in Husserl's terms), ***the "I think" must be able to accompany all my representations.*** Husserl's interpretation of the phrase is clearly not the same as Kant's. Kant refers to the mere form of consciousness, which is neither an intuition nor a concept, but the poorest representation,[4] the logical unity of the subject;[5] no manifold is given through the ego,[6] Hence, consciousness cannot be a sum total of background experiences or a stream of experiences related to the ego through an act, as it is in Husserl. Husserl's conception of the ego is rather similar to Bergson's vision of *duree*. (How Husserl came to this view is a question we save for later.) The direction of Husserl's concern is different from that of Kant and it is this difference that gives rise to Husserl's criticism of Kant.

2

Let us now examine the extent to which antropologism and psychologism can be attributed to Kant.

Kant considers the problem of knowledge and ethics from the standpoint of man within the world, i.e., from the standpoint of man as an intramundane being. Man is part of the world of phenomena and, as part of this world, he has access to it through his senses. Man knows nature only through his senses.[7] This intramundane character of man is expressed in the statement that man is affected by things or objects. Sensuality is the faculty of being affected. If we were to try to translate this Kantian position into an anthropological conception, we could only say that for Kant the essential problem - both in the realm of knowledge and the realm of ethical norms - is whether and how a being woven into the texture of reality can know the world rationally, that is to say, according to pure concepts, and act within the world according to an ethical norm that is not caused by nature. Kant had to establish the possibility of knowledge for a finite being whose finitude lies precisely in his sensuality. His sensuality is his intentionality - to apply that term - to the material world through organs belonging to the biological organization of man as a part of the world. In trying to solve this metaphysical-anthropological dilemma, Kant employed his fundamental conception of the spontaneity of the finite being, a spontaneity embodied in the *a priori* stratum of sensuality and intuition which provides the fundamental distance between man and the data he encounters through his sensuality.

For Kant, then, the anthropological equipment of man is an ultimate datum which both raises and solves the problem of knowledge. It raises the problem by posing the question of the intentionality of cognition extending beyond our interwovenness in the world. It solves the problem through reference to the data of cognition, a reference which precludes the danger of merely algorithmic - i.e., empty - thinking.

Whether or not we see man's fundamental position as accidental is ultimately either a terminological or a temperamental matter. Plato takes the position of man in the world as his point of departure; the myth of the soul and the theory of anamnesis are designed to solve the problem of knowing the world through belonging to it. For Plato, the fact that the soul dwells in the world but belongs fundamentally to the realm of ideas guarantees the cognition of the world. There is an affinity between the agent in the world and that which is known by the agent. Even for Spinoza the position of man and his structure are, to some extent, points of departure. The fact that we know only two of the infinite number of attributes is not unrelated to the fact that human beings are composed of the two attributes or their *modi* - soul and body.

For Kant, it is not only sensuality that reveals man as a being in and *vis-a-vis* the world. The same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the position of the ego as a thinking being. We do not know, Kant says, whether the consciousness of the self is possible without the things outside the self. We do not know whether one could exist as an ego only, as a thinking being, without being a man.[8] To restate Kant's view: We cannot prove the position of the ego as a thinking entity unless we encounter this ego in the realm of man's existence. The unity of the ego is in a way opposed to the encountered manifold and also a correlate of this manifold.

Husserl objects to this view. The manifold is no longer placed in relation to the ego, but is part of the inner stream of the ego. Husserl's view preserves the structure of Kant's theory but the places of its components. In spite of his efforts to maintain this difference, Husserl actually introverts the Kantian correlation of the manifold and the unity by placing the two not as opposites but as points in a continuum. Yet Husserl builds this architectonic structure at a price. Unlike Kant, he does not recognise or address himself to the dilemma of knowledge and ethics.

Kant's doctrine contains something of what he himself, in another context, calls an "apology for sensuality."[9] Sensuality, he says, has a bad reputation. The passive element is what causes bad things to be said about sensuality.[10] He cannot and does not wish to deny the fact that this passivity is indeed inherent in sensuality. He calls it receptivity. Receptivity is the

capacity to receive representations according to the mode in which we are affected by objects. There is a fundamental difference between the objects and the *Vorstellungen*, although the *Vorstellungen* are with us insofar as we, being in the world, encounter objects in and of the world. *Vorstellungen* are, by definition, within the intramundane subject and not in the world. The term "receptivity" may obscure the fact that we are concerned, even on the level of *Vorstellungen*, with an attitude or a mode of intentionality, to use Husserl's key term.

Husserl amplifies his criticism of Kant's adherence to anthropological psychologism by asserting that Kant's philosophy takes certain things for granted as facts. These "facts" are: (a) that there are external things affecting us[11] and (b) that there is a connection between the receptive exposure to things and the forms which have, supposedly, a universal validity.[12] Husserl holds the view that, despite his aspiration or programme, Kant fails to reach the level of transcendental philosophy, a level above mere *Weltanschauung*. The distinction between the temporary - or transitional - scientific point of view and the idea of rigorous science is to be maintained. In this sense, Husserl sees his own philosophy as a continuation of Kant's, as well as an attempt to overcome Kant's limitations. The last passage of one of Husserl's lectures on Kant,[13] in which he says that we are entitled to hope that Kant's genius will meet our modest offer of thanks with cordiality, is similar to the criticism and indebtedness expressed, for instance, by Heinrich Scholz toward Kant's theory of space and time. Although Scholz's point of departure is not the phenomenology of subjectivity but rather the need for a reformulation of the presuppositions of science in the light of the changes since Newton, Scholz says that he is perhaps bringing Kant into our own day.[14] Let us analyse Husserl's position - that is to say - the various features he discerns in Kant's philosophy.

3

Husserl points to the *de facto* accidental nature and anthropological bias of Kant's theory of the subject. He attempts to replace these by features of the subject. To be sure, we can identify Husserl's systematic programme and still question whether that programme was carried out and even whether it can be carried out.

All cognitive processes, according to Husserl - beginning with the cycle of sheer perception, recollection, expectation, anticipation of as yet unfulfilled horizons, and including the isolating, connecting, and relating processes that are involved in scientific cognition - are subjective processes.

They are processes of subjective intending or meaning (*Meinen*) of subjective cognitive acts. The existence of the world outside the individual is a subjective occurrence within the individual. Similarly, the space and time of the experienced world are representations within the individual, intuitions, contents of one's thought, and hence, subjective.[15] This turn toward the subjective, for Husserl, is the true beginning, the radical act of liberation from all scientific and pre-scientific traditions. Kant does not perform this radical act of emancipation, since he does not break through to the level of constitutive subjectivity remaining on the level of form.

Actually, there are two distinct ingredients to Husserl's doctrine. He attempts to describe every single intentionality within subjectivity: perception or anticipation, recollection and openness to experience, etc. Subjectivity must find expression in particular acts which are subjective in terms of their roots and their intentionality toward a certain object or else find expression in a specific trend of the act. Husserl seems to think that Kant does not present such a view of subjectivity and its inherent manifoldness. Kant is concerned first and foremost with establishing objects as functionally interrelated, i.e., in their causal relations. He is not concerned with the roots of the acts and the variations of acts which occur on the level of subjectivity. This might be considered as a criticism of Kant. Once an ego is posited, it calls for a phenomenological investigation not only of its functions - which alone do not call for phenomenological treatment - but also of its "life."

4

Husserl in this context is a radical philosopher in the etymological sense of the term, attempting to penetrate to the *radix* of subjectivity. He does not disregard one aspect which is predominant in Kant. This is clear from Husserl's own theory of constitution. Kant, Husserl says, does not grasp the true sense of the correlation between knowledge and objectivity (*Erkenntnis-Gegenstandlichkeit*). Hence he does not grasp the specifically transcendental problem of "constitution." This aspect is already apparent in the Transcendental Aesthetic, where Kant turns space and time into "forms of sensuality." Within that sphere only - and prior to the syntheses dealt with (though not very clearly) in the Transcendental Analytic - nothing can be given in terms of a constitution of spatiality (*Raumlichkeit*). Husserl adds that Kant does not deal with the space of geometry but with the space of mere perception and intuition, which is, nevertheless, the presupposition of geometry, just as the things of everyday life are the presuppositions of the scientific determination of things and of the natural sciences themselves.[16] In other words, to what extent

does the object become constituted in intuition (*Anschauung*)? How does the series of perceptions and recollections - in which this object is given - look?

Husserl criticizes Kant for omitting the constitution of the object from the sphere of perception itself. Kant, as the argument against him runs, considered constitution to take place only where there is a synthesis between the intuition and the concept, i.e., in geometry. In contrast to this, he took the object as encountered in perception merely as given, not as constituted. Yet constitution is the opposite of that which is merely given. Hence for Kant, *constitution* of the object ultimately means *construction* of the object. As Husserl says, Kant's concepts are constructive concepts - and this, as a matter of principle, prevents their ultimate elucidation.[17] The assumption seems to be that the ultimate elucidation of concepts depends on their placement in the stream of subjectivity. Only in that stream and as present before us can concepts be elucidated. This is the endeavour of the phenomenology of the inner awareness of time. The task is to go back to the roots of the constructive acts.

We must recognize that Husserl is correct in a major part of his criticism, at least to the extent that he calls attention to one aspect of Kant's doctrine. The object as perceived is not constituted for Kant, because Kant assumes the primary relation between man and world as given. Even though, as we have seen, Kant does not take receptivity as mere passivity, he construes the datum as perceived or as encountered through the activity of sensuality; it is not actively, i.e., functionally constituted. Husserl's criticism resembles the positive development of Kant's argument that we find in Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, where the construction of the realm of perception as such is traced rather than taken as merely or primarily given.

There is an additional component in Husserl which might be seen as the principal component and main innovation of his phenomenological philosophy. Husserl attempts to show, or to maintain, not only that the subjective stream is the reservoir of all acts of constitution but that there is also a harmony between the objects as intentionally encountered and the subjective acts directed to the objects. There are acts of perception and they constitute the object of perception; there are acts of recollection and they constitute the objects of recollection; etc. Since there is such a harmony, we can avoid being victims, as it were, of accidental mundane encounters, and we can try to "save the factualities" through constitution and acts performed for their sake. Constitution is present on all the levels of subjectivity.

Indeed, it is a rationalism occurring on the level of and through subjectivity, and it is quite extreme. Does a harmony of this sort exist? The

only way to assume a harmony between an act or a series of acts and the intended noema is to take the noema not as constituted by acts but as emanating from acts. Yet Husserl does not do this. He remains within the limits of intentionality and constitution and only enlarges the boundaries of the sphere of the radical beginning to include the object of perception. But he leaves untouched the correlation between cognizing and objectivities referred to by cognition. This harmony is either a riddle, or an actual harmony established *post factum*. Since there are objects encountered in different spheres of intentionality, we are looking for the acts that may be the correlates of these objects. To begin with, we know or are acquainted with the given; we supplement this knowledge and the given by identifying the knowledge of the given.

If this comment is valid, then we encounter in Husserl a transformation of the *petitio principii* for which Kant has been criticized since Solomon Maimon. Kant, it has been argued, assumes the validity of the natural sciences and goes on to provide *post factum* the categorical apparatus to base and safeguard the validity of these sciences. To be sure, we know the objects; individuals perform a variety of acts such as perception and recollection. Knowing this, Husserl traces the radical origins of the acts and makes this origins into subjective-constitutive factors for the objects encountered. This is not a way to go beyond facticity or factuality. It is merely a reconstruction of factuality - a factuality seen through but not genuinely constituted. There is also an attempt to raise factuality of cuts to the level of essence. Can such an attempt be at all successful? To answer this question, let us look at Husserl's criticism of Kant's theory of space as a *form* of intuition.

5

A case in point, or rather *the* case in point, is Husserl's criticism of Kant's theory of space as an intuition and as a form of intuition. No matter how many particular cases one takes and no matter how often one pictures sensuous material in one's imagination, the fact still remains that this material is organized spatially for him; the most one can do is perform an induction.[18] One cannot make a statement *a priori* concerning a place. Put differently, synthetic judgments in Kant's sense - and space is a component in a synthetic judgment, since a synthesis requires both concepts and intuitions - are judgments made by human beings only on the basis of their factual subjectivity.[19]

Looking first at Kant's text,[20] we may say again that, by and large the description presented by Husserl is justified, that is to say, space is related to the *de facto* human sensuality, for it is a *de facto* organ to be used in man's encounter with the . Kant says that space and time are valid as conditions for the possibility of objects being given to us. They are valid only for the objects of the senses and, hence, valid only for experience.[21] From the point of view of experience, nature and possible experience are one and the same thing.[22] This space (time, too; but we confine our analysis to space) as a form of intuition is a form related to the factuality of sensuality and to the boundaries of experience and nature delineated by this factuality.

Yet Kant's theory has a major aspect which Husserl disregards, or at least does not deal with in his writings, an aspect which is also important from the phenomenological point of view. Kant introduces the distinction between space *as a form of intuition* and space *as intuition*, in other words, between a form of intuition and a formal intuition. In a passage in a note to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*[23] he says that space represented as an object - which is necessary in geometry -contains more than the form of intuition. It contains the comprehension (*Zusammenfassung*) of the manifold according to the form of sensuality in an intuited representation (*Vorstellung*), so that the form of the intuition provides only the manifold, while the formal intuition provides the unity of the representation.

Commenting on this passage in Kant, Paton writes:

> Pure intuition is said to contain an *a priori* manifold, a manifold which is not a manifold of sense, but is given because of the nature of sensibility. This manifold is composed only of relations (spatial and temporal). It is at once the content of pure intuition and the form of (empirical) intuition.[24]

This seems to be an adequate interpretation of a cryptic, though quite relevant, statement. We can enlarge on it by saying that Kant places time and space in the domain of sensuality. They are its forms, but the position of a form in sensuality does not remove the form from the domain of forms as such. As the forms of concepts are concepts, so the forms of sensuality have the character of sensuality.

If we understand sensuality in its plain meaning as related to affectedness by objects, then space and time cannot be seen as belonging to it. As forms they are *a priori*, i.e., they apply to the objects but are not engendered by them. It seems, therefore, that Kant had to shift the meaning of sensuality from the relation to the things affecting it to the *direct* relation to the

manifold.[25] Indeed, this is one of the ways in which Kant characterizes the nature of sensuality. This aspect of the manifold on the level of *a priori* of sensuality is the form - that is to say, the very *structure* of time as composed of moments and the very *structure* of space as composed of points. This structure is unified by the formal intuition which implies the aspect of unity as opposed to the manifold as manifold in the usual sense of the term. There is a manifold and there is a unity on the level of the *a priori*, and there is a corresponding correlation of the manifold (as characteristic of the *a priori*). We could say that this aspect of Kant's doctrine is independent of the Euclidean interpretation of space as a form of intuition. This aspect of Kant might be called retrospectively the phenomenology of space. The structure which is not just a factuality of the accidental character of human sensuality could serve as a point of departure for the subtly different approach that Husserl presents.

As a matter of fact, Husserl does not take this route. In reply to Kant's acceptance and recognition of actuality, he suggests as an alternative the elevation of our attention from the sense datum to the *eidos* as an object given in genuine consciousness of the general or universal, a consciousness in which Ideas, in the sense of pure and general or universal essences, are seen (*erschaut*).[26] The thing is, according to its Idea, *res extensa*; with regard to space, for instance, it is capable of infinite transformations while remaining identical in shape and change even of shape.[27] What do we gain by replacing the factuality of space with the Idea of *res extensa* except a change in terminology and the systematic context from which the terminology emerged and in which it is rooted? If we cling to the original sense of the term *res extensa*, then we must assume that there is an identity between extension and space. One could argue about what is implied by extension and whether we may speak about extension without presupposing space as the locus of extension. Even though Kant does not present space as opposed to extension but as opposed to the manifold, one could suggest a possible transformation from the manifold to extension without fundamentally changing the whole approach.

What matters here is Husserl's attempt to turn factuality into essence and accidentally into necessity. This would imply that the spatial and temporal interpretation of the world is not due to the factual structure of the intramundane subject, but is rather necessary for the subject in its spontaneous or constitutive intentionality to the world. This is a difficult view to maintain, in spite of Husserl's far-reaching statement that a thing in space can be intuited - not only by human beings but also by God as the ideal representative of absolute knowledge - through appearances (*Erscheinungen*) in which it is and must be given "perspectively" and thus in changing "orientations."[28] This elevation of sensuality to the level of the archetypal intellect, that is no longer a thinking intellect only and that has an inherent constitution in terms of time

and space, differs from Kant's position. For Kant, sensuality is confined to the human realm in both knowledge and ethics. One could claim that space and time are not sensuous in the first place and then go on to claim that they are *sensoria dei*. But this is only an anthropomorphized way of setting forth the basic view that space and time are not factually inherent in the sensuality of the human being. There is no evidence for this view except the negative trend of emancipation from the human situation or the intramundane position.

The extent to which Husserl himself fails to overcome the confinement to the human realm can be seen from a comment related to his ethical view. He argues against Kant's conditions and limitations on the grounds that the reliance on pure reason cannot warrant the "ought" character of ethical norms. The feelings remain totally untouched and the posibility of generalization, i.e., of turning the maxim into a universal ethical law, has no validity for feelings.[29] We are bound to ask: How do we know that there is a stratum of feelings which is relevant for ethical theory and for the formulation of ethical principles? The phenomenology of the ethical principles presupposes, here, a knowledge of the anthropological data as empirically given or as interpreted by an anthropological theory based on certain data. According to such a theory and its reference to data, feelings play a role within the totality of human behaviour, function in human motivation and relate to an ethical norm. However, these are anthropological data; they relate to the person as he is. Husserl cannot escape the reference to these data or feelings, as he cannot escape the reference to data on the level of cognition and the status of space as form. To describe a factuality as essential does not blur the distinction between the factual and the essential. The factual has an essence, but this does not make it essential as far as its epistemological or ontological status is concerned.

6

The strength of Husserl's presentation lies in what might be called its vividness or concreteness. He describes the manifold of experiences (*Erlebnisse*) which are the concrete aspect of "formal contents" as space and time. What he does extensively in terms of time he does only fragmentarily in terms of space. When Husserl says regarding time that we try to clarify the *a priori* of time by investigating time consciousness,[30] one may wonder whether this is an adequate description of what he is about to do. He tries to discern the fundamental experiences underlying the notion of time and this is, at least, one aspect of what goes by the name of constitution. But even when we take retention or endurance as a fundamental aspect of the notion of time and reach this conclusion by experiencing retention, endurance, etc., the step toward

comprehending all these aspects under the overriding notion of time is a systematic and, to some extent, constructive step; it is not just a summing-up of the aggregate of the experiences phenomenologically described. We know, in a way, about time before identifying retention as a relevant aspect of time consciousness. The conception that denies a clear-cut move from the first beginning - the view that accepts certain facets as essential for fundamental notions and their intentional sense in acts - this conception cannot be part of a "first philosophy" which accords primacy to that which appears noematically in the stream of intentional acts. Perhaps the conclusion to be drawn is that there is no detached and absolute primacy. Rather, primacy is of different sorts, which may be auxiliary, in terms of one another, as the notion of time might be for the experience of temporality and vice versa.

Speaking about a spatial thing (*ein Raumding*), Husserl describes its appearance as always in a certain "orientation" (*Orientierung*), e.g., it is directed according to a position, placed with regard to an observer, up or down, right or left, near or far in the perceptual field. The fact that we can see a thing at a certain "depth" or "distance" from us seems an essential necessity, not just an accident of the factual encounter between man and the world.[31] But is this the essence of space, or are these the essential components of the experience of space on the level of the *Lebenswelt*?

For Husserl this might be a meaningful question because there are no noemata except those which are correlates of noetic acts. But, if this is so, then the validity of Husserl's polemic against Kant's confining himself to sensuality raises some questions. It might be said that Husserl replaces the given sensuality with a description of the given experiences of *Raumdinge* on a certain level of experience. The criticism of Kant for taking Euclidean space as an *a priori* of any knowledge whatsoever would be even more applicable to Husserl's attempt to go back to the experiences of *Raumdinge*. Husserl's presentation is fuller than that of Kant; yet one might wonder whether it brings us any closer to establishing notions free from the anthropologistic frames.

Nor does it make much difference that Husserl calls Kant's pure intuition "*Ideation*"[32] except when factual anthropological featurs are understood as essences. The question arises whether *Ideation* denotes a method of disclosing the essence of the content, once the content is attained. If *Ideation* denotes this, then it can replace Kant's method of eliminating the data and preserving the pure - i.e., empty - space concept as the invariable and thus *a priori* form. For *Ideation* we have to know the features of time and space beforehand. Thus we come back to the criticism voiced against Kant, namely that he imposes on time and space that which can be grasped in *Anschauung*. He confined these contents to a certain habit or to a certain axiomatic system of

geometry and physics,[33] the essences of which are to be seen historically - in terms of theories of the history of scientific thought - and as data that are encountered. Husserl searches for a realm of essences but only finds the facts again.

Here we touch upon some of the most fundamental problems of the philosophical attitude toward the world. Is it an accident that in Husserl we find what might be called a sympathy for Hume and a fascination with Kant, and this despite the fact that man is, for Hume, only a bundle of particular perceptions? The sympathy for Hume is rooted in Husserl's attempt to find an impression or experience underlying each content or concept. There is no doubt that the human being, as an intramundane subject, is overwhelmed with experiences and is continually engaged in their formulation and interpretation. Experiences form a between-relationship of the world and the ego and the ego and the world. Yet, is the phenomenological endeavour an endeavour only to bring about the turn from givenness to evidence or from givenness to giving to oneself - what is called *Selbstgabe*?

It is precisely in terms of the contents of space and time that one finds a limited field of human experience in which things that change and endure are encountered, things that occupy a place and move from place to place, while their changes of place occur in time. The contents of space and time are rooted in, are amplifications of these encounters. These amplifications might be conducted in the direction that Husserl called *Ideation*. But they might also be conducted in a different direction, whereby these encounters are related to the universal question about the things encountered: Where are things? The "where" is an overriding question referring to both space and time. We posit the contents of space and time as universal answers to the universal question. It is no longer a question limited in terms of the orientation of the finite human being, here and now, who asks about his own orientation "here" and "now." This becomes a question which takes the more limited aspect of the orientation of the human being and asks about the ultimate frame of reference for any here and any now, about where the here and now themselves, as encountered, are to be posited.

There is an experience underlying the here and now; there is an experience embodied in the very attitude of questioning; but the content of the questioning, when it assumes a universal shape, oversteps the boundaries of experience. It might become an experience in its own right. But then it should be qualified as an "intellectual experience," one where a certain content entertained by consciousness might engender an attitude, not vice versa. The universal question of the "where" is still a question of the intramundane human being. But it transgresses the limited boundaries of the limited being in terms

of his particular field of experience. The intramundane being asks about the universal intramundaneity. This combination might sound like a contradiction in terms, but we are concerned only with an attitude of questioning the whole range of intramundaneity, not this or that segment inside it. The quest for fullness of experience characteristic of Husserl imposes an undue limitation on the already limited human subject. The spontaneity of the finite subject - the *Leitmotif* of Kant's philosophy - calls for many modifications. But in Husserl's sense, a modification takes place within a range of possibilities and thus preserves the *Gestalt* that undergoes the modification. Even "first philosophy" is bound up with the primary finitude of human subjects. Even when it goes beyond this finitude it refers to it. The affinity and the difference between Kant and Husserl lead us beyond the relation between the two systems. Some systematic issues emerge as the outcome of this analysis.

We sum up the analysis by going back to the central issue of sensuality and the difference between Kant and Husserl on that issue. In the first place, we have to point to the relation pertaining between sensuality and receptivity.[34] Hence, through the mediation of sensuality, the objects are given.[35] The sensuous impressions are the raw material.[36] For Kant, sensuality is the faculty providing for the immediate contact with the data. It is because of this position of data and receptivity that Kant is brought to the conclusion that the world of sense does not exist for itself.[37] Sensuality is the bridge between the knowing subject and the data to which his knowledge refers. We may wonder whether there can be sensuality within data. It is one of the consequences of Kant's position that the data as such, being given, presuppose the faculty that receives them and through which they become data. Hence, negatively speaking, lack of spontaneity[38] is the other side of sensuality in its approach to the manifold of the data. Kant even attributes priority to the senses when he says that all our knowledge starts with the senses.[39] This priority of the senses is perhaps chronological, that is to say, we first approach the nature that surrounds us through the senses. Yet it may also have a structural meaning, because the synthesis characteristic of knowledge is due mainly to the component of the sensuous data. The emphasis put on the position of sensuality in terms of the encounter with the surroundings is essential for Kant's point of view and may serve as a means for presenting the difference in Husserl's position.

That difference comes to the fore in the fact that Husserl deals with intentionality or intentional life, not with faculties, let alone with sensuality. There is the multiplicity of intentionality belonging to any *cogito*. Thus the

difference between faculties, if it exists at all, is a manifestation of the underlying intentionality. The intending beyond itself is implicit in any consciousness. Hence we do not emphasize the particular contact with reality supposedly characteristic of sensuality once intentionality as such is endowed with going beyond itself. Since the essential point is intentionality, the world is not a sum total of data, but rather a world as a meaning.[40] We could put it like this: Since intentionality is intrinsically consciousness of something, there is no need for a special mediation, i.e., through the faculty of sensuality.

We could enlarge on this particular issue by pointing out that Husserl does not present his introduction to phenomenology as "Kantian mediations" but as "Cartesian mediations." The reference to Descartes is illuminating in the sense that the emphasis is laid on the plentitude of the life of the ego, though not necessarily on the transition from *cogito* to *sum*. The ego is not only a product of thinking or the form of consciousness, as Kant had it; the I is in itself a totally empty representation.[41] There is a relation between that position of the I and its position as the condition which accompanies all thinking. Husserl took the I not as a condition but as a content, and as a content which contains in itself - through what can be described as a continuity of intentionalities - the richness of acts and their possible modes in terms of their directions. Epistemologically, there is no need for the bridge attributed to the position of sensuality, since consciousness contains the various acts and their possible foci on the approach to that which is the correlated aspect of intentionality, that is to say, the noemata.

As a matter of fact, Husserl himself made his position understandable to us and therefore expressed polemically his difference with Kant's system. "Positive science is a science lost in the world. I must lose the world by epoche, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination."[42] For Husserl, self-examination is not a form of self-enclosure but rather a way to open the richness of consciousness and its possible and actual vistas to that which is conceived by it. There is no need for a prior approach, because all approaches stem from a single origin which is, by the same token, not only a source but a realm. Husserl enabled us to see his position because he himself concludes the analysis in the "Cartesian Meditations" by a reference to St. Augustine saying: "Do not wish to go out; go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the inner man." We quote St. Augustine in English in order to emphasize that Husserl's quotation is not merely a motto. "The ego grasps himself not only as a flowing life, but also as the I who lives this or that subjective process, who lives through this or that cogito, as the same I."[43] Since the I is interpreted as existing, but also as establishing through its intentionality a continuity with objects, the I is a primary synthesis; to use Kant's terminology, not a post-factum identity established by the pure act of thinking. Hence, in this different interpretation

related both to intentionalities and the status of the I, the difference between Kant and Husserl becomes prominent. That difference serves as an anchor and a focal point of the following expositions.

The absorptions of the Cartesian attitude or what Husserl calls Cartesian discovery into Husserl's system becomes evident in the interpretation of transcendentality. The fact that Husserl refers to "transcendental experience,"[44] is already an indication of a new meaning of transcendentaliy emerging in his system, in what can be considered to be a synthesis of the Cartesian and Kantian approaches. Husserl describes the realm of transcendentality as an infinite realm of being of a new kind.[45] This description in itself expresses his view that transcendentality is not a stratum of conditions of knowledge, but rather a realm of being. In addition, the employment of the term "experience" in that context points to the fact that there is a self-reflection inherent in transcendentality described as experience. Therefore transcendentality is not, in a manner of speaking, outwardly oriented to the data. It is, first of all, a self-enclosed realm which because of its richness can also function as a condition of knowledge or as a condition of encountering data outside consciousness. Because of this direction towards the inward character of transcendental life, Husserl attributes to this life the quality of being apodictic. That character is related to what is described as the experiential structure of the Ego. In this context, Husserl observes that Descartes does not move from the inner structure of the Ego to transcendentality. Husserl describes this as a failure because the transcendental turn has not been made.[46]

There is a correlation between the transcendcental position and the concept of transcendent: "The Objective world, the world that exists for me, ... derives its whole sense and its existential status ... from myself, from me as a transcendental Ego..."[47] We interpret this by saying that that which is wordly cannot be detached from my experiencings and these experiencings are called grounding acts. Hence, the objects are the intentional correlates of modes of consiousness of them;[48] we obviously have to stress both the aspect of correlation and the aspect of intentionality. Intentionality is essentially an attitude of being directed to themes or noemeta. This relation is not constructed, for instance, by employing the distinction between conditions and that to which the conditions apply. The correlation is inherent in the modes of consciousness. Therefore these modes as such have a transcendental position and validity and need not be deduced by modes of special philosophical consideration. The Ego taken concretely has a universe of what is peculiarly its own. Within this "original sphere" lies a "transcendent world."[49] There is but one possible method, which is that demanded by the essence of intentionality and its horizons.[50] "Never can I reach the point of ascribing being in the absolute to others, any more than to the physical things of Nature, which exist

only as transcendentally produced affairs."[51] This formulation, which brings together transcendentality and production, is indeed a possible resume of Husserl's interpretation of transcendentality, precisely because of the emphasis on production rather than on conditioning.

At this point, a comment on Kant's interpretation of transcendentality is apposite, though we shall deal with the transformations of transcendentality presently. For instance, *Prolegomena*, in paragraph 5, presents the position of transcendental philosophy as the complete resolution of the question: How are synthetic cognitions possible *a priori*? This formulation, stressing the aspect of "possibility," is essential for the understanding of Kant's interpretation of transcendentality. It is not a sum total of given components of the richness of the Ego. The explication of that which is made possible by reason is the essence of transcendental philosophy. Related to that is the view that transcendental philosophy or transcendental analytic (and the very employment of that term is significant) consists in the dissection of all our *a priori* knowledge into the elements that pure understanding by itself yields.[52] The introduction of the term "dissection" is perhaps indicative of Kant's methodical approach to transcendentality. Husserl's approach is different in that he presents the richness of the transcendental realm. Transcendentality connotes that which makes the knowledge of experience possible. In this sense, transcendentality is always directed to that which is beyond it, not to the plentitude of the Ego. The term transcendental "signifies such knowledge as concerns the *a priori* employment."[53] The conjunction of possibility and employment is significant because it indicates that transcendentality is that which makes possible or justifies the application of concepts or forms to data. It is this interpretation of transcendentality that leads Kant to introduce distinctions like transcendental aesthetic, analytic and dialectic.

For Husserl, the very presence of acts and intentionalities in the realm of transcendentality makes the application of these things possible. Since Kant interprets transcendentality not as a self-enclosed realm but as a system of conditions, he must use different ways to prove the possibility of the move from that which is on the level of transcendentality to the directedness toward experience or data. In this sense, the different interpretations of f
ality exhibit different systematic trends, and they will be the center of our forthcoming exposition.

The mundane or worldly is placed in opposition to the transcendental subjective realm of the I. The realm of the I is a naive experience or the natural attitude to reality as manifest not only in practice but also is the theoretical attitude of "naive" science,[54] possibly as one of the anchors of the philosophy of existence and the emphasis laid on the "worthiness" of man. The term

"mundane" is probably meant to imply that the "day-to-day" subject is involved in the worldly activities and attitudes. Transcendentality is not shaping those precisely because the involvement is incongruous with the self-contained subjectness.

NOTES

1. E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie* (1923/24), Part I, *Kritische Ideengeschichte*, ed. R. Boehm (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1956), pp. 228, 357 ff. (hereafter cited as "*EP*"). On the whole issue of A. Gurwitsch, "Der Begriff des Bewusstseins bei Kant und Husserl," *Kant Studien*, LV (1964), pp. 410-427. The term "anthropology" is used in this context not in the sense of a theory of the unique features of man or the position of man in the cosmos. It is used as synonymous with "psychology." Hence the choice is between anthropologism and transcendentalism. Cf. E. Husserl, "Phenomenology and Anthropology," trans. Richard G. Schmitt, in *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, ed. M. Chisholm (Glencoe, 1960), pp. 410-427. Kr.d.r.V. B. pp. 38-40; Kemp-Smith's transl. pp. 68-69.

2. *EP*, p. 357 ff.

3. *Ibid.*, Chap. 1.

4. *Kr.d.r.V.* A, p. 328; Kemp-Smith's transl. p. 319. B p. 408; p. 369.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 413; transl. p. 372.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 135; transl. p. 154-155.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 574; transl. p. 471.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 409; transl. p. 370.

9. *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, Ak. Ausgabe Bde V, pp. 7 ff.

10. *Kr.d.r.V.* B, p. 33; transl. p. 65.

11. *Erste Philosophie*, p. 376.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 358.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 287.

14. See H. Scholz, "Das Vermachtnis der Kantischen Lehre von Raum und von Zeit," *Kant Studien*, XXIX (1924), p. 21-69.

15. *Erste Philosophie*, pp. 225-226.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 386.

17. E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europaeischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phanomenologie*, ed. W. Biemel (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1954, p. 203; transl. David Carr, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1970, p. 199.

18. *Erste Philosophie*, p. 357.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 364.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

21. *Kr.d.r.V.* B, p. 148; p. 163.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 160; transl. p. 170.

23. *Prolegomena zu einer jeden kunftigen Metaphysik*, para. 36. One wonders whether there is warrant for Paul Ricoeur's statement that the Copernican revolution, disengaged from the epistemological hypothesis, "is nothing other than the phenomenological epoche" (Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree [Evanston, 1967], p. 180). The question is essentially related to the concept of constitution dealt with later in this book.

24. Kant's *Metaphysics of Experience* (London, 1965), p. 105.

25. *Kr.d.r.V.* B, p. 68; p. 88.

26. *Erste Philosophie*, p. 36.

27. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch, Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phanomenologie*, ed. W. Biemel (The Hague), p. 119.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 370-371.

29. A. Roth, *Edmund Husserl's ethische Untersuchungen*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, p. 38; cf. EP, p. 229.

30. *Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, Max Niemeyer, Halle a.d.S., 1929; English trans. by James S. Churchill, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (Indiana University Press*, Bloomington, Ind., 1964), p. 29.

31. *Ideen*, pp. 370-371.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 368.
33. Cf. Scholz, "*Das Vermachtnis der Kantischen Lehre von Raum und von Zeit.*" Kant-Studien 1924, pp. 21 ff. A further analysis of these issues is contained in the present author's *Wege zur Erkennbarkeit der Welt*, Verlag Karl Alber, Freiburg Munchen, 1983; and *Legislation and Exposition*, Hegel-Studien Beiheft 24, Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, Bonn, 1984, pp. 37 ff.

34. *Kr.d.r.V.*, p. 33; transl. p. 65.

35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*, p. 1; p. 41.

37. *Prolegomena*, para. 57

38. *Kr.d.r.V.*, p. 68; p. 88.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 355; p. 300.

40. *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 66.

41. *Kr.d.r.V.*, p. 404; p. 331.

42. *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 66.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 23 ff.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 52 note.

51. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B, p. 89.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

53. *Die Krisis*, p. 259; p. 70.

54. *Ibid.*

Chapter II

CONDITIONS AND FOUNDATIONS

1

Having discussed a specific topic in the systems of Kant and Husserl, we may pause in order to give a broader profile of the differences between the two systems. The detailed issues will be dealt with again presently.

We begin by outlining Kant's philosophical system and his departure from the traditional understanding of philosophy. Unlike Plato, Kant does not consider philosophy as presenting a grade of cognition endowed with a vision identifying intelligible objects. He does not assume that there is a symmetry between intelligibility on the level of reason and intelligibility on the level of objects. Speaking more broadly, we may say that Kant takes a critical view of the presumption that progress based on knowledge from concepts alone is possible. He gives a technical description of this cognitive situation by saying that in the domain of pure reason, or what he calls the speculative employment of pure reason, there is no synthetic judgment, whereas knowledge depends on synthetic judgment. Speculative reason refers to transcendent objects, and these are beyond the posibility of knowledge. Another form of the same argument is the statement that pure reason, by definition, lacks the component of intuition (*Anschauung*) and therefore cannot be a medium of knowledge. The result of this criticism of pure knowledge is that the mode of knowledge appears as endowed with a vision which could be seen as a surrogate of intuition as *Anschauung*. Objective knowledge is related to experience, that is to say, to data. The forms of intuition, i.e., space and time, are the mediating links between concepts and data.

2

In contrast to the view of knowledge as vision, Kant presents the view of knowledge as a prescribing, legislative activity. Knowledge arising from the sources of understanding or reason prescribes to the data the laws according to which they are to be configurated. This prescription includes the establishment or construction of the relations between the objects. Relations are constructed; they are not present in the data. In the universal relation to possible experience

lies the transcendental premise which precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible. Hence Kant's interpretation of knowledge is not based on the corresondence between intellect and the intelligible objects, but on the legislation of reason. Legislation cannot be seen as a discerning capacity; it is one which imposes its direction on the data. That direction are laws applied to data.

We can now point to the central position of the notion of condition in the structure of Kant's system. Every object is subjected to the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition within possible experience. Categories are conditions of relations and do not (this applies also to the category of substance) entail a self-contained position expressing an ontological status. The central place of the concept of condition is reflected not only in the status of the forms of time and space, but also in the status of the conceptual apparatus, i.e., the categories. Hence we can say that we know the data in and through the forms that turn them into objects. Data are identified through forms which are conditions of knowing the data. Knowledge is essentially structured as a synthesis, since it is constituted by data and the conditions of their cognition. Pure reason, since it does not refer to data, cannot be interpreted in terms of conditions: It can be interpreted in terms of the foci of its conception or projection - and these and not categories; these apply to understanding and not to reason.

3

It seems that there is justification for looking at Husserl's system or interpretation of knowledge not in terms of conditions or presuppositions, but in terms of underlying intentionalities which are directed toward the basic data. Being basic, these data make up the foundational groundwork of what is conceived in acts of knowledge. Husserl tries to explicate the immanent essence of every psychic experience (*Erlebnis*). The discernment of that essence turns the experience into an absolute givenness (*absolute Gegebenheit*).[1] We can already say that the discernment of an essence in a given experience is an act of cognition which does not depend on conditions. There is a correlation between an act of intentionality and that which is immanent in that act. It is not by chance that Husserl uses a combination of two approaches, as it were, between seing (*schauend*) and illuminating (*aufklarend*). The combination of envisioning and explicating is also presented as a combination of determining and distinguishing. Perhaps the aspect of determination carries connotations of Kant's notion of condition. But since it is placed within the context of seeing or observing, it cannot be seen as dependent

on a framework of conditions. Husserl even goes one systematic step further when he interprets that combination as a specific philosophical method.[2]

In Husserl's employment of the terms reason (*Vernunft*) and understanding (*Verstand*), we see an employment of a Kantian distinction in a non-Kantian structure. Husserl says that the seeing cognition of knowledge is reason and adds that the task before reason is to bring understanding to reason.[3]

When we attempt to understand Husserl's "seeing of essences" as applied to data and not to Platonic intelligible objects, we find that Husserl is concerned with data in Kant's sense. Yet he applies to them Plato's method of vision. Since every intellectual experience - and every experience in general - can be made into an object of pure seeing, then in terms of that seeing the experience is an absolute givenness.[4] We do not apply the method of construction to the data, but we do apply the method of seeing or discerning. If that method turns givenness into absolute givenness, then the relation between the datum and the cognitive approach to the datum is not that between the aspect of being conditioned and the aspect of condition. It is an immediate identification of the datum by seeing. Essences are not found only on the intelligible level like mathematical objects; they can also be identified on all levels, once intentionality is taken as the starting point and as a medium of awareness and discernment. Husserl distinguishes between the science of facts that is a science of experience and ideatic ontology which is essentially a theoretical approach.[5] Ideatic ontology is the sphere in which the foundations of our empirical science are situated. Again, the focus of the system is not the distinction between the data as conditioned and the forms as conditions, but between the facts and their foundations. Parallel to this distinction is the one between experience and ideatic ontology. The essences discerned as inherent in the data are the core of Husserl's presentation of knowledge as a structure of levels and not, as in Kant's epistemology, as a structure of correlates implied in a synthesis.

4

A further step can be identified here. If the data are the intentionalities as totals and not, e.g., that which is present to us through the senses, then the intentionalities become the broad spectrum to which the phenomenological approach to essences is directed. We must look at what is inherent in intentionalities. Thus, they can be understood as implicit potentialities. The discernment of what is inherent in those potentialities is thus a discernment of that which is actual and essential, since essences can be understood in the Aristotelian sense as the actualizations of potentialities.

We have juxtaposed what we describe as the inner logic of Kant's system with the inner logic of Husserl's system. By its mode of presentation, this juxtaposition formulates a typological approach or, in other words, the juxtaposition is summed up in "ideal typology" (*Idealtypus*). This aspect will be reinforced in the subsequent comparison of the transcendental approach in both systems. Yet when we come to details we are bound to find some components which overstep the self-contained ideal types, and we must recognize the various aspects in which the two systems are closer to each other than could be assumed on the basis of the typological approach alone.

We now turn to a detailed consideration and deal with additional aspects based on a more minute analysis.

The discernment of the built-in structure of intentionality is both an act of reflection and an act of *Wesenschau*. Reflection as "super-intentionality" discerning the pole of noema to which intentionality is directed is a *Wesenschau*. On the level of intentionality, interpreted from within, there is no *Wesenschau*. There is a noema but no explicit discernment or identification of it. Only on the level of "super-intentionality" does the explicit position of essence become prominent. Hence *Wesenschau* is an explicating vision. From this angle we see the difference between Husserl's view of vision and Plato's vision of ideas. The divergence from Kant obtains in any case. The essence inherent as the noematic correlate of the noetic aspect of every act of intentionality is not an actualization of a potentiality, but rather the explication of a potentiality; this explication is an act of reflection. The vision occurs on the level of reflection, though it is not confined to the aspect of the act as intentionality. Explication applies both to the noesis and to the noema. Reflection as explication identifies the two poles and their correlation. There is a continuity between intentionality to what can be described as an intention-ality; the latter explicates that which is present implicitly in the former.[6]

5

Let us make a comment on the historical background of the notion of "transcendental." Scholastic philosophy conceived of transcendental predicates (which differ from the position of the transcendent) as referring to concepts. In terms of their universality, these concepts go beyond the categories in the Aristotelian sense, pointing to different *modi* of being. Hence, they were also called *praedicamenta*. "Transcendentalia" refer not to the *modi* of being but to the being itself and thus, in terms of content, they amount to the predicates *unum, verum, bonum*.

Kant himself summarizes the basic change he introduces though, to be sure, that summary does not contain all the nuances and ambiguities related to the concept. "I entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*."[7] The two aspects are inter-related: The belonging of the transcendental to the sphere of knowledge (not to being) and the position of the *a priori* as preceding experiential data as condition (and not going beyond them). Despite the basic distinction, there is a correlation between the transcendental and the empirical elements of knowl-edge. Because of this distinction we are concerned with the sphere of the critique of knowledge. In keeping with the distinction, it is even said that the distinction does not concern the relation of that knowledge to its objects.[8] We may wonder whether that statement exhaustively describes the position of the *a priori* elements. They are identified not for the sake of a mapping of the sphere of knowledge, but in order to identify elements of reason or understanding which apply *a priori* to data. In this sense, the significance of the transcendental is only to make empirical knowledge possible.[9] Hence, the concept of the transcendental has two aspects - one in virtue of its position and the other in virtue of its function vis-a-vis data. The two are interrelated, but they are not identical. The position is the starting point in the direction of purpose, and thus also of function in knowledge and for the sake of knowledge.

6

Several critical aspects accompany the concept of the transcendental; some of them are important precisely when we hold before us the transformation of the concept introduced by Husserl. The first aspect relates to the "I" or "Ego": "...I have no *knowledge* of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself." "The consciousness of self is thus far from being a knowledge of the self..."[10] The negative or critical meaning of that statement is that the distinction between appearance and the thing in itself applies also (or, we may say, *even*) to the self-awareness of consciousness. I appear to myself not as I am:[11] the "I" is the mere form of consciousness.[12]

The second, negative, aspect is what might be called the exclusion of morality from the scope of transcendental philosophy. The notion of transcendental cannot be employed in or regarding the sphere of morality. The transcendental is limited to the sphere of knowledge, that is, to the scope of reference of the *a priori* concepts, to the empirical data, or to references activated in the sphere of cognition. Kant, in the explication of the cognitive aspect (in the negative or critical sense of explication), restricts knowledge in the following way: The empirical data are present within the horizon of

morality as desires, urges, inclinations, search for pleasure, allurement, etc. These empirical elements are not constitutive of morality; they are components of the empirical attitude, which must be overcome within the scope of morality and because of the imperative grounded in reason as manifested in morality. In morality, reason and its *a priori* concepts do not positively refer to empirical data, but rather the *overcoming* of the empirical data is directed by reason and the imperative. Because of this position of the empirical data in the structure of morality, they are to be regarded as hindrances, not as correlative data. Hence transcendental philosophy is a philosophy of pure and merely speculative reason.[13] "Speculative" in this context must be understood not as a purely speculative employment of reason,[14] but as theoretical in the sense in which the notion of rational science as purely speculative is applied to mathematics.[15]

There is another aspect, namely the characterization of transcendental philosophy as unique in the whole field of speculative knowledge; no questions concerning objects given to pure reason can be unanswerable for this same reason.[16] The meaning of this programmatic statement is probably the following. Transcendental philosophy is delineated in scope by the notion of the *a priori*, both in terms of the position of the concepts or propositions, as well as in terms of their application to the data. Since the *a priori* is applicable to data, whatever lies within the sphere of reference of the *a priori* to data is open to knowledge. Negatively speaking, whatever lies outside the sphere of application of the *a priori* is by definition outside the sphere of possible knowledge. The limitations inherent in the application of the *a priori* indicate, by the same token, the positive direction and solution of the problem or task of knowledge; only that which lies within the scope of application of the *a priori* is open to knowledge.

Anticipating Husserl's version of the transcendental, the following can be said, indicating the basic features of Kant's version: The notion of transcendental has, for Kant, a meaning in the application to data and thus bears on his central approach to knowledge as synthesis. The *a priori* as *a priori* is independent of the data, but its validity is correlative. Once there is no correlation between the *a priori* and the data, the notion of the transcendental cannot be employed. The transcendental, having that function and position, cannot be regarded as characteristic of reason or of consciousness as such. It is a manifestation of the activities of reason and is in this sense the essence of understanding - *Verstand.*

7

Before continuing our attempt to identify the notion of transcendentality, an observation on the concept of evidence is appropriate.

Kant confines the validity of evidence to the sphere of mathematical knowledge, inasmuch as mathematical proofs must always proceed under the guidance of pure intuition (*Anschauung*) and by means of a synthesis which is always evident.[17] The demonstrated truth of mathematics is evident.[18] The reference to mathematics is essential in this context, since mathematics is a knowledge based on (or in) synthesis - not a synthesis of sensuous data and *a priori* concepts or propositions, but a synthesis of forms of sensuality with the *a priori* form of thinking. "Even from *a priori* knowledge concepts, as employed in discursive knowledge, there can never arise intuitive certainty, that is, *[demonstrative]* evidence, however apodeictically certain the judgment may otherwise be."[19]

The following might be an interpretation of Kant's position and the rendering of the locus of the evidence as conviction in terms of the certainty related to a proposition: All knowledge is grounded in a synthesis of the conceptual element and the element of data present in the consciousness through the mediation of sensuality. From a structural point of view, a synthesis is a manifestation of the correlated components of thinking and sensuality. From that viewpoint mathematics is a manifestation of the synthesis of forms of thinking with the forms of sensuality. Evidence can be attributed only to a synthesis taking place on the level of forms. Negatively speaking: there is no synthesis where only the element of the *a priori* attributed to forms of thinking is present with no corresponding element of the *a priori* related to the forms of sensuality. The sensuous sphere is present in the scattered data, not in the formal coordinates of sensuality. Hence, evidence and its position do not circumvent the essence of cognition as synthesis. It can be present only in its relation to the formal components of the synthesis and thus to the formal components of knowledge. The synthesis is an act performed by consciousness or by thinking representing the active, *qua* spontaneous, component of consciousness. The structure of correlation and synthesis is preserved even in the sphere of mathematics. Hence evidence is a certainly accompanying mathematical synthesis. In any case, transcendental ability is the referential aspect of reason as understanding. The essence of evidence and its position is dealt with presently.

8

The first structural difference between the conceptions of Husserl and Kant appears in their characterizations of consciousness and transcendentality. The basic issue for Husserl is not the synthesis between thinking and the data presented to consciousness by sensuality, but the intentionality of consciousness as such, whose characteristic feature is the interrelation of *noesis* and *noema*. The correlation between the two components is not identical with the

correlation established by a synthesis of the *a priori* and empirical elements. Intentionality in general, as experience (*Erlebnis*) of consciousness of something (*von irgend Etwas*), is the very essence of consciousness. The synthesis for Kant is an explicit and deliberate act of consciousness; an act is performed to activate consciousness, which in turn is performed to arrive at cognition. In other words: according to Kant the synthesis is to be listed with the teleology of consciousness, while for Husserl it belongs, by and through intentionality, to the very essence of consciousness. Moreover, the synthesis for Kant takes place between heterogeneous elements - thinking and sensuality - whereas for Husserl the synthesis as a correlation between *noesis* and *noema* does not describe the character of the elements involved in the spheres of understanding versus sensuality, but rather their position within the comprehensive structure of intentionality. Hence intentionality is present even when the *noema* is not sensuous but conceptual. Therefore, for Husserl, intentionality in general and evidence belong essentially to each other. Evidence is a universal mode referring to the whole "life of consciousness." Through evidence intentionality is endowed with a universal teleological structure.[20] We are to arrive at it as an achievement or as a goal; in this sense it has a teleological status. Coming back to the previous formulation, we may say that, whereas for Kant the synthesis is an achievement and thus points to the teleological structure of consciousness, for Husserl evidence is not an achievement that accompanies the synthesis. For Husserl evidence points to the teleological structure of consciousness which is a manifestation of the universal position of consciousness. Nominally, evidence is coterminous with a certainty that excludes every doubt.[21] Phenomenologically, evidence is a mental seeing of something itself.[22] As such, it is related to the striving for knowledge, the fulfillment of one's intention.[23] Hence, evidence is not related to a formal synthesis, in the mathematical sense of the term, but to transcendental subjectivity.[24] It is the expression of the living evidence or the "I am."[25]

9

Husserl formulates his relation to Kant's version of the transcendental in the following way: "Kant never permitted himself to enter the vast depths of the Cartesian fundamental investigation, and his own set of problems never caused him to seek in these depths for ultimate groundings and decisions."[26] At this point we offer an observation that may reinforce Husserl's resume, using Kant's description of his own viewpoint. Kant says in the well-known "credo": My place is the fertile bathos of experience.[27] One may juxtapose the depth of experience (whereas experience is a synthesis) in which the transcendental element is involved and the depth of the "I" in its pure and "living subjectivity"; "a transcendental philosophy is the more genuine, and better fulfills its vocation as philosophy, the more radical it is and ... comes to its actual and true beginning, only when the philosopher has penetrated to a clear understanding of himself as the subjectivity functioning as primal source..."[28] Kant's philosophy is on the *way* to this or is a step in that direction. To be sure, it is a philosophy opposed to prescientific and scientific objectivism. It goes back to the knowing subjectivity as the primal locus of formations of sense and ontic validities. Kant's philosophy is "a truly universal transcendental philosophy meant to be a *rigorous* science..."[29] We notice here that Husserl imposes, as it were, his previously formulated concept of philosophy of science, not science itself. Kant's rendering of that philosophy is in Husserl's eyes the first attempt in that direction.

Husserl tries to establish a kind of synthesis or integration of the Cartesian and Kantian directions. Hence he relates transcendentality to the knower's reflections upon himself and his knowing life. "Working itself out radically is the motif of universal philosophy grounded purely in this source and thus ultimately grounded. This source bears the title *I-myself*, with my entire actual and possible knowing life, and, ultimately, my concrete life in general."[30] The use of the notion of "life" in the context of ultimate subjectivity is not accidental. It can be explained not only by an extrapolation or sublimation of the concept of our concrete life. Since we are immersed in life and life is ultimately grounded in radical subjectivity, it follows that subjectivity is bound to be viewed as "life." The reasoning starts from the opposite angle, that is to say, reflecting phenomenologically, we find life within radical subjectivity. Life characteristic of that level cannot be eliminated on the level of our concrete existence and life.

What does "life" mean on the level of radical subjectivity? Husserl speaks about a dimension of the living spirit.[31] The discernment of that dimension is open to theoretical self-evidence.[32] It is a matter of spiritual functions which exercise their accomplishments in all experiencing and thinking. Though Husserl refers to the distinction between transcendental subjectivity and the soul,[33] it is obvious that Kant also maintains that distinction, since otherwise he could not, among other things, have presented the paralogisms of rational psychology. Kant deals with the concept of the transcendental in terms of its position within the cognitive synthesis, while Husserl attempts to characterize the transcendental in its own inner structure and stream of "life." This is not said by Husserl but is a consequence of the previous discussion.

The functional aspect in Kant leaves no room for the *Gestalt* aspect that Husserl phenomenologically presents. Husserl tries to combine the discernment of subjectivity with the realization of the demand for apodicticity of a presupposition as one of the modalities of judgment as Kant has it, but he

tries to do so in terms of the findings of self-reflection. Hence, Husserl refers to Kant's and subsequent transcendental philosophy as a philosophy "...in which the transcendental primal active ... the motive which arises out of the demand for apodicticity, is still not aroused."[34]

Still, what is the "life" attributed to subjectivity? The systematic position of the *Cartesian Meditations* is to be seen in that context. We refer to the flowing conscious life in which the identical Ego lives, to its conscious life, to its perceiving and imagining life sensuously, or to the asserting, valuing or willing life to which the Ego can at any time direct its reflections: "He can contemplate it and, in respect of its contents, explicate and describe it."[35] There seem to be two levels of "life." The first is the sum total of the intentional acts in one's character on the one hand, and the process of flow on the other. The second level is reflection, which is the upper scale of intentionality concerned with the variety of acts. The first level is the concern of descriptive psychology, while the second level is the concern of transcendental phenomenology of consciousness in the strict sense of that term.[36] Natural reflection belongs to our everyday life, while in the phenomenological reflection we are engaged in a transcendental experience in which an essentially changed subjective process takes the place of the original one.[37] "Consequently I, the transcendental phenomenologist have objects ... solely as the intentional correlates of modes of consciousness of them."[38] Consciousness is reflective or deliberate, that is, it is accompanied by consciousness as awareness. The intentionality characteristic of consciousness is explicated on the level of consciousness and discernment. Hence, we identify objects as correlates of consciousness, not as constructs of propositions through a synthesis, but as given correlates that cannot be isolated from the acts of *noesis*. Husserl moves from synthesis to correlates, from propositions to acts. In a sense, he is closer to those parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the first edition that were omitted in the second, since they are concerned more with acts and less with the logical structure of propositions. Indeed, Husserl implicitly refers to the first edition of the *Critique*. Acts are integrated in the phenomenological texture. They differ from concepts or categories which are conditions to be applied *a priori* to experience.

Intentional together-relation (*intentionelle Mitbeziehung*) is mentioned in the context of the synthesis of recognition, which applies to every external objectivity, though this synthesis exhausts the full extent of "external experience."[39] The reference is to "reproductive" consciousness, which means the consciousness directed to an object as one perceived in the past which I now consider again. The statement is meant to convey the view that there is no perception that does not entail a performance by consciousness. There is no perception unless the activity of consciousness is presupposed and made manifest in that perception. Indeed, recognition appears in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as the "Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination," preceded by the synthesis exhibited in the "Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition" and followed by the "Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept."[40] For Kant, even apprehension -the elementary mode of cognition - is grounded in a synthesis, or is a synthesis. If this is so on the elementary level, then *a fortiori* the synthesis is present on higher levels of awareness - in imagination and in concepts. Each of the levels is imbued with its own characteristic mode of synthesis: apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. Though Husserl refers in quotation marks to the "synthesis of recognition," he does not mention the other acts with which Kant deals or the levels of awareness to which Kant refers. But the affinity between the active character of consciousness, as understood by Kant and Husserl's interpretation of the activity, is a striking example of the affinity that pertains at this point between Husserl's conception and that of Kant.

To be sure, parallel to that "positive" relationship to Kant is the expression of Husserl's reservation, namely that Kant confined his philosophy of the *a priori* or primacy to the activity of consciousness in the direction of experience. Husserl considers that confinement to be a reaction to Hume or an expression of Kant's reactive dependence on Hume. Since Hume is concerned with experience, Kant, in his attempt to solve Hume's problem, remains within the boundaries or "depth" of experience without going into the position of "ideal configurations." The ideality of logical configurations is placed within the scope of consciousness or of the intentional and correlative character of consciousness with reference to that which is ideal and not empirical. Hence, Husserl argues that Kant's understanding of the *a priori* character of logic does not lead him to understand correctly the ideality of the logical forms.[41] This is a programmatic statement both in its negative reference to Kant and its positive interpretation of transcendentality: transcendentality does not only mean the *a priori* condition grounded in thinking; it also relates to the very structure of consciousness and its acts. Hence it cannot be confined to the application of forms to empirical data. Wherever there is a correlation between *cognitio* and *cogitatum* - and that correlation is not confined to the sphere of data and their presence in consciousness (for example, through the act of recognition) - there exists a transcendental structure and grounding. This pertains also to ideal or logical configurations which are *noemata* and thus must be viewed within the

scope of the intentionality of consciousness. The transcendental problem of objective logic is parallel to the transcendental problem of the science of the real (*Realwissenschaften*).[42] Hence, the transcendental inquiry amounts to the inquiry of phenomenological subjectivity in the comprehensive sense. Kant's presentation of transcendental philosophy and his neo-Kantian followers are to be registered as significant early stages (*Vorstufen*) of genuine transcendental philosophy.[43]

This statement may serve as a resume of the main difference between Husserl and Kant. The difference pertains not only to the issue of whether transcendental inquiry is limited to experience of must be enlarged to encompass the sphere of the ideal.[44] The issue is whether transcendentality is to be seen in the context of an attempt to identify the essence of subjectivity.[45] Hence transcendentality is not confined to the position of conditions. It amounts to a realm of the "life" of subjectivity.

To conclude this part of our analysis, we point to what can be viewed as a paradoxical development of Husserl's turn to self-givenness, which is characteristic of the concept of transcendentality as well as of the concept of constitution. The reference is to Heidegger's version of transcendentality which amounts, in a sense, to the reintroduction of what might be described as the vector of outgoing. Thus, in a way, it is a return to Kant's version within the context and ambience of the philosophy of existence: "Every opening of the being (*Erschliessung*) as transcendence is *transcendental* knowledge. *Phenomenological* truth (openness of being) is *veritas transcendentalis.*"[46] The outgoing character of the transcendental is a symmetric response to openness of the transcendent (*Erschliessung*). The element of the outgoing has a Kantian flavour because transcendental concepts refer to data. The element of transcendence instead of replacing the concept of transcendentality removes it from the structure of cognition as identified by Kant. Here Husserl's notion of self-givenness becomes the anchor for the position of being and its openness.[47] Again the emphasis is on the correlation within the realm of consciousness and not on the distinction between condition and that which is conditioned, and thus dependent on condition.

Subsequent analysis sheds additional light on the two-fold relation between the systems.

NOTES

1. *Die Idee der Phanomenologie*, hrsg. von Walter Biemel. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p.45.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

5. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie*, Erstes Buch, herausg. von Walter Biemel. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p. 24.

6. The chapter on Husserl in H. s book: *The Phenomenological Movement: A historical introduction*, 2nd ed., vol. 1, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1, 1965), p. 74 ff., introduces the reader into the manifold topics of the system.

7. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* B, p. 25; trans. 59.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 81; p. 56.

9. *Prolegomena*, Anhang, etc. Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. IV, p. 373 n.; trans. and introduction, Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis and New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950), appendix, p. 122n.

10. *Kr.d.r.V.* B, p. 158; p. 169.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 155; p. 167.

12. *Kr.d.r.V.* A p. 381; p. 353.

13. *Kr.d.r.V.* B, pp. 28-29; p. 61.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 669; p. 531.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 508; p. 433.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 505; p. 431.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 452; p. 396.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 469; p. 406.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 762; p. 590.

20. Edmund Husserl, *Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft* (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1929), p. 142.

21. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*. herausg. S. Strasser, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, pp. 55-56.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

26. Edmund Husserl, *Die Krise der Europaischen Wissenschaften* etc , p. 102, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 99.

27. *Prolegomena* (edition cited in note 3), p. 379 n.; transl. p. 123n.

28. Husserl, *Die Krise etc.*, p. 102; trans. p. 99.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101; trans. pp. 97-98.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 120; trans. p. 118.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 121; trans. p. 119.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 120; trans. p. 118.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 273; trans. p. 339, Cf. *Cartesianische Meditationen, p. 55 ff.*; trans. p. 14 ff.

35. *Cartesianische Meditationen*, pp. 69-70; p. 31.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71; p. 32.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74; p. 34.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 68; p. 29.

39. *Formale und transzendentale Logik*, p. 141.

40. Kant, *Kr.d.r.V.* A, p. 98 ff; p. 131 ff.

41. Husserl, *Formale und transzendentale Logik*, p. 231.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 233.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 234-235.

44. *Cartesianische Meditationen*, p. 92; p. 57.

45. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phanomenologie. Funf Vorlesungen*, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana XI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p. 52.

46. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Erste Halfte (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1929), p. 38. The English edition, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), p. 6, uses the word "disclosure" for *Erschliessung*

47. For additional reference, consult
Husserl, *"Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie"* (1924) in *Erste Philosophie* (1923-1924) *Erster Teil, Kritische Ideengeschichte*, ed. Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana VII (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1956).

See also: Roman Ingarden: "About the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism," incl. in *Phenomenology and Natural Existence, Essays in Honor of Marvin Farber*, ed. Dale Riepe, Albany, N.Y. State University of New York Press, 1973, p. 95 ff. On the two systems, consult I. Kern, *Husserl und Kant. Eine Untersuchung uber Husserls Verhaltnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

Chapter III

FROM IDEATION TO CONSTITUTION

We now go on to analyze Husserl's conception of constitution and the impact on Husserl of Kant's exposition of that conception. It is appropriate to start the discussion with some comments on the concept itself.

1

The term *konstituieren* may mean, *inter alia*, "to establish something." This in turn implies (1) to create something and to make it as such and such; (2) to acknowledge that such and such is the case. An additional sense in *konstitutieren* is: to bring about, to organize things together. It is because of this sense that we refer to constitution as an establishment of a certain - legal - order.

Since constitution connotes an establishment of things or of an order, we speak about something as being constitutive to things or for things. This sense introduces into our discourse the notion of a basis: a thing is constitutive if it serves as a basis or ground for another thing. In this sense it is the origin of things as in the case of constituting a team or a group of people. "Origin" means the principle of establishing that which emerges from the act of founding, as in the case of bringing together people by assuming an objective for their togetherness, rules of their behaviour, etc. In this sense "constituting" may mean either a basis inherent in an act that occurs in time - the constitution takes place at a certain date -or a grounding in a principle or reason as, for instance, when a group is constituted by people who adhere to certain rules or objectives. These two aspects of constitution may be combined or - at least methodically - separated.

We also speak about one's "physical constitution." In this case we refer more to one's character or nature than to the *act* that creates one's physical character. "To be constitutive" does not refer here to the grounding or founding <u>of</u> a state of affairs, but rather to that which is considered to be essential <u>in</u> the state of affairs as it is.

Among these various meanings of the term constitution there are affinities, but there are also different nuances within each group of meanings. Therefore, when a philosopher refers to a term which also has a meaning in everyday discourse, he either transfers that meaning into his system and thus uses the term vaguely, or else he establishes - or constitutes, as it were - a fundamental meaning in his system related to that in ordinary discourse, but made more precise.

2

In Husserl's thought - more exactly, in his later thought -the notion of constitution occupies a central place. Yet there is an inverse proportion between the centrality of the notion and the precision with which its meaning and function are formulated. The ambiguities which this notion has leave room for the question of whether its centrality can be taken for granted from the systematic, as distinct from the textual, point of view.

It is also plausible to assume that Husserl introduces the notion of constitution into his thinking under some influence of Kant. Yet in view of the position of this notion in Kant's system, the situation is even more perplexing.

For Kant, too, the term "constitution" is related to the various meanings extant in the current usage. Thus, for instance, Kant relates constitution to the notion of order. The order referred to is the order of nature, and as such it is related to the order in time.[1] The aspect of ground or origin emerges in Kant's system when he speaks of reason becoming the origin of the general order of nature.[2] However, in Kant's system, the term "constitutive" has a still more defined meaning and function.

A constitutive principle is a principle of the possibility of experience and of empirical knowledge of the object of senses.[3] To be constitutive requires a relation to sense-perception or to a corresponding schema of sense perception. Where the relation to sense-perception is lacking, there can only be regulative principles[4] establishing the systematic unity of knowledge;[5] that unity stands against experience proper as related to objects of sense. Where there are only concepts, their order of unification is regulative or systematic; where there are sensuous data, their unification is constitutive or cognitive, i.e., empirical. Unification is the activity of the position of conditions. Unification is an order imposed on data through forms.

The difference between mathematical and dynamic principles and categories makes this distinction even more prominent. Mathematical categories refer to objects of intuition (*Anschauung*); dynamic categories refer to the existence of these objects either in their interrelation or in relation to reason.[6] The *a priori* conditions of intuition are necessary from the point of view of possible experience, while the conditions of the existence of objects are accidental because we cannot establish *a priori* the very existence of things or objects.[7] The dependence of the principles of perception on the *a priori* structure of the forms of intuition enables us to assume their necessity. In contrast to this, the appearance of things or their existence does not depend on

the *a priori* structure of knowledge and therefore cannot be necessary; it is defined as dynamic, opposed to mathematical. Dynamic principles refer to intuition; therefore their validity is intuitive. The validity of principles which refer to things related to reason is discursive.

The relation to intuition characteristic of constitutive principles emerges in the nature of mathematical knowledge, as distinguished from philosophical knowledge. Here constitution is related to construction. To construct concepts is to exhibit the concepts in intuition *a priori*, without reference to experience as the encounter with data. We exhibit in intuition the object which corresponds to our concept.[8] Demonstration as an apodictic proof is possible only because of the element of intuition.[9] Construction leads to demonstration; both are possible in mathematics and impossible in philosophy. Philosophical definitions, in contradistinction to mathematical ones, are only expositions of given concepts, while mathematical definitions are constructions of concepts.[10] Exposition is making the meaning of a concept clear,[11] while construction is the embodiment of a concept in intuition. Hence exposition is analytic and construction synthetic.[12] Being discursive, philosophical thinking is thinking in predicates.[13] Mathematical knowledge, being constructive, is thinking in relation to intuition. Hence Kant's concept of constitution refers to the relation between thinking and data and points to the exhibition of thinking in data. It is not the notion of the creation of data or of the presentation of data as emerging from the origins of cognition. Constitution orders data, but the data are encountered, not created from the structure of knowledge.

3

The ambiguity of the notion of constitution in Husserl has been recognized by the commentators. Marvin Farber points to one meaning of constitution as referring to a whole being composed of simpler elements;[14] another meaning of constitution refers to a reduction of a sphere to an elementary stratum.[15] Eugene Fink points to several possible meanings of constitution as bringing together (*zusammenstellen*), establishing an order of things, creating and fixing of things, the ordering of our images and representations about things and the establishment of the meaning of the object. Fink points out that in Husserl these meanings blend together.[16]

A different interpretation or different direction of interpretation is presented by R. Sokolowski. According to this interpretation, constitution appears as an inquiry into the sources of primitive concepts and forms. This inquiry results in the discerning of three main spheres constituted out of the sources: (1) The logical or categorial forms that are constituted in categorial acts; (2) meanings which are constituted in intentional acts; (3) constituted

objects of reference.[17] The three spheres listed by Sokolowski can be classified as comprising meanings and objects. This description points to an act constituting the first two spheres (categorial forms and meanings) and does not mention acts in connection with the sphere of objects of reference. It seems correct to conclude that the notion of constitution is related to the sphere of acts.

One can justifiably take the theme of acts as the most fundamental aspect of Husserl's theory. Yet we cannot be oblivious to the fact that Husserl employs the term "constitution" or "to be constituted" to point to the relation existing between a thing and its nexus. Thus he says that a thing constitutes itself as unity of schemes or, more properly, as unity of the causal necessity in the context of dependencies.[18] He also seems to use the term "constitution" to mean the essence of a thing, as, for instance, when he says that the body constitutes itself originally in a twofold way: as matter in terms of extension, in colour, heat, etc. and also as feeling, such as heat on the back of the hand, and cold in the feet.[19] There is no reference here, at least no explicit reference, to a particular act constituting the construction of the body. Constitution here means the essence of the body, as this essence appears as a neutral matter on the one hand, and as related to one's own sensitivity on the other.

Having said this, and without trying to hint at a unity in the diversity of meanings of the notion of constitution where this unity is lacking, we shall concentrate on that aspect of constitution which Husserl himself characterizes as the constitution of objectivities of consciousness.[20] To speak about objectivities of consciousness presupposes the character of consciousness as becoming manifest in objectifying acts (*objektivierende Akte*).[21] Supposing that objectivity connotes that which subsists in itself, we may say that Husserl is concerned (1) with discerning the character of acts by virtue of which we may refer, mean and grasp that which subsists in itself and (2) with analyzing the question whether the relation to the act is external to that which subsists in itself or else alters the character and the meaning of that which supposedly subsists in itself.

A literary observation may be appropriate at this point. Husserl uses the term *objectivierend*, or generally: *Gegenstandlichkeiten des Bewusstseins*. We find in Goswin Uphues the term *Objektivationstheorie* that he introduces by way of opposition to the *Vertretungstheorie*, that is to say, the theory of representation. We project, he says, the ideas (*Vorstellungen*) from ourselves into the space, and we make them into objects (*Gegenstande*) or hold them as objects.[22] It is not relevant for our analysis to go into the details of Uphues' theory. What matters here is the use of the term *objektivieren* and, what is more essential, the fact that Husserl faces the question of assuming constitution

as *objektivieren* without falling into the pitfalls of projections - as the nineteenth century trends in the line of Hegel's system and its influence would suggest.

4

Representing consciousness cannot be constituting. Constitution is an activity directed at something, not just an activity of mirroring something. Consciousness engaged in constitution is bound to be intentional, since intentionality is its essential activity. Intentional acts refer positively and actively to an object. Intentionality is a contact with an object created by consciousness itself, since intentionality is ultimately that contact entertained by consciousness due to its very nature. This is implied in consciousness as objectifying. But is it constitutive? Is intentionality an activity of *reference* or an activity of *creation*? In an intentional experience there is the noetic ingredient, or moment, as Husserl has it, *qua* act; there is also the noematic moment, i.e., the meaning to which the act refers. Is the noematic moment constituted by the noetic one? Indeed, here is Husserl's fundamental dilemma. One may venture the hypothesis that he over-interpreted his own findings regarding the intentionality of consciousness by pushing intentionality forward to the point of constitution. Yet constitution considered as an extended intentionality uproots the basic notion of intentionality as a built-in correlation of *noesis* and *noema*.

If the world is a meaning of reality constituted *in infinitum*,[23] one may wonder whether Husserl's description refers to the assertion that the meaning of that which is in the world has to be entertained in acts of intentionality, or whether he holds that the sphere where this meaning is placed is constituted by intentionality. To put the question differently: Did Husserl think that, were it not for the understanding of the notion of the world, "world" would not appear within the horizon of consciousness which entertains this notion through its inherent intentionality? The first possibility points to constitution seen as awareness, the second to constitution as creation.[24] Yet if the first possibility is present, one may wonder why did Husserl use the term "constitution" at all. The interpretation of his view as pointing to the realization of a meaning by way of awareness of that meaning cannot, and does not, suggest the notion of creation of the *noema* as that which is grasped in and by awareness. Reality as entertained by consciousness is a meaning not created by consciousness but discerned by it. It is understood as a reality in contradistinction to phantoms, or numbers, or fairy tales. The meaning of reality is the locus of all that which is understood and discerned by consciousness. Consciousness understands what reality connotes, or gropes for the understanding of it. Reality appears

within the horizon of consciousness through awareness of its meaning. But the meaning of reality carries, to use Husserl's terminology, the moment that reality is not an inner aspect of consciousness though it is grasped by it. Hence one may wonder whether Husserl's enigmatic statement that a true abyss yawns between consciousness and reality[25] can be maintained. One may say just the opposite: The meaning is the bridge between consciousness and reality because consciousness grasps itself and is reflective, and also grasps that which is not itself; consciousness is also referential. In both cases it is intentional; the intentionality is its own character; it emerges out of its own spontaneity.[26] One may thus formulate the dilemma: Either intentionality is sufficient, or else not even constitution will suffice to solve the problem that intentionality failed to solve. Consciousness entertains the idea - the sense or meaning - of reality, because consciousness is aware of its antisolipsistic character. It does not create the idea of reality, but it understands it. The creation of an idea of reality would have to be justified within the orbit of the process of creation,[27] while the intentional grasp of that idea has its justification precisely in the attempt on the part of consciousness to adequately understand that which is. Transcendences are not hidden, as Husserl says;[28] they are also referred to. Hence their character as transcendences must be adequately formulated.

Intentionality is not an empty activity creating out of its own source the pole of the *noema* to which to refer. Once he has pointed out the active character (*Leistung*) of intentionality, Husserl is inclined to talk in a vein closer to Fichte than to Kant. He speaks about the activity of positing reality (*Seinssetzung*),[29] as if the Ego were Fichte's Ego. In Fichte, the Ego (*das Ich*) posits the non-Ego through the act of its own limitation. In another context Husserl says that the pure Ego, being identical with itself, can be objectively (*gegenstandlich*) posited. He seems to imply here that the Ego has the capacity of self-awareness, of becoming an object for itself. But this does not mean that it becomes an object opposed to itself, as Fichte implies. The notion of constitution lends itself to an interpretation in Fichte's terms and thus may result in a confusion of the distinction between the activity of intentionality and that of constitution. Fichte's Ego is self-contained and all-embracing in its initial position. Out of its own self-awareness, which is a perpetual act, it creates the non-Ego. Husserl's Ego is *ab initio* related in and through the active intentionality. Intentionality refers to a content or to a meaning. Consciousness, the intrinsic nature of which is intentionality, has self-awareness. It enables consciousness to distinguish between itself and reality and to grasp reality as reality and not as consciousness, without having to resort to the notion that the Ego limits itself to provide room for the "material of duties," as Fichte put it.[30] Understanding is a mode of intentionality. As such it may be directed towards the consciousness itself or to the noematic component.

5

What leads Husserl to this view which is a shift from intentionality to constitution *qua* construction? One possible explanation is that Husserl imposes on the structure of consciousness as objectifying the aspect of transcendence and immanence which is related to a somewhat different line of philosophical argumentation. Consciousness in its objectifying direction transcends its sphere of acts by the very nature of the acts; by entertaining senses and meanings it is *transiens*, to use a term which was current in philosophical writings before the introduction of the term *transcendent*. Husserl seems to deal with a sphere of transcendence, or with transcendence as a sphere where the world is constituted. He goes even further when he states that that which constitutes the world cannot be world.[31] To be sure, he points to the aspect of intersubjectivity or co-subjectivity (*Mitsubjektivitat*) that is an essential aspect of world. If he means to say that intersubjectivity is an indispensable feature of world, then he is certainly correct. We distinguish between a "private" world and *the* world. The world is not private; it is intersubjective by definition. Yet it is doubtful whether intersubjectivity, which constitutes world by being an essential feature of it, also constitutes world by being the productive factor of world, because we denote *the* world from the very beginning as intersubjective. The world comprises many subjects. World is also the *noema* of many acts of intentionality of the self-same subject and of different subjects. These subjects are of the world, and the world is the ultimate encompassing horizon of their different thematic *noemata*. But none of this warrants the statement that the factor that constitutes world cannot be of that world. The theological metaphor which creeps in here is more than misleading: The creator of the status and the activity of the world is not of the world, because the creator is the origin of the world in terms of its very existence. But the subject entertaining in its intentionality the meaning of the world is of the world and does not create the world by positing it as existing. Were it not for the fact that the subjects endowed with consciousness - the inherent nature of which is intentionality - are of the world, one would wonder whether their intentionality would entertain the meaning of "world" altogether. The subject or subjects are indeed in the world. Hence in their intentionality, or intentionalities, they are aware of it on the level of the sum-total of acts of awareness - that is to say, on the level of their respective consciousnesses. The harmony of monads to which Husserl sometimes refers, is the harmony of monads "with windows," all of them related to the ultimate horizon of things and meanings - that is to say, to the world. The characteristic feature of human consciousness is that it is the consciousness of a being belonging to the world

yet engaged in the activity of understanding, an activity *vis-a-vis* the world, not just part of an occurrence in the regular course of events of the world order. The subject is in the world but still faces it. These two aspects are grounded in the position of consciousness, and there is no justification to attribute primacy to one of them.

6

Yet this reference to the world does not, in Husserl's view, exhaust the essence of intentionality. He sees in the intentionality of consciousness not only the aspect of transcendence but also, in a symmetrical way, that of immanence, or what he calls subjectness (*Subjektsein*). While outward experience takes place we are not necessarily aware of the subjective modes of appearance of the objects. In the experience of things the subjective character is missing. Only through reflection do we direct our view from experiences of things and their related qualities to ourselves.[32] Once we direct our attention to the realm of subjectness, we see that the activity of constitution addresses itself not only to the constitution of transcendences and of ideal forms or logical shapes, but also to the constitution of the subjectivity inherent in immanent experiences. In the domain of immanent subjectness there is a stratum of *Urauffassung* which is not constituted as an *Auffassung* within the flow of temporal variations of the manifold (*Abschattungsmannigfaltigkeiten*).[33] Once we reach the ultimate stratum of subjectness, we reach the stratum of original consciousness (*Urbewusstsein*) that is supposed to be subject only - or, as Husserl says, not content or object within phenomenological time.[34]

There seem to be two reasons for this concern with the subjective activities directed towards the subjectness. One reason lies in the fact that this subjective domain is seen as a sphere; once it is so seen as such it seems to be the task of phenomenology to inquire into the dynamic rhythm of subjectivity. This leads Husserl to deal with the subject matter of subjectivity as *Egologie*.[35] We come back here to the original intentions of the system. This sphere of subjectness is described as the sphere of transcendental life. To be sure, life here does not have the naturalistic meaning rejected in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*. Subjectivity is a realm of a kind of dynamics; it should be looked at as a metaphoric expression or as simile - when we say: "life." By entering into this line of description, Husserl is led to discern an element of fulfillment in subjectivity. Once we discern the full richness of the sphere of subjectivity, we dwell on the level of the spirit. The natural child of the world is turned into the phenomenological child, the child in the kingdom of pure spirit.[36] This redemptive meaning of immanence, with all its Buddhistic associations, has nothing to do with the problem of reference to the transcendent object. The only element it shares with the theme of the transcendent object is the fact that

intentionality is not only characteristic of consciousness referring to an object, but also of consciousness referring to itself. When consciousness refers to itself, it discerns the original stratum of consciousness. Yet Husserl does not imply here that this original stratum is an Ego in Fichte's sense, which posits the non-Ego. Husserl rather tends to show that not only is intentionality characteristic of the self-referential consciousness; constitution is characteristic of it too.

The difference between the various acts of constitution is to be found in the fact that within the sphere of consciousness we discern ultimate acts of *Urbewusstsein* - that which constitutes and is not constituted. But does this distinction solve the problem of the transcending consciousness? To be sure, we learn a great deal here about consciousness; this part of Husserl's writings is probably the richest of his philosophical legacy. When we engaged in asking about consciousness transcending itself we see that consciousness is immanent to such an extent and intent that it is endowed with such a plenitude, that adherence to or immersion in it is, in a way, redeeming. Hence we have to ask how and why consciousness can and should go forth from its own sphere and become involved in reality or in the world, involvement which makes us not only children of the world but children of darkness as well.

Husserl assumes that. in addition to his concern with the sphere of immanence for the sake of immanence, he can also retreat from the world we live in to the subjective activities out of which this world emerges. How it emerges is not clear and cannot be made clear by positing and describing the sphere of subjective activities. The fact that the immanent world is also constituted as the transcendent world does not make the two worlds parallel. On the contrary, the dependence of the transcendent on the immanent emerges. All this raises the question: Why, or for what purpose, is there transcendence at all? It seems that precisely where Husserl is most illuminating in terms of his phenomenological findings he leaves us with the fundamental puzzle with regard to the functional relation of the immanent to the transcendent, or the functional transcending of the immanent, i.e., consciousness *vis-a-vis* reality or the world.

This part of Husserl's system becomes even more prominent through the imposition of the distinction between the absolute and the relative on the duality of consciousness and its intentional object. Immanent being is without doubt, in this sense, the absolute being. Experience is merely the grasping (*Erschauen*) of something which is given in perception (*Wahrnehmung*) as absolute.[37] In what sense can Husserl attribute absoluteness to consciousness? If he wants to say that consciousness creates itself and is not an effect of the processes of the world, then he is correct. Yet if he wants to establish the

position of consciousness - such that its position can be asserted without its primordial or original relation, or intentionality to the object - then he seems to be wrong. Consciousness itself establishes the contact with the object; but by the same act it separates itself from the object. The subject understands its subjectivity through its constant reference to the object. Without reference to the object we would not be aware of our own inwardness; inner time is established through the constant pointing to transcendent time or time at large. Consciousness is self-originating but not absolute. It is relative to the object - either to the transcendent object or to the object of its own reflection. Again: Husserl does not assume that consciousness is self-contained or all-embracing. Hence he cannot assume that it presents an absolute realm. Therefore we must distinguish between the self-originating character of consciousness that is related to its spontaneity and its alleged absolute position. The grafting of these two aspects or components onto consciousness weakens Husserl's point because of the meaning of the terms themselves, and because of the consideration of the functional transcending of consciousness towards objects that we have already discussed. - We come back to intentionality.

7

The emphasis put on the absolute character of consciousness and its inward activi- ties overshadows an important consideration in Husserl's theory of constitution. The consideration in question is the place occupied by experience (*Erlebnis*) or intuition (*Anschauung*) on the level of consciousness regarding contents and meanings entertained intentionally by consciousness. The theory of intentionality, as it appears *prima facie*, stresses only the active character of acts of consciousness or else, in the other direction it stresses the fullness of consciousness, since it is always consciousness of something. The theory of constitution adds another aspect: What is present on the level of consciousness is due to the acts of consciousness itself, that is to say, these acts intentionally entertain contents, whether they are related to transcendence or to the inward "life" of consciousness itself.

Husserl is concerned with the problem of how to bestow clarity and distinctness on concepts and propositions of pure logic. He took the position - this is the central aspect of his theory of constitution - that no clarity can be achieved unless we explore the acts on the part of consciousness that accompany these contents or are their subjective correlates. The theory of constitution here amounts, as Walter Biemel says, to the restitution of the acts of consciousness which provide completeness on the level of acts, and to what may be called the objective meaning of the contents. The obvious example for this direction of Husserl's theory is the theory of inner time. Husserl is concerned with what he calls the time-constituting flow of consciousness[38] that

he characterizes as absolute, in the sense previously explained as an experience of flow which, in his view, precedes the experience of objective time and can be understood as the primary experience. The reference to objective time is not a formula or a constructed method but an activity rooted in, and supported by, a real experience. This is an experience of consciousness on the level of consciousness, on the one hand, and the root-experience granting immanent essence to all subsequent experience, on the other.

The systematic argument for this view lies in Husserl's position that the given is the ultimate factor. The ultimate given is the given experienced by consciousness within its own boundaries. The given is encountered not by way of construction but through experience or even through *Wahrnehmung*. Hence Husserl speaks about the pure Ego as having the possibility of a primary *Selbsterfassung*, or *Selbstwahrnehmung*.[39] The pure Ego is not encountered through the medium of knowledge which is the organ of perceiving. The given has been shifted from the sphere of sense-perception to the sphere of that which is originally given for reflection by the Ego itself. It follows that (a) logical concepts necessarily have their origin in intuition and must emerge on the basis of certain *Erlebnisse*;[40] (b) there is an *Erleben*, i.e., a mathematical *Erleben* which is the correlate, in terms of the psychic character, to pure logic or to pure mathematics;[41] (c) the principle of all principles is the primary giving intuition (*Anschauung*) that is the origin of the legitimacy of all knowledge. It is the primary origin of that which is given, as it were, in all its bodily reality;[42] (d) what is called evidence is ultimately an experience either in the sense of *Erfahrung* or in the sense of *Erlebnis*. Hence the categories of objectivity (*Gegenstandlichkeit*) and evidence (*Evidenz*) are correlates. The experience of the evidence is the experience of the Ego possessing that which it gives to itself (*Selbstgabe*).[43]

Husserl himself oscillates between the view of consciousness as occupying an absolute position with respect to contents which are correlates of objectivities. Being a correlate is a position which defies absoluteness. If we accept Husserl's theory regarding the correlative position of consciousness, then consciousness is fundamentally dialectical. It is both self-originating and thus independent and, by the same token, correlative. In any case, the concept of the absolute position of consciousness cannot be justified in this context.

What leads Husserl to this view or to this drive to find the corresponding acts on the level of consciousness not only for individual experience - haptic perceptions, etc. - but also for pure forms of logic and mathematics? Why does he not let the form or forms be disconnected from acts? This aspect of Husserl's theory can be explained by two considerations, one of a systematic and the other of a historical character.

We read a piece of poetry. We find there symbols, descriptions of landscapes and of experience, etc. We may ask: Is this poetry genuine? Did the poet's mind entertain the described experiences? Does the symbol have a meaning within the orbit of his poetic imagination or experience, or did the poet take the symbol out of the dictionary or acquire the expression from another poet; did he, as a matter of fact, indulge in poetic phraseology and not in authentic expression? One may wonder whether such questions or reservations are always valid or, on the other hand, one may question the validity of the view that the piece of poetry is self-contained and does not call or allow for criticism or evaluation based on the restitution of the poet's experience. Husserl, within the sphere of philosophy, is concerned with the genuine character of thinking. He is opposed to the "play" of thinking for the sake of thinking, that in his view amounts to manipulations and constructions with pseudo-concepts. The genuine character of thinking is safeguarded when the construction has a correlate in an act of intuition and experience. Forms and contents without supporting acts are empty. This could be a way of summing up Husserl's view. This philosophical position as a total justification is difficult to maintain because it can lead to the questioning of, e.g., the law of contradiction, unless we find an experience which is a correlate of the law. Even if we find that experience we may still wonder whether the fullness of the content or meaning safeguards the validity of the law, or else whether validity is guaranteed by the self-givenness which supposedly ensures authenticity or is implicit criticism of the content. At any rate, Husserl's phenomenology is a criticism of philosophical constructions including *Denkformen*.

At this point we must again consider the comparison with Kant's Metaphysical Deduction, rather than his Transcendental Deduction. The starting point of Kant's doctrine is the assumption that the function of unity is primarily exhibited in judging or forming a proposition, i.e., in the logical functions present in Formal Logic.[44] The form of the proposition creates the categories that further exhibit the function of unity and that run parallel[45] to elements of passing judgment or forming propositions. The functions as exhibited in the realm of logic are pure concepts of reason, while the categories refer *a priori* to objects in intuition in general. The transition is legitimate because of the fundamental identity of the function of the forms of logic and the categories of empirical knowledge. The functions of Formal Logic constitute the basis of the categories of empirical knowledge. The position of being constituted depends on the function of unity first exhibited in the realm of formal acts of unifications. It is characteristic of Kant's view that reason can depend only on reason, i.e., that the categories of empirical knowledge as categories of reason can depend only on the forms of logic which are in turn forms of reason. Kant regards unity as unification and hence as the exhibition of the activity of reason, while intuition (*Anschauung*) and perception (*Wahrnehmung*) are related to the manifold. The manifold is by definition receptively absorbed through modes of contact with data; the data are given but are not initially unified. Kant maintains the fundamental dichotomy between being given and being actively approached. Corresponding to this is the dichotomy between intuition and the understanding or reason.

Husserl attempts to eliminate this dichotomy. He points to givenness on the level of consciousness which is self-givenness. We encounter here a mutual dependence between activity and modes of passivity. Intuition, *Anschauung*, *Wahrnehmung* or *Selbstwahrnehmung* are not doomed to passivity. According to Husserl's view, they are inherent in acts of understanding as founding transcendence. In a more mitigated view they are correlates of acts of understanding of contents. Concepts relate to acts of experience *qua Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis*; these acts are activities (*Leistungen*). Husserl bases the cognitive approach to the world on primary acts of *Anschauung* which are activities though not acts of reason in its formal and functional expressions as embodied in judgments and propositions. Intuition is active and hence it can be the starting point - replacing the role played by the formal unification that is the axis of Kant's Metaphysical Deduction.

Thus, we encounter here a fundamental difference between Kant and Husserl which cannot be eliminated despite Husserl's hesitations in his conscious attitude to Kant. Kant thinks that the transcendental ground is thinkable only by pure reason.[46] For Husserl the transcendental domain is not the domain of the thinkable in terms of reason. It is *eidetic* and opens up both for the noetic and the noematic components of the *Erlebnis* of consciousness and the correlates of consciousness.[47] With all the interesting and illuminating elaborations of the concept of the transcendental, it seems that Husserl retained this fundamental understanding of the concept throughout his development. This is clearly indicative of the difference between the two thinkers. Later, this difference is analyzed further.

8

For Kant constitution is the constitution of experience brought about by the categories or principles that apply to data; categories have constitutive validity for the data or for experience. Kant is not concerned with the acts of the Transcendental Ego beyond the fundamental act of Transcendental Apperception, Apperception being the basis of the possibility of the categories. Transcendental synthesis is *ab initio* the synthesis of the manifold of representations. The forms are of a constitutive character; Kant does not refer

to the acts of grasping meanings. Here we see the main difference between Husserl and Kant in terms of their interpretations of constitution.

In Kant's system there are two different strata - reason and data. The problem of constitution is that of the possible meeting of these two strata in spite of their difference. The meeting is accomplished by virtue of the validity of the forms of unification. In a way, we know what must be united, i.e., the manifold of data, and we know what is the unifying factor, i.e., the logical forms transformed into transcendental forms - categories and principles. How do we know the meanings which must be constituted, i.e., reinstituted immanently on the level of consciousness? The acts are themselves knowledge of the meanings when the meanings are grasped within the flow of original consciousness. There is no difference between the acts of grasping and the contents grasped, except for the Ego. The Ego can only grasp and not be a content of grasping. This is the meaning of self-givenness or self-origination. Again, how do we know the meanings which are beyond the sphere of consciousness? One way for Husserl to solve this problem is to point out the constructive or productive character of the constitutive acts. We do not know, in the first place, the meanings beyond consciousness because they are not there, except when consciousness creates them and makes them relative to its own fundamental absoluteness. Let us mention that in Plotinus, emanation provides for the manifold of the world - not the world in its purity but the world in its darkness - because of the material stratum of reality present in the world.

When Husserl takes advantage of the non-creative component of constitution, i.e., when he points to its correlative aspect in terms of the correlative and hence mutual relationship between acts and meanings, he faces the question of "the first knot"; where do we primarily, or even primordially, encounter the sphere of meanings? Here the theory of *Lebenswelt* emerges. *Lebenswelt* emerges in our predicative encounter with it. On the basis of this primordial encounter all conceptualization is established or constituted. We are immersed in the world which is from the very beginning grasped in its meaningful position and in the correlative components which constitute its meaning. Hence we may always refer to this world. Indeed we are summoned to refer to it. Space and time are not forms or pure forms of a constructed experience of science. Spatiality and temporality play a privileged role in the pre-theoretical experience of the *Lebenswelt*. They provide the correlates from the very beginning. Additional meanings are thus conceptualizations or idealizations of the fundamental meaning.[48] The question concerning the first step towards contacts and meanings does not occur, because meanings are inherent in *Lebenswelt* and thus encountered in the very presence of acts of intentionality. What intentionality provides for the characterization of the structure of consciousness, *Lebenswelt* provides for the fact that there is no

intentional component without meaning, and there is no encountering the world without encountering meanings. Kant's theory of constitution is concerned with constructing synthesis. Husserl's theory of constitution attempts to discern and to articulate the primordial synthetic character of consciousness. Hence the synthesis need not be constructed. It is given.[49]

This basic finding of Husserl's philosophy is somewhat obscured by the ambiguities of the term "constitution" and by the fact that there is a perplexity because the pre-reflective synthesis of acts and meanings based on the correlation between acts and meanings is named "constitution."[50] This term carries the association of a productive synthesis brought about for the sake of establishing a contact between factors which from their own respective position do not create this contact. The initial correlation turns construction into a method which is not needed. When correlation is there, there is no need to establish it. The hard core of the difference between the two systems in their interpretation of constitution can be summed up in the following way: Kant understands constitution as establishing of objects. They are not given but constructed; hence synthesis is the act of construction. Husserl understands constitution as coming back to the grounding acts. These are inherent in subjectness or in consciousness. For Kant constitution is related to the product, for Husserl it is the discernment of the underlying realm of cognitive and even psychic acts. The discernment of the potentialities implicit in the actualities of the consciousness is one of the expressions of Husserl's position. Intentionality, as Husserl interprets it, is a primary correlation of the *noesis* and the *noema*. It can be seen as a given synthesis which as such does not call for a construction and its related position of conditions.

NOTES

1. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B, p. 243; trans. pp. 222-225.

2. *Prolegomena*, para. 38.

3. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B, p. 537; p. 692.

4. *Ibid.*, B, p. 692; p. 546.

5. *Ibid.*, B, p. 699; p. 550.

6. *Ibid.*, B, p. 110; p. 116.

7. *Ibid.*, B, p. 199 ff; p. 195 ff.

8. *Ibid.*, B, p. 429 ff; p. 381 ff.

9. *Ibid.*, B, p. 762; p. 590.

10. *Ibid.*, B, p. 758; p. 587.

11. *Ibid.*, B, p. 38; p. 68.

12. *Ibid.*, B, p. 758; p. 587.

13. *Prolegomena*, para. 46.

14. *The Foundation of Phenomenology. Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy*, Cambridge, Mass., 1943., p. 579.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 556-557.

16. E. Fink, "*Operative Begriffe in Husserl's Phanomenologie*", *Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung XI* (1957), p. 34.

17. R. Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964, pp. 38-39.

18. *Ideen zu einer Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie*, ed. H.L. Van Breda, II: *Phanomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed. M. Biemel, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1952, p. 127.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

20. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie*, ed. H.L. Van Breda I: *Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phanomenologie*, ed. W. Biemel, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1950, Ch. II, p.

21. II, Halle a.d.S., 1913, p. 493.

22. *Erkenntnistheoretische Logik, Leitfaden fur Vorlesungen*, Max Niemeyer, Halle a.d.S., 1909, p. 45 f.

23. See the quotation in Alwin Diemer, *Edmund Husserl, Versuch einer systematischen Darstellung seiner Phanomenologie*, Meisenheim, 1956, p. 18, n. 10.

24. On this, consult E. Fink's various interpretations of Husserl.

25. *Ideen*, I, p. 117.

26. See the present author's *Spirit and Man, An Essay on Being and Value*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1963, p. 7 ff.

27. To refer to an example: The creation of the world in monotheistic religions has to be justified in terms of the creator.

28. E. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phanomenologie. Funf Vorlesungen* (Husserliana, II), ed. W. Biemel, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, p. 11.

29. *Cartesianische Meditationen*, p. 102; p. 68.

30. *Ideen*, II, p. 101.

31. Diemer, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

32. *Phanomenologische Psychologie* (Husserliana, IX), ed. W. Biemel, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962, p. 147.

33. *Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, ed. M. Heidegger (Max Niemeyer, Halle a.d.S., 1928), p. 444 (78).

34. *Ibid.*, p. 437 (101 ff.).

35. *Cartesianische Meditationen*, p. 109; p. 75.

36. *Erste Philosophie*, 1923/24 (Husserliana, VIII), ed. R. Boehm, *Zweiter Teil*: *Theorie der phanomenologischen Reduktion*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1959, p. 123.

37. *Ideen*, I 44; 49.

38. *Vorlesungen...*, pp. 373 ff (100 ff).

39. *Ideen*, I 44; 49.

40. *Logische Untersuchungen* II, p. 5.

41. Quoted in W. Biemel, "*Die entscheidenden Phasen in Husserl's Philosophie*," *Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung* XII (1959), p. 201.

42. *Ideen*, I, p. 52.

43. *Formale und transzendentale Logik*, p. 14.

44. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B, p. 159; p. 170.

45. *Prolegomena*, para. 21.

46. *Kr.d.r.V.* B, p. 124; p. 125.

47. *Ideen*, I. p. 245.

48. See A. Gurwitsch, "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* XVI (1955/56), pp. 380-399.

49. Consult J. Kern, *Husserl* und Kant. Eine Untersuchung uber Husserls Verhaltnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964.

50. Jay Lampert stresses correctly some aspect of Husserl's affinity with Kant's conception of consciousness. The affinity to Hegel seems to be more problematic. See : Jay Lampert: Husserl and Hegel on the Logic of Subjectivity. *Man and World*, October 1988, p. 363 ff. Hegel's position is one of synthesis and not one of the roots in subjectness.

Chapter IV

FUNDAMENTAL DATA AND THEIR EXPOSITION

We go on with a comparative analysis of Kant's approach to the basic data of time and space as forms of *Anschauung*, and Husserl's phenomenological look at the essence of fundamental data within the realm of consciousness. This is a *post factum* analysis, and one cannot ignore the curious fact that Kant uses the term phenomenology within the context of his theory of motion (*Bewegungslehre*). Part of the theory is concerned with motion or tranquillity only in relation to the mode of representation - *Vorstellungsart*. Hence it is a phenomenon (*Erscheinung*) of the external senses.[1] The fact that Kant uses the German term *Erscheinung* together with the Greek term *phenomenon* is based on the distinction between that which appears and the thing in itself. That which appears is not an illusion; it presupposes the subject and the organs in relation to which it appears. Hence the emphasis is laid on what Kant calls "affection." We do not look at a datum within consciousness but at a datum in relation to the encounter between perception and what is given to perception.

The difference between this description within the theory of motion and phenomenology proper should not prevent an attempt at an analysis of the two systems, with a twofold approach: taking advantage of Husserl's phenomenology in order to shed light on Kant's system and using Kant's system to elucidate some aspects in Husserl.

1

Space and time have been analyzed before in the context of the different approaches of Kant and Husserl. We shall be concerned now with additional aspects related to the two forms, but not confined to them. The particular subject matter of our investigation is what Kant calls exposition or *Erklarung* in commenting that *Erklarung* in German stands for terms like exposition, explication, declaration and definition.[2] We discuss the

metaphysical exposition that Kant applies to the concepts of space and time, in the second edition of *the Critique of Pure Reason.* The concept of metaphysical exposition applies, therefore, to the notions of space and time as notions of intuition (*Anschauung*). It applies to intuition which is not intellectual and cannot emanate from understanding (*Verstand*).

Our task is to elaborate on the notion of "metaphysical" which appears in the context of that exposition. Kant defines metaphysical exposition as follows: "I mean the clear, though not necessarily exhaustive, representation of that which belongs to a concept: The exposition is *metaphysical* when it contains that which exhibits the concept *as given a priori*."[3] The first question concerns the particular meaning of the term "metaphysics," or its adjectival form "metaphysical," in the present context. Metaphysics does not mean here the concern with the inescapable tasks of pure reason, insofar as those tasks transcend the realm of appearances, i.e., God, freedom and immortality - and this is one of Kant's most common interpretations of metaphysics. Again, metaphysics does not mean here that aspect of philosophy which is concerned with the highest principles of the employment of pure understanding. This is so since the metaphysical exposition refers here to notions of space and time, and these do not belong to pure understanding and its employment. Speaking broadly, it can be said that, insofar as metaphysics is concerned with the first grounds of our knowledge (*die ersten Grunde unserer Erkenntnis*), the analysis and exposition of space and time can be subsumed under the general heading of philosophy in that sense. Space and time could be listed within the broad scope of the first grounds of our understanding. This, too, calls for qualification, since if pure knowledge of reason as stemming from mere concepts is metaphysics, as, for instance, Kant's *"die Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaften"* has it, then the metaphysical exposition cannot belong to metaphysics in this sense, since it refers to intuitions or forms of intuition. Thus it does not have its grounding in concept only; it applies a conceptual analysis to a non-conceptual element - to intuition as *Anschauung*.

Using Kant's fragmentary observations in the *Reflexionen*, we may perhaps gain insight into the more specific connotation of the term metaphysics. Kant says that metaphysics is a philosophy of pure reason (*eine Philosophie der reinen Vernunft*).[4] He adds a rather important qualification saying that it is a philosophy of the form of the subject and not of an object. Insofar as metaphysics is philosophy about the form, it contains within itself the exploration of space and time as forms of subjects.[5]
The notion of the form in this sense is more specific than the notion of the first grounds, since it may refer specifically to different forms, including the forms of *Anschauung*. In a broader formulation Kant says that metaphysics is the science of the principles of all knowledge *a priori* and all knowledge which

ensues from these principles.[6] Again, under this heading we may include forms of intuition as necessary principles of all knowledge *a priori*, if we understand knowledge in the strict sense of the term as different from thinking. Knowledge is a synthesis of concepts and intuitions.

We come back to the previously quoted definition of metaphysical exposition, since that definition refers to a concept, not to an *Anschauung*. It seems warranted to say (a) that Kant took the term "concept" in its broad sense as a content in general or as a meaning, not in the more limited sense as a product of understanding *qua Verstand*; and (b) he implies that the exposition is formulated in concepts, though its subject matter in this case is an intuition and not a concept. Every rendering or every formulation ultimately takes a conceptual shape. This aspect provides for a kind of methodological primacy of concepts, since an exploration of intuition is also performed on the level of concepts. It is in this sense that Kant says that space is not a concept of reason, but metaphysics seeks the concept of reason referring to it. The notion "concept of reason" is perhaps too strong, since Kant is not aiming at a formulation of the nature of space, or of time, as concepts of reason. Yet he cannot escape giving a formulation through concepts and thus maintaining the relation of reason to intuition and *vice versa*.

2

We would also like to point out that in the context of the description of the metaphysical exposition the emphasis is placed on the interplay between the form of presentation in that exposition and its subject matter. The subject matter must be given *a priori*. Thus, exposition in the metaphysical sense is not an exposition of an empirical datum. That is why the metaphysical exposition applies to space and time as *a priori* data. As data they are endowed with a structure, and as *a priori* forms they apply to *a posteriori* data. The metaphysical exposition applies to forms only.

The first problem that Kant faces here is related to his interpretation of time and space as *Anschauungen*, and as *a priori Anschauungen* at that. The problem is brought to the fore by what he says in the context of the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding: "...that of all representations combination (*Verbindung*) is the only one which cannot be given through objects. Being an act of the self-activity of the subject, it cannot be executed save by the subject itself."[7] If we interpret this statement strictly, space and time could be *a priori* meanings or data only when they are modes of combinations, or else acts of the self-activity of the subject. They would belong to what Kant calls functions (*Funktionen*): "By 'function' I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation."[8]

Kant juxtaposes affections underlying intuitions and functions on which concepts rest. He is bound to qualify his statement and to assume *a priori* data which cannot be included in the sphere of combination and cannot either be executed by the subject itself or rest on functions. He is bound to assume, therefore, that the manifold combined by concepts has a primary structure due to space and time. That manifold contains a primary diversity of space and time, and because of that primacy, space and time belong to *Anschauungen* and not to concepts. In order to include space and time in the sphere of *Anschauungen*, Kant had to perform a metaphysical exposition to show that the structure of *Anschauungen* can be maintained even when the *Anschauungen* at stake are *a priori* data and are thus not due to affections. *Anschauungen* or intuitions in the traditional sense - this was the case for Leibniz - presuppose the presence of the intuited object (*angeschaut*). It has been characterized by Kant as "the representation (*die Vorstellung*) which can be given only through a single object..."[9]

If time and space are *a priori* data, they cannot be given through a single object. They are bound to be data of a different character, data on a level of their own; they can refer to objects, but they cannot be given by them. It is one of the tasks of the metaphysical exposition of time and space, keeping in mind the particular structure of *Anschauung*, to find an *a priori* equivalent for the lack of the presence of the object. Indeed, this is one of the major tasks that Kant undertakes. In other words, Kant sets out to present the *a priori* structure of the manifold or the manifold in its totality. Inasmuch as he sets out to explore that structure, he cannot, for obvious reasons, be guided by single objects. On the contrary, it is a task of the metaphysical exposition to show that single objects are located within the structured manifold, i.e., space and time.

One of the perplexities related to this delineation of the scope of the metaphysical exposition is the allegedly innate character of time and space. In this sense time and space as *a priori* data could be conceived as *a priori* only to the extent that they are innate in sensuality or *Anschauung*. Kant is of two minds regarding the innate character of time and space and even of the categories. He suggests the distinction between first seeds and dispositions of pure concepts in the human understanding. The occasion of experience which, as *causa occasionalis*, at least gives the occasion for the exhibition of the forms in their purity - the latter being freed from the empirical conditions attached to them - and the empirical conditions would also contain the empirical conditions of their exhibition. Kant uses the term "occasional causes" - *Gelegenheitsursachen*, or "first stimulus" - *Anlass* of the production both of forms of intuition and concepts.[10] He does not make it clear how this convergence between the seeds and the *a priori* on the one hand, and the occasion provided by experience on the other, comes about.[11]

3

Let us return to the metaphysical exposition of space and time. We recognize two interrelated objectives: (a) It is meant to show that space and time are not empirical concepts derived from external experience. This statement, put positively, says that space and time are *a priori* representations and as such underlie all other representations or appearances. (b) The second objective of the metaphysical exposition is to show that space and time are not of a discursive character; nor are they general concepts. They belong to the sphere of intuition. As *a priori* they can only belong to the sphere of intuition by being pure intuitions or the forms of pure intuitions.

As for the first objective of the metaphysical exposition, whereby space and time are "original representations," Kant's exposition sounds like the counterpart of Hume's treatment of space and time in the first part of *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Hume says for instance: "The table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of extension." Or, "... the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these coloured points, and of the manner of their appearance"; "from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time... is always discovered by some *perceivable* succession of changeable objects."[12] In contrast to Hume, Kant argues that in order that sensations be referred to something outside me, the representation of space must be presupposed.[13] In a parallel way he says, in terms of time, that neither coexistence nor succession would ever enter our perception were we not to presuppose the representation of time as underlying them *a priori*.[14] To be precise, it must be observed that Kant is not concerned with the exhibition of what a given *a priori* concept contains; he is concerned with establishing space and time on the level of the *a priori*. He uses the procedure of explicating the presuppositions of representations and perceptions, not of exposition, as the method of articulating the content or structure of a given concept - in our case, of the notions of time and space. There is a methodical difference between asserting the *originaria*,[15] and the *a priori* character of both as presuppositions. The notion of presuppositions carries within itself the meaning of validity for other data or appearances, e.g., for perceptions; the notion of the metaphysical exposition refers to that which is implicitly contained in a concept irrespective of its operational validity.

An additional aspect of Kant's analysis of space and time as *a priori* representations lies somewhere on the borderline between the expository perspective and the operational one. We refer to the *Gedankenexperiment* that Kant performs for both space and time: "We can never represent to ourselves

the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects."[16] "We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove time itself, though we can quite well think time as void of appearances... Appearances may, one and all, vanish; but time... cannot itself be removed."[17] Kant attempts to attain two goals simultaneously: First he wants to safeguard the presentness of space and time, the latter being asserted through the "experiment" of removing objects from space and time, while maintaining the presentness of space and time even as void of objects and appearances. Space and time are the last refuges of the method of elimination: Appearances can be eliminated - space and time cannot. Kant's second goal is to turn the indelible frameworks of space and time into conditions of the possibility of appearances as universal conditions. It goes without saying that the very notion of conditions carries with itself an operational or functional meaning, since from the point of view of condition, space and time are not self-enclosed data, necessary in the sense of being irremovable. They are necessary in the sense of being presuppositions for other, viz. removable, data. The statement that time and space are 'the necessary' features in the intuition (*das Notwendige in der Anschauung*)[18] points to the two meanings of necessity.

Be that as it may, the first aspect of the metaphysical exposition is concerned with the establishment of the status of space and time as *a priori* data without determining, as yet, whether they are intuitions or concepts. Hence the heart of the metaphysical exposition is the part that sets out to show that time and space are intuitions, not concepts. Indeed, this is the central point, if we follow Kant's argument that intuitions relate to affections, whereas concepts relate to functions. Functions are understood in this context to be deliberate acts or performances. The direction of the performance is bringing together elements or establishing relations between them. Kant cannot argue that space and time are functions, since he does not argue that space and time are sustained procedures or methods ordering data in sets of relations. He argues that appearances are in the first place in space and time. Space and time are not used to organize or systematize data and appearances. Just the same, Kant cannot assume that space and time as *intuitions* rest on affections, even though according to his own statement *all* sensuous intuitions rest on affections.[19] One objective of the metaphysical exposition is to show that space and time are intuitions, but not sensuous ones, i.e., they are forms of pure intuition.

This statement must be qualified because of what Kant says elsewhere about the form of this intuition that can lie *a priori* in our faculty of representation "without being anything more than the mode in which the subject is affected."[20] Indeed, in this context Kant comes back to the distinction between being affected and being an act of spontaneity. This

distinction leads to a conclusion - not elaborated by Kant himself - regarding the nature of affection, which comes to the fore as far as pure intuitions go. Kant probably wants to emphasize that space and time as pure intuitions relate to the subject as such or, phrased negatively, do not derive from outer data. If this is so, then we find that Kant is driven to an anthropological presentation of space and time: Being affected here is being innate, since we refer to a situation within the scope of the concrete human subject.

4

One of the features of intuitions, as Kant sees them, is their immediate character in the sense that in or through intuitions we grasp at once the object before us. Intuitions are opposed to concepts, whose main property is discursiveness.[21] The discursive character of concepts must be understood in the strict, literal sense of the term as the method of going around: This method differs from immediate = direct grasp. Discursive knowledge does not give birth to intuitive certainty which is demonstratively evident.[22] There is no demonstrative proof of the direct and immediate relationship between space and time and the appearances that can - hypothetically - be removed from them. We show ourselves this primacy of space and time and reach an intuitive certainty, but we have no demonstration of it in the conceptual or discursive sense of the term. It is for this reason that Kant says in *Prolegomena*, para. 46, that discursive thinking is thinking which takes place through mere predicates. Hence, one outcome of the metaphysical exposition of space and time is that both space and time are presented to our reflection immediately; their position is ascertained with intuitive certainty, not through a series of predicates. Not only is their position intuitively ascertained, but also their validity as comprehensive frameworks of forms is seen by us directly, i.e., intuitively. We may justly conclude that not only is it that the position is one of intuitions, or that the data are intuitions, but also their applicability is intuitively present to us.

Kant does not elaborate this distinction between the character of the datum of the form and the character of the awareness of the validity of the datum for appearances, but the conclusion seems to follow from his own reasoning. Indeed, we must raise the question regarding the subject to whom these data appear and for whom these data are intuitively ascertained. Kant, unlike Husserl, does not raise this question because the reflecting subject, while obviously in the background of this analysis, is still not in the forefront of this analysis. In summing up we may say that space and time are present, though their presence is made apparent to us through a sort of process of elimination. Though we conclude that they are present in a roundabout way, the conclusion reached is intuitive, not discursive, in character. Indeed, one may wonder what

is the real argument for the intuitive character of space and time: Is it their presence or is it the awareness of their presence? It is obvious that we are here applying Husserl's phenomenological distinction between the intentionality and the theme.

Related to this aspect of the metaphysical exposition, though again not entirely explicit in Kant, is what might be called the view regarding the minimal assertions implied by space and time. These minimal assertions refer to assertions about data and appearances. Time and space do not combine data; syntheses are accomplished in them but not through them. Time and space provide information about the positions of the data, but not about their inter-relations. On this issue there are important, though scattered, remarks in the *Reflexionen*. Space, says Kant, contains the form of all coordination in intuition, time contains the form of subordination.[23] The term "subordination" here most probably means what Kant himself calls "succession."[24] Subordination implies first a ladder-like structure of one thing being subsumed under another thing. Kant could not have had this in mind, because time does not have a vertical structure and thus could not be coterminous with subordination. Here we must understand subordination as in some way horizontal, where one thing succeeds another, or where changes are successive determinations taking place within time. Kant is probably referring to this when he says that time is the condition of the infinite aggregation.[25] Apposition, which originally has a grammatical meaning as *ad positio* (*Beisetzung* in German), is again understood here in a dynamic sense in which B is ad-posited to A, C to B, and D to C, etc. Again, apposition here implies succession, while aggregation implies coexistence.

In a different sense, both space and time refer to the very presence of things. The distinction between the direction of the presence in terms of space and that in terms of time - rendered by Kant as *omnipresentia* - is related to space, while maintenance refers to time. We can see this distinction as pointing to the primary datum that things in space are simply present in it, as being there, while things in time are maintained in the succession. But *omnipresentia* and maintenance (*Erhaltung*) are two modi of the same basic datum that Kant calls *die Beharrung*, perpetual existence.[26] Since both in time and in space we refer to modes of presence of things, one *vis-a-vis* the other, we refer in time to the mode of succession or simultaneity and in space to the mode of coexistence. For Kant, both are *composita idealia*. They refer neither to substances nor to accidents, but only to relations; these in turn are conceptually prior to the things or the *relata*.[27] We may add at this point that the relations implied are relations of position, within the framework of time as well as in that of space. Things are in time and in space; their presentness amounts there to their position.

5

We remarked earlier that the central point in Kant's exposition of the character of *Anschauung* is its directness.[28] The directness connotes the straightforward - immediate - reference to the object perceived by *Anschauung*. Along with that exposition Kant frequently reverts to a description of *Anschauung* as what he sometimes calls a singular representation - a point made central in a recent analysis by Professor Hintikka.[29] While directness implies the mode of reference and applicability to the object, singularity implies intuition that ingredient in *Anschauung*. It points to the fact that *Anschauung* perceives the object as a whole or else, perceives it as unique, since it is a whole within its own limits.

How can space and time as pure intuitions, or forms of intuition, refer directly to objects, and how can they be singular representations? In the foregoing analysis we saw that the relation of space and time to the objects is dissolvable, since space and time can be conceived as devoid of objects. Therefore, this relation cannot be direct or immediate. Moreover, space and time are broad or all-embracing. Therefore, the question arises concerning their singular character, conceived as characteristic of intuition.

It seems warranted to suggest that in his metaphysical exposition, Kant is attempting to find an equivalent for the singular character of space and time as intuitions, once it is clear that that character cannot be maintained in its primary meaning, in view of the absence of a one-to-one relationship between space and time and the objects. Kant suggests what can be described as a kind of structural equivalent of singularity. That equivalent status and content relates to his description of space and time as all-embracing.

The singularity of space and time interpreted as all-embracing frameworks emerges first in the fact that parts of space and time cannot precede all-embracing space or all-embracing time. Kant makes the point even more explicitly about time than about space: "Different times are but parts of one and the same time; and the representation which can be given only through a single object is intuition."[30] The fact that fragments of time are parts of the all-embracing time amounts here to the singularity of time or its essence as a single, whole content. What is by implication characteristic of the single object is not that it lacks parts or fragments, but that these parts do not form a hierarchical structure in the sense that the general or the universal content - concept - appears at the head of the particulars from which it is abstracted. The comprehensiveness of space and time - and to be comprehensive also implies that which is comprehended - appears here as an equivalent to the singularity

perceived by intuition. While in the structure of concepts particular concepts are specimens to be abstracted in order to reach the general concept, the parts of space and time are limitations of all-embracing space and time. They are not particular illustrations nor points of departure for the formulation of the abstract *qua* general. Probably Kant had before him here the traditional analyses of generality and abstractness according to which abstractness is formulated by conceiving the similarity (*similitudo*) between the parts or singular instances. In contrast to the notion of similarity grasped discursively through a look at the parts, space and time are presented as at once all-embracing or, as Kant has it, as an infinite *given* magnitude.[31] Also, all-embracing space and time are infinite, or unlimited. This position or character is but another aspect of their non-abstract nature. An abstract concept cannot be assumed to be infinite, since it does not contain within itself an infinite number of representations.[32] This is so since through abstraction we can arrive at a relatively or comparatively general common ground, but by definition, we cannot arrive there through an all-embracing universal notion. Applying the terminology used by Kant in the context of his transcendental ideas, we may say that space and time are all-embracing or universal. Kant calls complete quantity of the extension universality (*universalitas*); indeed, space and time represent the complete quantity of extension. Only the original representation can be complete in extension;[33] complete and infinite seem to be synonymous.

Reflexionen throws additional light on what Kant meant by the intuitive character of space and time. He suggests a distinction between the *quantum* and the quantity. The quantum only, in which all quantity can be determined, is undetermined with regard to the mass of parts and is a continuum, i.e. space and time.[34] We must emphasize not only the terms quantum and quantity, but also the distinction between being determined and being undetermined: Determination pertains to particular quantities, while lack of determination pertains to all-embracing space and time. All-embracing space and time lack determination. Therefore, as pure intuitions or forms they are a continuum. It is in this sense that the universality precedes the mass of the homogeneous parts, and only through the quantum continuum is the mass of the homogeneous parts posited (*gesetzt*).[35]

In this context it is appropriate to mention another distinction made by Kant: that between *totum syntheticum* and *totum analyticum*. A *totum syntheticum* is a whole whose composition is based, insofar as its possibility goes, on the parts, and these in turn can be thought without any composition. Whereas a *totum analyticum* is a whole of parts, insofar as their possibility goes they presuppose the composition in the whole (*die Zusammensetzung im Ganzen*). And indeed, space and time are *tota analytica*, while bodies are *synthetica*.[36] The comprehensive character of space and time is manifest in

the fact, as Kant observes, that all parts of space and time are themselves spaces and times. We may distinguish between being a quantum and being a compositum. Space does not emerge through the position of the parts; rather, the parts are possible only through space. The same applies to time.[37] We may therefore sum up by saying that space and time are singular, since they are all-embracing. This is a presupposition for all that follows as far as spacio-temporal reality is concerned.

At this point Kant somewhat overburdens his metaphysical exposition by moving from the intuition of space to geometrical propositions such as, for instance, that in a triangle two sides together are longer than the third. This proposition can never be derived from the general concept of line and triangle, but only from intuition.[38] It is not clear whether Kant refers to what is present in space, in which all the parts coexist *ad infinitum*, or to what is perceived or intuited, i.e., grasped with reference to, or against the background of, all-embracing space. We can assume that space is an *Anschauung* in the sense discussed here without assuming that propositions of geometry are intuitively grasped, that is to say, are endowed with what Kant calls apodeitic certainty. This comment has a parallel in the context of time; it emerges there even more sharply. Kant says that the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous is not to be derived from a general concept. If time is related to succession, and neither coexistence nor succession could come within our perception if the representation of time were not presupposed to be underlying them *a priori*, then the fact that different times cannot be simultaneous seems to be implied in time as the form of succession. Only things existing in time can exist simultaneously.[39] But what applies to things in time does not apply to time as such. Here, too, Kant superimposes on the character of time that which is immediately contained in the intuition and representation of time,[40] but he does this with more legitimacy in the context of time than in the context of space. In the latter context he refers to a particular geometrical proposition about a particular configuration in space, while in the context of time he refers to the meaning of time in its comprehensive character. This particular point, which can be described as the phenomenological essence of time, can be reinforced by what Kant says elsewhere, in an earlier period of his philosophical development: The parts of time do not determine each other mutually - only the preceding determines the succeeding. Time, therefore, has only one dimension.[41] This proposition is meant to convey the notion that the structure of time allows for an expository analysis. There is a built-in relationship between the parts of time and its one-dimensional character. In other words, there is a clear relation between the determinations of time, i.e., its parts, and their emergence or appearance in succession.

In summing up this part of our analysis we may reiterate the previous statement about the all-embracing character of space and time and the particular structure of the two totalities versus the parts as limitations of totality. This is Kant's attempt to find at the level of the *a priori* or at the level of purity an equivalent to his own characterization of *Anschauung* as a single representation. In a way it can be said that the total is a single *par excellence*. By shifting from the singular referent to the all-embracing framework, Kant attempts to resolve one of his dilemmas: How can intuitions, which by definition belong to the sphere of affections, be pure and *a priori*? The resolution of this dilemma points to the fact that, in spite of the non-empirical origin of space and time, or in spite of the fact that they are not grounded in affections, they still embody the structure of singularity. Nevertheless, Kant preserves at least traces of another interpretation of intuitions as containing the immediacy of awareness and the certainty of the grasp or conclusion grounded in that immediacy. The first part, that of the structural equivalent of singularity, is perhaps the predominant one in Kant's analysis and thus forms the core of his metaphysical exposition. Indeed, that exposition is applied here *in concreto*, since it explores that which is contained in a concept as given *a priori*. The structures of space and time are presented as contained in the concepts as given *a priori*.

The second ingredient of Kant's presentation, that appears in the context of the metaphysical exposition, raises some doubts as to whether it legitimately belongs to that context. The aspect of certainty cannot be listed among the ingredients of a concept, since that aspect implies being aware of the ingredients or of the validity of the statements referring to the ingredients. We may say further that, as far as the awareness of certitude goes, awareness can be grasped, entertained and assessed only by a reflective consciousness which looks both at the realm of intuitions and at the realm of concepts, compares these realms and assesses their respective validity. Metaphysical exposition proper is concerned with exploration, while the statement about the certitude of intuitions is concerned with validation. There is a difference between the two attitudes and their concomitant methods.[42] We must distinguish between that which is present in the *Anschauung* as such and that which can be applied to the data. This is already an allusion in the direction of a phenomenological exposition *a la* Husserl.

6

There is an additional aspect to the structure of space and time which can be analyzed under the heading of the metaphysical exposition, though Kant himself, both in the first edition of the *Critique* and in the second, does not present that aspect under that heading. We refer here to what in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is called the synthesis of the manifold that sensuality presents in its original receptivity.[43] It appears that on the level of receptivity there is already a synthesis of the manifold or that receptivity does not present a chaotic manifold to be conceived ultimately through a synthesis brought about by the conceptual apparatus alone. The footnote in its cryptic formulation may throw some more light on the issue before us: "Space, represented as *object*... contains more than mere form of intuition; it also contains *combination* of the manifold, given according to the form of sensibility, in an *intuitive* representation, so that the *form of intuition* gives only a manifold, the *formal intuition* gives unity of representation... space and time are first *given* as intuitions, the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding..."[44] The following is a possible interpretation of the passage quoted: Space and time, as forms of intuition, give a manifold, since they are magnitudes composed of parts which they embrace. Thus, the aspect of the manifold is inherent in the very structure of space and time. For this reason, Kant underlines in the exposition of space the aspect of the *given* magnitude,[45] and in the exposition of time the aspect of given as unlimited.[46] From the perspective of form of intuition, he underlines the *givenness* as intuitions. Together with that aspect of givenness, which is the aspect of the manifold, Kant emphasizes the original synthesis inherent in space and time. That synthesis, which now goes by the name of formal intuition, brings unity to the multitude. That unity is inherent in space and time and does not stand in need of the concepts of the understanding whose original function is to render unities. Thus, on the level of space and time we encounter manifoldness and unity - the two are merely two different aspects of the same structure. Space and time are in this sense a sort of primary synthesis. There is the aspect of matter on the level of space and time, and there is also the aspect of form on that level.

The two terms "matter" and "form" call for a qualification: When Kant refers to sensations (*Empfindungen*) as the material for sensuous knowledge, the material aspect of space and time cannot be listed under the heading of sensations or sensuous knowledge, since the material is the other side of manifoldness. Matter must be understood here as inner determinations (*Bestimmungen*) which are nothing but relations;[47] these are the relations of coexistence, simultaneity and succession. Again the very structure of space and time points to their characteristic composition which is that of totalities of positions - one relative to the other - or of relations *qua* positions. On the basis of the primary structure of relations there can be levels of matter or material elements. But these can never be given empirically. In this sense matter is the physical element - that element signifying something which is encountered in space and time and therefore contains an element of existence (*Dasein*) which

corresponds to sensation.[48] Matter on the level of the physical elements presupposes matter as the aspect of the manifold embraced in space and time as structures. Whereas the first relates to sensation, the second relates only to the form. Thus, we can sum up by saying that space and time are explicated as characterized by a kind of self-containment: They are both matters and forms, manifold and unity, dispersion and synthesis. Space and time being forms of intuition or sensuality mediating between concepts and data, occupy a position in the synthesis of knowledge. But in their own orbit they are structures which can be regarded both from the material and from the formal angle. Here again we can look at this additional presentation of space and time as an elaboration upon their nature as embracing structures.

7

There is a *torso* in Kant concerning time as an intuition which relates to contradictions and the principle of contradiction. Kant asks the question: What makes something possible which, according to the mere concept of a thing, makes it impossible. The answer is: time. The reasoning behind this statement seems to be the following: Opposite determinations (*determinationes oppositae*) can only succeed each other. In this sense time does not belong to the concept of the things but only to the mode in which we intuit the things (*wie wir sie anschauen*).[49] Using the principle of contradiction specifically, Kant says that it is not self-contradictory to attribute opposite predicates (*praedicata opposita*) to phenomena, provided that they are not attributed to them simultaneously but only as stages in the phenomenon (*als Folgen in der Erscheinung*). When the opposite predicates are attributed sequentially in time to phenomena, they do not pertain to things in themselves. We note the relationship between predicating opposites and the aspect of change; the aspect of change goes beyond the limited sphere of possibility or of the logical status of the subject. Change refers to existence in time and is actually the existence of opposites in time (*die existentia der oppositorum in der Zeit*).

The description or definition of change, though referred to in the *Reflexionen*[50] as the problem between concepts and intuitions, is retained in the *Critique*: "For alteration is combination of contradictorily opposed determinations in the existence of one and the same thing. Now how it is possible that from a given state of a thing an opposite should follow not only cannot be conceived by reason without an example, but is actually incomprehensible to reason without intuition. The intuition required is the intuition of the movement of a point in space.[51] The *Critique of Pure Reason* preserves the view that the very concept of change or alteration requires the presupposition of intuitions, since these provide the background against which contradictory predicates can be attributed to one and the same thing. But

unlike these fragmentary reflections, Kant makes a distinction between the principle of contradiction as such and contradictory predicates of things in space and time: "The principle of contradiction... as a merely logical principle, must not in any way limit its assertion to time-relations. If I say that a man who is learned is not learned, the condition, *at one and the same time* must be added; for he who is at one time unlearned can very well at another be learned. But if I say, no unlearned man is learned, the proposition is analytic, since the property, unlearnedness, now goes to make up the concept of the subject, and the truth of the negative judgment then becomes evident as an immediate consequence of the principle of contradiction, without requiring the supplementary condition, *at one and the same time*.[52] The difference between the two views relates to the position of space and time or, more specifically, to the position of time. The first view does not maintain the distinction between changes occurring in time and predications of opposites. For both views the background, or let us say substrate, of time is necessary. The second view maintains the distinction between predication and changes and attempts to formulate the structure of predication without referring to time. Hence, according to the second view, the statement of an analytic character, based on the principle of contradiction, does not call for time as an ingredient. The first view assumes that both the notion of changes and the function of predication presuppose the ingredient of time. Moreover, since predication is conceptual in character, and opposite predicates are attributed to the self-same subject, we are bound to presuppose time as a non-conceptual background in order to provide "room" for the predication of opposites.

Kant's own quandary may reasonably be seen as related to the well-known descriptions in Aristotle: "If, then, it is impossible to affirm and deny truly at the same time, it is also impossible that contraries should belong to a subject at the same time, unless both belong to it in particular relations, or one in a particular relation and one without qualification."[53] "It is that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect."[54]

Thus, we may put Kant's position as follows: Opposite predicates cannot be attributed to a subject at the same time. Hence the time component must be presupposed for our different statements. Time is thus incorporated in propositional structure itself, not only in propositions about changes and alterations. The view presented in the *Critique*, by making the distinction between the realm of experience and changes and the realm of propositions and analyticity, removes the aspect of time from the level of propositions; it is thus more radical than Aristotle's view. The first view "enlarges" the Aristotelian presentation; the second view eliminates the component pointed out by Aristotle.

This does not imply that the notion of time has transcendental validity for this fragment of Kant's logical considerations, if we understand the concept of transcendentality in its strict sense as pointing to a principle which makes synthetic knowledge possible. It has been the purpose of this exposition to emphasize the point that the component of time as *Anschauung* appears at a certain stage of the formulation of Kant's system to be pertinent also for the sphere of logic.

8

Intuition as *Anschauung* is related to sensuality. The links between the two are of different though interrelated natures: In the first place, intuition and sensuality are, according to Kant, modes of receptivity, that is to say, things are given to us by means of our senses alone.[55] If we take this statement literally, there is still a difference between them, in spite of the affinity due to the receptive character of sensuality and intuition: Sensuality is the medium, while intuitions are the product. However, the statement must be qualified because there are pure intuitions, i.e. *a priori* intuitions, or forms of intuition, which are not products of sensuality. Despite this difference, Kant says explicitly that "sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of that which is immediately represented, through sensation, as actual in space and time."[56] Pure intuition is thus one of the subheadings of sensuous intuition, since that intuition as empirical is actual in space and time. Nevertheless, space and time are listed under the heading of sensuous intuition, since that intuition as empirical is actual in space and time. Nevertheless, space and time are listed under the heading of sensuous intuitions. In contrast to this, Kant entertains a concept of a non-sensuous intuition; there are objects of non-sensuous intuition. These objects are not extended in space, do not endure in time, and do not undergo changes which are successions of determinations in time. The relevant feature of non-sensuous intuitions is the immediacy characteristic of any mode of intuition, be it sensuous or non-sensuous.[57]

To use a traditional philosophical expression, we may say that Kant attempts to "save the phenomenon" of sensuality. Indeed, for his analysis of sensuality, included in *Anthropologie*, he uses the title "Apology for Sensuality" (*Apologie fur die Sinnlichkeit*). Kant attempts to provide that apology by undercutting the traditional understanding of sensuality, the understanding he attributes to Leibnitz or to the Leibniz-Wolff school. Of course, it can also be attributed to the Platonic tradition. In the Platonic tradition, sensuality is an obstacle to thinking and, therefore, an obstacle to knowledge. The Leibnizian version of that tradition, according to Kant, emphasizes mainly the fact that sensuality lacks clarity.[58] Kant sets out to defend sensuality against this major indictment. His main point of defence seems to be that there is an *a priori* structure to sensuality. Because of that structure sensuality cannot be a chaotic sum-total of impressions; it carries a structure in itself from the very beginning and is even, as we have seen, a primary synthesis between the material and the formal elements. This structure as present in sensuality has two manifestations which must be emphasized, even though Kant has not formulated them clearly:

(a) Acts of sensuous perception occur both in space and time together or separately in either of them. In other words, the isolated acts of sensuous perception occur within the framework of space and time, whereas space and time have a definite structure - that of coexistence and succession.

(b) Acts of sensuous perception as isolated acts already have a spatial or temporal character. Put negatively, they do not merely take place in a broad framework of space and time; the particular acts as such are imbued with a spatio-temporal character. The first aspect points to space and time as conditions of sensuous perceptions, while the second aspect points to the spatio-temporal character of the acts as such. The second aspect refers, therefore, to the character of sensuality, while the first aspect refers to the dependence of sensuality on space and time, jointly or separately.

The following conclusion emerges: The structures of space and time are immediately realized in sensuality. They are not only, or perhaps not primarily, structures of the manifold of the data. They are conditions of sensuality on the one hand, and ingredients of sensuous acts on the other. Theoretically, one could suggest a distinction between the structure of the data and the medium of their perception. Yet, as a matter of fact, Kant combines these two considerations and makes space and time related to sensuality; he superimposes on them the anthropological position.

One further comment is apposite here with reference to the notion of metaphysical exposition, as distinct from the notion of metaphysical deduction. Such an exposition is the representation of that which belongs to a concept. Deduction, metaphysical deduction in particular, is an exploration of the *a priori* origin of the categories.[59] The metaphysical exposition is concerned with *a priori* concepts, not with the origin of those concepts. It takes the concepts as given *a priori* but does not go into their *a priori* origin. In this sense, the metaphysical exposition takes *a priori* concepts as ultimate data and is engaged in the explication of that which is implicitly contained in them. The major case in point is the intuitional character of those *a priori* concepts to which the metaphysical exposition is applied. Where the metaphysical deduction becomes central, the concepts are not given *a priori*; they must be

deduced, or else their origin must be discerned and traced. Because of this difference there is no metaphysical exposition of categories. The metaphysical exposition is confined to intuitions because their structure is an ultimate datum; they are involved in sensuality as an ultimate fact. We cannot explain the fact that the manifold of the data is embraced in space and time, that parts of space and time are themselves space and time, or, from a different angle, that there is a merger or coincidence between the sensuous apparatus and the *a priori* conditions of space and time. In contrast to this, there is a need for, and possibility of, showing the basis of the categorial apparatus from the unity of apperception or from the very nature of thinking as unification. Hence, for concepts and categories the metaphysical deduction is not presented, while the metaphysical exposition is presented for given structures inherent in space and time.

We come back to the difference between affections and functions. In affections things are brought within the horizon of our awareness; through functions data are combined, joined, and synthesized. Functions as activities call for an exploration of the transition from one level of activity to another, i.e., from the transcendental unity of apperception to unifying forms or patterns, or from formal - logical patterns to categorial ones. Even when we assume that there is an ultimate datum, that of the transcendental Ego, or transcendental apperception, or the "I think,", we point to a functional datum whose dynamic character is expressed in that it produces subsequent dynamic or functional cogitations. This is not the case with intuitions, since they are not of a functional character. Therefore, their ultimate structure has to be encountered and recognized, and not deductively traced. At this point Husserl's perspective - significant in itself - is also illuminating the trend of Kant's system.

NOTES

1. *Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaften, Akademie Ausgabe*, Bd. IV, p. 554 ff.

2. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B. p. 758; transl., p. 587.

3. *Ibid.*, B. p. 38; p. 68.

4. *Reflexionen Kant's zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Aus Kant's handschriftlichen Aufzeichnungen*, herausgegeben von Benno Erdmann (Leipzig, Fues Verlag (R. Reisland) 1884), p. 35, Ref. 109. Albert Johannes Dietrich's book *Kant's Begriff des Ganzen in seiner Raum-Zeitlehre und das Verhaltnis zu Leibniz* (Halle a.S., Verlag von Max Niemeyer, 1916) is instructive because it is based on the *Reflexionen*.

5. *Reflexionen*, p. 35, Ref. 110.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 42, Ref. 140.

7. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B. p. 130; pp. 151-152.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 93; p. 105.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 47; p. 75.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 118; p. 121.

11. The question of the innate character of time and space and the limitations of that notion are discussed and critically elaborated by H. Scholz, *Das Vermachtnis der Kantischen Lehre von Raum und von Zeit*," *Kant Studien* XXXIX (1924): 21-69. See also "*Erkentnisstheorie*," Friedrich Kuntze, included in *Handbuch der Philosophie*, hrbg. von A. Baeumler and M. Schroter, Abt. I. *Die Grunddisziplinen* (Munchen und Berlin 1934, Druck und Verlag von R. Oldenbourg), p. 78 ff.

12. *A Treatise of Human Nature* by David Hume, reprinted and edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1946), pp. 34-35.

13. *Kr.d.r.V.* B. p. 40 ff; p. 70 ff.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 38; p. 68

15. *Ibid.*, B. p. 46; p. 74.

16. *Ibid.*, B. p. 438; p. 388.

17. *Ibid.*, B. pp. 38-39; p. 68.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 46; p. 75.

19. *Reflexionen*, p. 398, Ref. 122.

20. *Kr.d.r.V.* B. p. 93; p. 105.

21. *Ibid.*, b. p. 129; p. 151.

22. *Ibid.*, B. pp. 39, 69; pp. 47, 75.

23. Ibid. B., p. 42 ff; transl. p. 71.

24. *Reflexionen*, p. 396; Ref. 122.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 400; Ref. 122.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 405; Ref. 123.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 409; Ref. 125.

28. *Anschauung* is described as immediate revelation (*unmittelbare Offenbarung*). See: "*Was heisst: sich im Denken orientieren,*" 1786, in Kant's *Werke*, Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. VIII, p. 133 ff.

29. We refer here to the controversy between Jaakko Hintikka and Charles Parsons. See: *Logic, Language-Games and Information. Kantian Themes in the Philosophy of Logic*, by Jaakko Hintikka (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1973), where Hintikka mentions a few of his own writings related to our topic. See the note on p. 23. Cf. also Charles Parsons; "Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic," included in: *Philosophy, Science and Method. Essays in Honour of Ernest Nagel*, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, Morton White (Mac-Millan, New York, 1969), p. 568 ff.

30. *Kr.d.r.V.* B. p. 47; p. 75.

31. *Ibid.*, B. p. 39; p. 69.

32. *Ibid.*, B. p. 40; p. 70.

33. *Ibid.*, B. p. 379; p. 316.

34. *Reflexionen*, p. 299; Ref. 1038.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 187; Ref. 618.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 121; Ref. 393.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 421; Ref. 1458.

38. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B. p. 39; p. 69.

39. *Ibid.*, B. p. 46; p. 74.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 47; p. 75.

41. *Reflexionen*, p. 113; Ref. 366.

42. We cannot disregard the aspect of certainty related to intuition. It is in this context that Kant speaks of evidence (*Evidenz*), emphasizing that the intuitive cognition is clearer than the discursive one. (*Immanuel Kant's Logik, Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen, zuerst herausgegeben von Gottlob Benjamin Jesche. Neu herausgegeben von Walter Kinkel, Felix Meiner*, Leipzig, 1920, p. 78). Insofar as Kant refers to the aspect of certainty, he comes close to Descartes' description of intuition. Intuition is the conception that an unclouded and attentive mind so readily and distinctly gives us that we are wholly free from doubt about that which we understand. Among the examples mentioned by Descartes in the context is not only the fact that each individual can mentally have intuition of the fact that he exists and that he thinks, but also that the triangle is bounded by three lines only, or that the sphere is bounded by a single superficies. We distinguish mental intuition from deduction by the fact that in the conception of deduction a certain movement or succession enters. No movement or succession enters in the mental intuition. Cf. *Rules for the Direction of the Mind, included in: The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, rendered into English by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Dover Publications, New York, 1931), vol. 1, pp. 7-8. We shall deal presently with the topic of evidence.

43. *Kr.d.r.v.*, A. p. 100; p. 132.

44. *Ibid.*, B. pp. 160-161; pp. 170-171.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 39; p. 69.

46. *Ibid.*, B. p. 48; p. 75.

47. *Ibid.*, B. p. 321; p. 279.

48. *Ibid.*, B. p. 751; p. 583.

49. *Reflexionen*, p. 115; Ref. 374.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 116; Ref. 377.

51. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B. pp. 291-292; p. 255.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 192; p. 191.

53. *Metaphysica* 1011, B. p. 20 ff.

54. *Ibid.*, 1005, B. p. 22 ff. Cr. "Time, Truth and Knowledge in Aristotle and other Greek philosophers," in: Jaakko Hintikka: *Time and Necessity, Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 62 ff.

55. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B. p. 33; p. 65.

56. *Ibid.*, B. p. 147; p. 162.

57. Reference should be made to the interpretation by Jaakko Hintikka and his attempt to differentiate between the intuitivity of mathematics and forms of sensuality. He emphasizes that Kant, in his actual arguments for subjectivity of space and time, means by "intuitivity" predominantly *individuality* as distinct from the generality and discursive thinking related to it. Intuition as a particular idea, in contradistinction to general concepts, has no necessary relation to the senses. Even if we accept this interpretation, we still face Kant's system as it stands, wherein space and time are related to sensuality and are essential components of mathematics. When space and time, as components of mathematics, are interpreted as particular ideas, their particularity as totality appears in terms of sensuality and its structure. Cf. Jaakko Hintikka; "On Kant's Notion of Intuition (*Anschauung*)", included in: *The First Critique: Reflections on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. by Terence Penelhum and J.J. MacIntosh (Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., Belmont, California, 1969), p. 38 ff.

Kant's lectures on Logic attempt to present a general view of intuitive cognitions a well as aesthetic perfection. Aesthetic perfection consists of the congruence of the cognition with the subject and is grounded in the particular sensuality (*die besondere Sinnlichkeit*) of man. There are no objectively valid laws insofar as aesthetic perfection goes, but there are general laws of sensuality which hold good for the whole of humankind. *Logik*, ed. by W. Kinkel, Leipzig, Meiner Verlag, p. 40.

58. *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Ak. Ausgabe Bd. V*, p. 7 ff.

59. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B. p. 159; p. 170.

Chapter V

FROM EXPOSITION TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL INSIGHT

1

The difference between rational functions and the reception of data as attention is a difference which may be rendered in phenomenological terms. Kant himself, in describing the difference as one between reception and spontaneity, already presented some of the basic features of these sources of knowledge. We start this part of our discussion by referring to the analysis of the topic before us in Friedrich Kuntze's *Die kritische Lehre von der Objektivitat.*[1] We comment on that analysis because Kuntze correctly points out the kinship between Kant's notion of metaphysical exposition and deduction and the phenomenological approach, although he does not elaborate on the difference between metaphysical exposition and metaphysical deduction; he even lists under the heading of deduction what Kant himself calls exposition. Kuntze's attempt is the more important since, for chronological reasons, he had at hand only Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* and could not discuss the explicit references the later Husserl makes to Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic. Be that as it may, it is instructive to comment on Kuntze's interpretation, as well as on his attempt to elaborate Kant's views, by taking advantage of the phenomenological approach.

2

The first topic is the relation between the transcendental deduction - concerned with the possibility of the deduction of the *a priori* modes of knowledge of objects to be applied to the objects of an intuition (*Anschauung*) in general, and the metaphysical deduction. Kuntze maintains that the transcendental deduction is the fulfillment of the metaphysical or that the metaphysical deduction is the preparatory groundwork for the transcendental. He interpreted this relation to mean that the metaphysical deduction is concerned with originalities of thinking (*die Ursprunglichkeiten des Denkens*), but he compares the findings of the metaphysical deduction to the characters of

Hebrew consonants without vowels. Only possible experience adds the vowels and thus turns unpronounceable consonants into a conjunction of sounds. Kuntze has in view the relation between the metaphysical and the transcendental deductions on the level of concepts, but not on the level of intuitions; he disregards the fact that on the level of intuitions there is no deduction but only exposition. This is so since on the level of intuition, because of the particular interplay between matter and form, form of intuition and formal intuition, the metaphor of vowels and consonants is not applicable. We may use this metaphor regarding concepts, because for concepts, intuition as composed of matter and form is turned as a whole into matter or material for the conceptual form. When Kuntze emphasizes the dependence of the metaphysical deduction on the facts of psychology, he may have two aspects of that dependence in mind: first, the convergence between the structure of intuition and the psychological fact of the sensuous perception; second, the psychological fact, or a fact interpreted as psychological, that there is thinking as a sum total of functions of unifications. Kuntze goes even further when he equates what he calls irrationality with originality (*Irrationalitat ist die Ursprunglichkeit*), when he says that at the end of all philosophizing we find a simple affirmation of certain propositions (*ein schlechthinniges Jasagen zu gewissen Satzen*). We may adopt this resume and apply it to our previous analysis. The structures of space and time are ultimate data and that structure must be affirmed as such.

Kuntze is concerned with separating, as far as possible, the ultimate data from their involvement in the psychological substratum. He therefore suggests substituting the general spatio-temporal tendency for three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time. Along with this he attempts to give a trans-psychological version of the notion of "metaphysical," with full dependence on Kant: "Metaphysical is an *a priori* when it describes a general scientific disposition of the spirit which, as an ideally strictly defined manifold, embraces all possible theories in a certain direction." In speaking of the "disposition of spirit," Kuntze does not entirely avoid psychological innuendo. He attempts to go beyond the limitations of sensuality by pointing to the manifold and the variations of a theoretical character that refer to it. Indeed Husserl, in Kuntze's interpretation, does not present his phenomenoloy as a branch of psychology as a science. Husserl is concerned, as Kant is, with the pre-scientific and therefore pre-psychological experience. He deals with the activities of thinking as well as with the combinations brought about by thinking (*Handlung und Verbindung*); these are primary and essential. If this is so, then the highest point of all theory of knowledge cannot be, as Kant thought, the unity of apperception, but an all-embracing science about theory as such. Husserl called that science the pure theory of the manifold (*reine Manigfaltigkeitslehre*). Any particular formation of a theory is only a variation

within the framework of that universal theory of the manifold. The shift from psychological confinement or anthropological residues to a thematic, as it were non-psychological, component, is an extension of Kant's position. Before going on to elaborate further on the problems related to phenomenology, let us comment on this interpretation of the affinity between Kant's theory and Husserl's phenomenology.

3

Kuntze's interpretation is characterized by a shift from time and space as such to the components of time and space, the latter being characterized as *Menge*. He attempts to preserve the data without grounding them in modes or forms of perception. To be sure, this is not an interpretation of Kant, but a step beyond - and Kuntze is aware of this. The question is whether this interpretation preserves the whole range of themes and problems present in Kant. The *Menge* in Kant has a structure whose nature has been well expressed by Hegel as forms of apartness (*die Formen des Ausseinander*).[2] This characterization is more than a recognition or acceptance of data because it points to the fact that there is, as it were, a common ground to space and time which cannot be exhausted in the spatio-temporal trend, to use Kuntze's expression again. Space and time embrace data; the data embraced are outside one another, both in the line of time and the configuration of space. If we accept the notion of *Menge*, we accept the idea that there are ultimate indelible data. The theory of *Mengen*, called *die Mannigfaltigkeitstheorie*, is an attempt to render the different formal structures of the manifold as it is originally present. The emphasis placed on space and time stems from the view that the primarily given data are endowed with primary forms. This would ultimately imply that any further formalization presupposes the forms of space and time, even when that formalization leads from those forms to structures of a mathematical or topological character which do not contain the space-time component.

To be sure, Kant provides an explanation for the primacy of space and time, because he grounds space and time not in the data but in the perceiving subject and views them as forms of sensuality. Let us restate some of the reasoning behind that position, problematic as it may be. Kant tries to show, both by way of an exposition and by an attempt to discern certain presuppositions, that the very act of perception occurs in time. That act presupposes the distinction between the perceiver and his datum. Hence an externality is implied in the act of perception, as there is a locus *qua* time that embraces the act of perception. Through the theory of the thing in itself Kant tries to explain the presence of the datum as a corollary of that explanation. Even more significantly for our analysis, Kant assumes that the concept of a

datum implies the subject to whom the datum is given. In Kant's analysis the thing in itself is a transmitter of the datum, while the perceiver is the receiver of the datum. The datum is something encountered. The theme of Kant's inquiry is the level of that encounter that he takes to be the level of perception. There can be no question that anthro-pological considerations are prominent in this analysis. But in addition to those considerations we have here a kind of metaphysical or phenomenological exposition of the data and their appearance to the subject.

Data are endowed with a structure. That structure is relations between the data. The mininal relation is the positions of the data in the expanse of space and in the line of time. Once we are concerned with data and their relations, the relation between the data and the perceiving subject is brought to the fore; that relation as a fact or as an act is lodged in space and time. The emphasis placed on sensuality implies, therefore, that the first encounter between the subject and the world is endowed with a formal structure not totally different from the structure of the encountered data. In other words, perception occurs in space and time and presupposes both. This is so since the perceiving subject perceives the data as a mundane being, belonging to the realm of the data despite the distinction between the act of perception and the perceived data.

This interpretation enables us to discern in Kant some different phenomenological directions. It leads us to a rather difficult question related to the distinction between affections and functions, a distinction we have been concerned with before. A perception is an act of the subject, though it is related to, or even dependent upon, affection. The dichotomy between affections and functions presented by Kant calls for some qualifications. We encounter data through acts of perception, and these acts in turn are not functions *qua* unifying activities. A distinction, not suggested by Kant, must be maintained between acts and activities. Acts are perceptions insofar as in them the distinction between the perceiver and the datum is present or implied. Activities are deliberate forms of unification to be applied to data. Hence activities refer to data, but not directly. The direct immediacy is characteristic only of perceptions, precisely because in perceptions the perceiving subject, as dwelling in the world of data, still entertains the data in acts which are different from the data themselves. Husserl was probably aware of the limitations of the Kantian dichotomy between affections and functions when he suggested that the notion of objects exercising their impact on the subject has to be replaced by the notion of the *Empfindungsdatum* that he characterizes as that which dwells in the consciousness, or else as that which is a matter (*Sache*) of perception (*der Erfassung*). It is for this reason that Husserl speaks of the intentional character of affection, thus endowing affection with the main property of consciousness

in general. The datum is what he calls "of an impersonal character" present in the mode (*Modus*) of the intentional plenitude.

Kuntze is concerned with the metaphysical deduction of the categories, not with the metaphysical exposition of space and time, though possibly he blurs the distinction between the two. The metaphysical deduction, as it appears in the first edition of *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, is concerned with *a priori* grounds of the possibility of experience. The distinction is between the apprehension of representations in intuition as modifications of the mind; their reproduction in imagination; and their recognition in the concept.[3] From the point of view of forms or modes of sensuality only the synthesis of apprehension in intuition is relevant, since it is related to *Anschauung* by definition. Kant says about the starting point of this synthesis of apprehension that all representations are modifications of the mind. Hence they belong to the inner sense. Therefore all the data of knowledge, insofar as they are representations (*Vorstellungen*), are subject to time, since time is the formal condition of the inner sense. Again, the distinction must be made between the manifold of representations and each singular representation insofar as it is contained in a single moment. From the point of view of the latter, representation can never be anything but a unit. It follows then that we encounter a unit against the background of the manifold. The representation as a unit must be separated from the manifold, or, as Kant says, must be "held together." He calls this act of primary unification the synthesis of apprehension. It is directed immediately to intuition, since it is in intuition the manifold is first offered. The manifold as such can never be represented. A single representation comes about by virtue of the synthesis of apprehension. Sensuality in its original receptivity presents the manifold, while the unification *qua* formation of separate entities is a pure synthesis of apprehension.[4] We mention this aspect of the metaphysical deduction of the *a priori* acts of synthesis, as distinct from the transcendental deduction, in order to emphasize that this presentation points to the fact that acts are activities; they appear for Kant only on the level of understanding or reason, not on the level of receptivity. Kant tried, apparently, to point to the primary or minimal activity of synthesis. Because of the dichotomy he maintained, he had to locate that primary activity not on the level of intuition or perception of the manifold but on the level of functions. His attempt was directed towards the discernment of basic activities outside or beyond the basic forms of affections. This aspect reappeared in some of Husserl's writings.

Our purpose now is not to deal with Husserl's relation to Kant, but to point to some central issues which recur in Husserl's phenomenology, related to Kant's metaphysical exposition in the strict sense of the term, namely to space and time. Kuntze's interpretation represents a profound insight, all the more so

since - as we have observed - he could have had access only to the *Logische Untersuchungen*. We are in a more fortunate position; we have access to the major works of Husserl's in which the variations on the theme of the metaphysical exposition are rather conspicuous.

4

The difference between Kant's approach to space and time and the core of the phenomenological approach can be stated as follows: Kant assumes that the facticity of the forms of sensuality has an essence. That essence is immanent in sensuality and thus is open to the metaphysical exposition. Moreover, that essence can be viewed as the *a priori* of sensuality. In this sense Kant takes a non-Platonic view, since he ascribes essence to factual data perceived through our senses. This essence is permanent and can be explicated as such.

Husserl's phenomenology differs programmatically in the distinction he proposes between that which belongs to facticity and that which belongs to essence. Husserl says that we do not take an interest in the facticities of consciousness and its course, but only in the problem of essence. That problem is related to what he calls jurisdictions of reason (*Recht-sprechungen der Vernunft*); these must be explored in the context of the essence of transcendental consciousness, that is to say phenomenologically, in the pure sense of the term.[5] If we take this programmatic statement as our guide, we may say that for Kant the facticity of consciousness and the problems of essence coalesce. Therefore, the fact that forms of sensuality exist provides the justification for their employment, since the ultimate stratum carries with it its own justification by virtue of its position as an ultimate stratum.

The direction of phenomenology is close to the metaphysical exposition in its formation; it is purely descriptive and presents the description in exploring the field of the transcendental pure consciousness in pure intuition.[6] When we compare this statement with that about the beholding regard (*der schauende Blick*), pure intuition is the mode of exploration *a parte subjecti*, but not the status of the datum *a parte objecti*. For the beholding regard the datum appears as an absolute, and there are no various angles to it,[7] while in the metaphysical exposition there is the conceptual rhythm that step by step brings to the fore that which is contained in the primary datum. The metaphysical exposition is concerned with intuition but is itself not intuitive. In this sense there is a difference between the metaphysical exposition and the phenomenological *Wesenschau*. The two approaches meet again in the attitude of not making demands but discerning that which can be explored in consciousness itself in its pure immanence as essential;[8] the structure of sensuality

is of an immanent character. Therein lies its whole essence and, as a consequence, its validity.

The adumbrated difference between the subject matter (on the level of intuition) and the mode of exploration (being essentially an intuition) is relevant for the present issue. At first glance one could assume that the meeting-ground between Kant's metaphysical exposition and Husserl's phenomenology lies in Husserl's investigation. But this is not so; we must consider the difference before we embark on examining a further aspect of Kant's philosophy of forms of intuition and its counterpart in Husserl.

The reason why the problem of time does not provide for a meeting-ground between the two approaches can be stated as follows: Kant is concerned with the primary datum of time or space (to be examined subsequently). Husserl is concerned with what he came to call constitution, namely acts of positing data, acts of making them present in the awareness, and generally speaking, the character of intentionality which posits data, relates to them, and experiences them in the sense of *Erleben*.

In the first place, Husserl is concerned with the phenomenology of the inner time-consciousness. If we introduce that terminology into Kant's system, it becomes clear that the problem of inner sense, if we take it as the counterpart of inner time-consciousness, is for Kant a datum whose form is time, with all the distinctions that go with the difference between a datum and its form. The fact that time is the form of the inner sense leads Kant to the assertion of universal or objective time, whereas Husserl says explicitly that his analysis involves the exclusion (*Ausschluss*) of every assumption, stipulation, or conviction concerning objective time. He characterizes the objective time excluded from the scope of his enquiry as belonging to all the transcending presuppositions about the existing - *alle transzendierende Voraussetzungen vom Existierendem*. Objective time does not belong to the sphere of transcendence as being outside or beyond consciousness; it belongs to the sphere of transcending presuppositions because, as such, it is not intentionally entertained in the present consciousness. Kant would grant this, because the position of universal time transcends the occurrence of acts in time, including acts of the inner time-consciousness. To put it positively, following Husserl's own statement, we can say that what we accept is not the existence of a world-time, the existence of a duration of things (*dingliche Dauer*), but only time and duration as they appear to us. The emphasis on the appearing aspect is rather significant, because that aspect is related to constitution, understood in the broad sense as positing a datum and making it present in and for the consciousness. In a different formulation Husserl says that we abstract all

transcendental interpretation and introduce perceptual appearance (*die Wahrnehmungserscheinung*) to the primary given content.[9]

Applying this language to the thrust of the metaphysical exposition in Kant's sense, we may say that that exposition is an interpretation which does not reduce the forms to the perceptual appearance as the primary given content. Since Kant's explicit concern is with presuppositions, he asks the question about what is implied in time as a presupposition. He is not concerned with the absolute or temporal flux of consciousness, becaue he assumes that this flux cannot be understood only as an immanent temporal unity or as a lived experience. In itself, it can be ascertained only through reference to the coordinate of pure, formal, or objective time. The outcome of this comparison of the metaphysical exposition and the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness could be that the metaphysical exposition can take advantage of the richness of the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness, in order to re-assess its basic position with regard to time. Because of the aspect of "inner time consciousness" the topic of space is not dealt with in this comparative analysis.

5

Husserl's *Ideen* is a rich subject for close comparison with Kant's theory. Husserl comments on the term "Ideation" which he presents as synonymus with pure intuition (*reine Anschauung*). He sums up the topic by saying that ideation is the phenomeno-logically clarified Kantian concept of pure intuition (*der phanomenologisch geklarte Begriff von Kant's reiner Anschauung*).[10] The concept of ideation must be understood in the broad sense, implying all consciousness, simple and direct, which refers to an entity. Here Husserl seemed to have in mind the description, or at least one of the descriptions, of *Anschauung* that we find in Kant, that stresses *Anschauung* as direct awareness. Yet it is not clear in Husserl's reference to Kant whether *Anschauung* is understood as a mode of approaching the subject matter or as the subject matter itself. To be sure, he refers to the *Idee* of space, that in turn would mean that space here is a subject matter. The fact that the term *Idee* is applied to that subject matter would not exclude the possibility of viewing it as belonging to *Anschauung* in Kant's sense. That this possibility is not excluded can be seen from one of those phenomenological descriptions related to what Husserl calls orientation. He is referring to the visual field in which we can orient ourselves according to certain directions such as above, below, at the right, at the left, close or far away. These changing aspects are related to an invisible limit (*Grenzpunkt*). Husserl describes these different aspects of orientation as alleged facilities or accidental aspects of the intuition of space. But actually they belong to the necessities of the essence.[11] This is not a step

from the space in which we try to find directions of orientation to pure space in Kant's sense; the tendency is to identify the aspects present in the horizon of our experience and orientation with the essence. Nevertheless, Husserl implies that space encompasses all these orientations. Because it encompasses them, space as such is not identical with any particular orientation. Space is not formal in Kant's sense, but rather embracing; this last aspect is present in our consciousness through particular acts of orientation. We pointed before to the ambiguity regarding the locus of *Anschauung*, in whether it belongs to the subject matter or rather to the perspective of the phenomenological spectator. It can now be said that *Anschauung* is described on the level of the subject matter.

As far as the concept of *Anschauung* of time goes, Husserl's position is even closer to Kant's than it is regarding space. First, he distinguishes between phenomenological time (which is a unified form of all experiences in one stream of experience - that of one pure Ego) and what he calls "objective," that is to say, cosmic, time.[12] Phenomenological time is not identical with time as experienced in the sense stressed in the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness; phenomenological time itself is a form of all experiences (*Erlebnisse*). The application of the term "form" is significant, since form is one of the factors providing continuity[13] or constancy. In other words, each actual experience is necessarily an enduring experience. Because of this enduring quality, it lodges itself within an infinite continuum of durations, a replete continuum (*in einem erfullten Continuum*).[14] Husserl points to the relation between the single act of experience and its inner duration, on the one hand, and the transcending continuum on the other, without assuming that this transcending continuum is constituted by to-be-discerned acts. Even when he speaks of opposite directions of the continual changes, in which the afterwards corresponds to the foregoing[15] he must assume the presence of the perspective of the "afterwards" and the "foregoing" in order to establish a locus for the experiences. In a way, the perspectives transcending the actual experiences are presupposed. The phenomenological description wavers between the description itself and the broader awareness of the loci in which the awareness and its concomitant description occur. To be sure, Husserl does not start his investigation from the form or from the coordinates in order to proceed to the actual experiences. Nevertheless, he is aware of the fact that without the coordinates the description is impossible or perhaps even the experience is moot, since it would lack the self-awareness of belonging to a continuum of experiences. One could not experience a moment without being aware of the flux or stream of moments.

We are trying to describe the proximity between Husserl's and Kant's analyses. Interestingly enough, even at this point Husserl is not close to Kant's metaphysical exposition but rather to Kant's transcendental deduction, insofar

as Husserl is concerned with the exploration of that which must be presupposed for the sake of the actual experience. Husserl does not start from geometry or arithmetics. He starts with the actual *Erlebnis* and tries to remain within its scope and move to the broader coordinates essential for *Erlebnis*. This proximity between *Erlebnis* and the coordinates sheds light again on the richness of the phenomenological exploration; in addition, it is one of the trends of Husserl's doctrine which brings us back to critical philosophy.[16] If we look at some of the other attempts made by Husserl, his proximity to Kant, with all its ambivalence, will become even clearer.[17]

6

Husserl finds himself in a dilemma insofar as his proximity with Kant is concerned, a proximity of which he himself is sometimes aware. The first horn of the dilemma is Kant's programmatic merger, reiterated in the previous analysis, between facticity and essence, which amounts to the coalescence of forms of sensuality and pure intuitions. Husserl attempts to extricate essence from its immersion in facticity. In doing so he is bound, according to the logic of his system, to turn essence into an object of *Wesenschau*. *Wesenschau* is a vision or intuition, an all-around grasp of an object, distinct from discursive thinking which is tied up with what Husserl calls "angles" (*Seiten*). Hence the method of the metaphysical exposition, i.e., the method of the explication of the implicit, is not transferable to a system centered around the *Wesenschau*. Husserl suggests that the broad horizon of time is not a presupposition of the act of time-awareness. Neither is it an explication of that awareness. It is a horizon within which the particular act of time-awareness takes place and through which that awareness is meaningful. An act in isolation, without the horizon of time, cannot be endowed with the meaning of time. The meaning is the corollary of the breadth of time and cannot be a component of a sporadic isolated act.

We thus encounter the other horn of the dilemma that related to the coalescence between time and space, intuitions and sensuality. *Formale und Transzendentale Logik* is instructive here, because it exhibits, on the one hand, the centrality of functions and the concomitant criticism of Kant and, on the other, still a kind of indebtedness to Kant.

The emphasis is placed on what Husserl calls "performing acts" (*leistende Tatigkeiten*) and "habitualities" (*Habitualitaten*). Probably, the latter must be understood as constant attitudes produced by the performing acts. This aspect emerges when Husserl suggests what is the outcome of the acts, i.e., that which is performed and its permanent results (*verharrende Ergebnisse*).[18] The whole theme is reason in its actuality,[19] and actuality must be understood here, in its primary sense, as an activity. Reason is actual only when it is active. Because of that, the major theme is the subjective one that in this context means the totality of the acts and performances. The meeting ground between the analysis of acts and the analysis of the results, epitomized in the relationship between the *cogito* and the *cogitatum*, is called *eine Kritik der "Vernunft"*. Husserl uses here not only the title of Kant's work but also the associations that go with the programmatic aspect of Kant's system. It is important in this context to notice that the programme of critique is not materialized in the investigation of the faculties or of the inherent limitations.

Critique in Husserl's sense is concerned with *Setzungen*, that is, active positions, as he describes them - positions, theses, attitudes (*Positionen, Thesen, Stellungnahmen*).[20] Each one of these steps is accompanied by its own evidence.[21] The aspect of evidence points to subjectivity, awareness, not to functions referring to objects accompanied by self-consciousness, let alone to affections which, by definition, are caused by objects or things and whose first root is not in the subjectivity of consciousness. It is in this sense that Husserl speaks of "performing intentionality" (*leistende Intentionalitat*) which belongs to transcendental subjectivation (*transzendentale Subjektivierung*); the latter is but the other side of the coin, that is to say, the *a priori* aspect of genuine objectivity.[22] It seems there is reason to stress, in Husserl's terms, *subjectivation* or *Subjektivierung* versus objectivity - *Objektivitat*. Husserl is concerned with the trend towards subjectivity, not with the fact that subjectivity is there as a last resort, calling at most for an explication. This trend is reinforced by the aspect of evidence that amounts to absolute apodicticity[23] and, what is even more important, by the fact that intentionality and self-granting (*Selbstgebung*) are essentially concepts belonging to each other. It should be stressed again that, insofar as there is a structure to sensuality, that structure is simply there; it cannot be interpreted as correlated with evidence or with the self-reflection implied in the notion of *Selbstgebung*.[24]

Along with the emphasis on subjectivization goes the emphasis on evidence. Even perception (*Wahrnehmung*), which in Kant's system is exemplifying receptivity, is interpreted by Husserl as perception manifesting itself as present (*das Sich-selbst-gegenwartigzeigen der Wahrnehmung*).[25] We can use here the notion of immanent genesis[26] as epitomizing the trend towards regression to subjectivity. In the context of immanent genesis, Husserl mentions forms which we somehow used to take ontologically for granted; among these forms are space and time. In the context of this emphasis on subjectivity, intentionality, performances, etc., Husserl takes exception to Kant's theory of transcendental logic. He expresses his criticism or reservations in rather strong terms, claiming that that theory does not pose any transcendental questions.[27] Kant's idea of transcendental logic is different from the theory

Husserl has before him, a theory Husserl himself describes as subjectively oriented (*subjectiv gewendet*). He criticizes Kant's attempt to ground transcendental logic in formal logic, because formal logic in Kant's sense, as Husserl understands it, is concerned with ideal configurations of thinking (*ideale Denkgebilde*).[28] It is not concerned with the acts whose performance finds expression or results in the ideality of logical configurations. Because of this orientation Kant did not comprehend the specific meaning of ideality. Hence Kant's system calls for either a supplementation or a revision in the direction of phenomenological subjectivity.[29]

Looking at this polemical part of Husserl's theory, we can conclude that if transcendental logic is criticized or even rejected because it lacks full grounding in performing acts of subjectivity, the transcendental aesthetic is bound to be rejected even more strongly. Programmatically, transcendental logic is grounded in functions. Husserl criticizes that grounding because the functions concerned are not acts of subjectivity in the full sense of the term. Intuitions, whether pure or forms of intuition, are not grounded *ex definitione* in functions. Therefore they cannot be placed even at the threshold of the transcendental discussion.

In this context, in Husserl there are several hints at Kant's deductions in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: The synthesis of recognition (*Synthesis der Rekognition*) is mentioned[30] in quotation marks, alluding to Kant's notion of the synthesis of recognition. Husserl probably found this notion congenial because it contains an element of an act or of a performance. "For this unitary consciousness is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation... Such consciousness, however indistinct, must always be present; without it, concepts, and therewith knowledge of objects, are altogether impossible."[31] Husserl - we conjecture - points to this synthesis of recognition when he refers to the uniformity of co-validity (*con-positio*), that is related to an infinite manifold of possible modes of consciousness lending themselves given to merging in one consciousness.[32]

Towards the end of his Logic, Husserl explicitly refers to Kant's notion of transcendental aesthetic. He realizes the affinity of his own presentation with the thrust of Kant's system, though he emphasizes that the transcendental aesthetic will be conceived in a different sense. In this context he speaks about the eidetic problem of a possible world in general. He refers to the eidetic description of the universal *a priori* without which, in mere experience and preceding the categorial actions (*kategoriale Aktionen*) - taken in Husserl's sense, not in Kant's - objects would not appear. Furthermore, the unity of nature or of a world as a passive synthetic unity could not be constituted. One stratum of this unity is the aesthetic *a priori* of spatio-temporality.[33] Husserl seems to interpret here transcendental aesthetic as a kind of regional logic of the sphere of experience. That sphere is related to a passive synthesis - and this, in spite of everything else, reminds us of Kant's receptivity. Yet Husserl attempts to carry out a constitution of passivitity - though this may sound like a contradiction in terms - or to present the acts involved in the passive synthesis or in receptivity. Here he recognizes the validity of the position ascribed by Kant to space and time. He probably tries, as far as possible, to overcome the simplicity of the attitude of being affected and to bring affections and functions as close to each other as possible. It is because of this attempt that Husserl refers to Kant, though he qualifies his reference by speaking about Kant's aesthetic as a narrowly circumscribed version (*endumgrenzt*) of Transcendental Aesthetic.

7

If we suppose that the essence of consciousness is exhibited mainly in acts of intentionality, not, as it were, in ready-made concepts, then intentionality is to be found on every level of cognitive activity. From the point of view of the running theme of *Erfahrung und Urteil* there is bound to be a basic difference between Kant's and Husserl's approaches. But in spite of this, and this is indeed surprising, on several issues *Erfahrung und Urteil* represents the formulation closest to that of Kant, precisely on the issue of forms and, more specifically, on the issue of time.

To be sure, the aspect of horizon is present in the analysis of time, and the heading of the analysis sounds Kantian: "Time as a Form of Sensuality."[34] Husserl speaks first about horizon-intentions (*Horizont-Intentionen*); every perception as conscious-ness aware of objectivity (*Gegenstandlichkeit vermeintes Bewusst-sein*) has a horizon embracing the preceding and the subsequent.[35] The horizon is not a neutral, indifferent framework against which the act of perception occurs, or a background discerned by the external spectator. The horizon gives meaning to the very lodging of the acts of perception. Thus it is not a coordinate, but part and parcel of the meaning itself.

When he speaks of the strong locus or position of time (*feste Zeitstelle*), Husserl moves from this immersion of the horizon in the perception or, the other way round, from the belonging of the perception to the horizon: He refers to what he calls objective time in terms of that position.[36] The reference is to one and the same world, represented by or imbued with objective time. The one and the same world is not identical with the horizon, since that world is the widest possible framework in which all events, whether perceived or recollected, are lodged. It is for this reason that Husserl refers not only to

phenomenal time but also to objective time, since phenomenal time is given in the intentional objectivity (*intentionale Gegenstandlichkeit*).[37] Because of this extension from phenomenal time to objective time, Husserl says explicitly, even emphatically, that we can understand the inner truth of Kant's proposition: "The time is the form of the sensuality and therefore is the form of every possible world of objective experience."[38] He goes further in the direction of Kant's exposition of time when he says that all times fit into one time - implying Kant's notion that there is one all-embracing time with fragmentary times as its limitations. Time is the common form, the first and the principal form, the form of all forms, and the presupposition of all connectedness that brings about unity.

The notion of form, as Husserl clarifies it, initially means that which necessarily precedes everything else within the possibility of an intuitive unity. Therefore, temporality as duration, coexistence, and sequence is a necessary form of all objects intuited as united; that is why it is the form of intuition. The term "form of intuition" is explained as the form of that which is intuited as concrete and individual (*Form der konkret individuellen Angeschauthei-ten*)-.[39] Here again the association is with Kant's exposition of *Anschauungen*, including pure *Anschauungen* and their forms, as singular representations which are thus capable of being seen in the present context as concrete and individual. Husserl proposes the step from the individual character of time as a form to time as the one and only form of all individual objectivities (*aller individuellen Gegenstandlichkeiten*). Since time is a form of individual objectivity, being the presupposition for the basic unity underlying individual objectivities, time is also the form and presupposition of the Ego. This is *prima facie* a strange and perplexing step taken by Husserl, since the form of the object is, by the same token, also the form of the Ego and the acts of intentionality of which the Ego consists. All the perceptions and experiences, says Husserl, of an Ego are connected with regard to the intentional objects. They refer to one time. One can suggest that this symmetry between the Ego and its object exists only on the level of intuition or *Anschauung* which is not the level of the pure or Cartesian Ego. Nevertheless, it is revealing to notice the phenomenological significance of time and the form of time for the vivid structure of consciousness. Husserl says that when we speak about the stream of consciousness we, in a certain sense, already presuppose infinite time. The reference to the notion of presupposing (*man setzt voraus*) goes beyond the phenomenological description and, to say the least, is congenial to Kant's notion of presuppositions. It cannot be argued that the meaning or the concept is contained in the awareness or in the act but must be explicitly, i.e. trans-cendentally, presupposed.[40]

A minor point should be mentioned here, referring to the primacy of the form of time in relation to the position of space. Time, for Husserl, is the

form of individuals insofar as they are enduring. Therefore time is the form that brings about the unity of individuals, including the unity of many individuals. Time underlies the situation of being one next to another (*nebenein-anderliegend*). By virtue of being together in one time, individual objects of perception acquire their spatial situation.[41] From this point of view a primary status is attributed to time in relation to space. The preference of the position of time over space is a coming-back element in Husserl's system.

8

There are basic modes of temporality. One of them is the time of the given (*Gegebenheitszeit*) and the time of nature - as objective time.[42] All objects of time are embedded (*eingebettet*) in one time. Through its duration each object, as it were, cuts off a fragment of time belonging to itself. We do not start with the act of perception and the horizon that embraces it and bestows on it a meaning of the preceding and the subsequent. We look at an object in time as a cutting from objective, and thus universal, time, providing for the horizon of context (*Zusammen-hangshorizont*). In elaborating on this, we may say that there is a difference between the horizon of the preceding and the subsequent - which is the horizon close to the object or act - and the broad horizon exemplified by time as the form in the strict sense of the term. Hence we move to the concept of the world as the universe of reality. That universe is characterized by a spatio-temporality in which individual objects are prominent through their spatio-temporal locality (*Raum-zeitliche Lokalitat*).[43] We must distinguish between the concrete experience (*das konkrete Erlebnis*) and its immanent time, which is, by definition, the time of givenness and presence on one hand,[44] and on the other, objective time, now called a rigid form referring to the rigid being, which is the time in which everything exists.[45] In Kant's terms, we can distinguish here between the immanent time of the inner sense and the all-embracing time of all data.

The extent to which Husserl in these considerations comes close to Kant's position becomes even clearer when we look at the crux of the argument. We refer here to the aspect of affections versus functions, or else receptivity versus spontaneity. Once Husserl entertains the notion of forms of sensuality, he also refers to the sphere of passivity; sensuality belongs to that sphere.[46] Moreover, he speaks about the phenomenologically necessary concept of receptivity. To be sure, the phenomeno-logical approach enables him to mitigate the dichotomy between receptivity as a mode of passivity, and spontaneity as a mode of activity. Receptivity does not stand in exclusive opposition to the activity of the Ego. Rather, receptivity is the lowest rung of activity. This is a significant point and an important improvement on Kant's dichotomous presentation. Even when we assume that affection is due to the

affecting thing and the sensuality that stems from the thing, affection as receptivity is not just an effect of a cause in the physical sense of the term. A transformation takes place *en route* from the thing to sensuality, due to what psychologists call the specific quality. That quality in turn can be viewed as a kind of activity or a kind of independent ingredient inherent in sensuality, be it as receptive as it may. It is for this consideration that Husserl suggests a shift in perspectives: from the perspective of the dependence of sensuality on the thing affecting it to sensuality as the lower layer or manifestation of activity. This change in perspective enables Husserl to go beyond the duality of sensuality and understanding (*Verstand*), a duality which he overcomes from a different angle, through the phenomenon of intentionality, once intentionality is viewed as the essential feature of consciousness on all its levels, including sensuality. Intentionality is the basis of the unity of the diverse manifestations of consciousness. That unity replaces Kant's duality of sensuality and reason *qua* understanding.

9

The affinity between the phenomenological intuition and the metaphysical exposition has been shown before by referring to Kuntze's suggestion concerning the replacement of Kant's data by Husserl's notion of the manifold. We now come back to this notion since Husserl, in *Formale und transzendentale Logik*, calls the manifold the objective total concept (*gegenstandlicher Total-begriff*).[47] Husserl is engaged in formulating a theory of the form of the realm of knowledge in general. From the notion of the theory of the manifold he goes on to establish the essential types of theories concerned with the manifold. The actual theories in this sense would be specializations, or what he calls singularizations of a general theory of the manifold, now concerned with a particular manifold. Looking at the concept of the theory of the manifold, a concept running from the *Logische Untersuchungen* to the *Formale und Transzendentale Logik*, from the position of *Erfahrung und Urteil*, we may say that Husserl takes advantage of the form of time as the form of sensuality in order to deal with the manifold on that level. He does not confine the notion of the manifold to sensuality. Insofar as experience goes, and insofar as perception is a mode and a medium of experience, he comes rather close to Kant's discussion and vindicates some of the insights of Kant's aesthetics and metaphysical exposition. One can look at this vindication as an attempt at a phenomenological translation not only of the metaphysical exposition, but also of the different data which were the concern of that exposition.

In this analysis of the impact of form in Kant and Husserl, insofar as Husserl comes close to Kant, we have become aware of Kant's own description

of the concepts "matter" and "form." Matter signifies, as Kant says, the determinable in general; form signifies its determination. For every thing, its constituent elements are the matter, while the mode in which they are combined in one thing is the essential form. The usual conception is that in order that something be in a position to determine anything in a definite fashion, it must first be given, at least in concept. Consequently, from the perspective of the pure understanding (*Verstand*), matter is prior to form. But, as Kant reiterates, this does not apply once his own doctrine is adhered to: The data are only intuitions or appearances. In this case, the form of intuition as a subjective property of sensuality is prior to all matter, i.e., to sensations. Space and time come before all appearances and before all data of experience. The form is given *by itself* and the matter does not serve as a foundation. On the contrary, its own *possibility* presupppposes time and space as an antecedently given formal intuition.

The conception of matter and form is grounded in a dichot-omous analysis. The basic distinction between the determinable and the determination prevails even when the question of what antecedes and what succeeds is answered differently than usual. Broadly speaking, Husserl does not tend in the direction of a dichotomous analysis but towards an investigation into what might be called fullness. In this sense, time is not the determination of the datum but, as we said before, part of its meaning. Yet, insofar as Husserl applies the notion of form, he is willy-nilly driven to absorb some elements present in Kant's dichotomy. Additional aspects call for exploration which will reiterate Husserl's notion of self-reflection characteristic of the essence of consciousness. The difference between this conception and Kant's view of the "outgoing" essence of forms prevails.

NOTES

1. *Die kritische Lehre von der Objektivitat, Versuch einer weitfuhrenden Darstellung des Zentralproblems der Kantischen Erkenntniskritik* von Dr. Friedrich Kuntze, (Heidelberg, Karl Winter's Universitatsbuchhandlung, 1906). In his *Erkenntnis-theorie*, (Handbuch d. Philosophie, Berlin u. Munchen, R. Oldenburg 1931), Abteilung I) Kuntze does not mention the theory of the manifold in the phenomenologicl sense. Instead he mentions the theory of extension (*die Ausdehnungslehre*) conceived by Hermann Grassmann. The relevant points in Kuntze's *Die Kritische Lehre* are on pages 87, 88, 91, 93, 195.

2. *Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, para. 450. Bolland's edition (Leiden, A.H. Adriani 1906), p. 947. See: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und Phanomenologischen Philosophie*, I Buch, herausgegeben von Walter Biemel, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p. 80 ff.

3. *Kr.d.r.V.*, A. p. 91; transl. pp. 124-125.

4. *Ibid.*, A. pp. 99-100; pp. 131-132.

5. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und Phanomenologischen Philosophie*, pp. 331-332.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 141-142.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

9. Edmund Husserl's *Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, hrsg. von Martin Heidegger (Halle a.d.S., Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1928), pp. 368-369. References are to the English translation: *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, by Martin Heidegger, trans. by James S. Churchill, introd. by Calvin O. Schrag (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 22-23.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 370; p. 24.

11. *Ideen* etc., the above edition, p. 368. See Iso Kern: *Husserl und Kant, eine Untersuchung uber Husserl's Verhaltnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 270. Also: Guido Antonio del Almeida: *Sinn und Inhalt in der genetischen Phanomenologie E. Husserls* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p. 70. Kern mentions Kuntze's book in his bibliography, p. 444, but does not refer to the book in the text.

12. *Ideen*, pp. 370-371.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

17. Husserl's relation and attitude to Kant have been discussed in several works in addition to Kern's; for instance, Rudolf Boehm, "*Husserl und der klassische Idealismus*," in *Vom Gesichts-punkt der Phanomenologie, Husserl Studien* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 18 ff.; see the reference to Husserl's statement that more than a decade passed before he overcame the stage of static Platonism and entertained the idea of trans-cendental genesis as the principal theme (p. 22). One could say that the shift to the acts of a constitutive character exemplifies the shift from static Platonism to genesis. Kant's forms, both of sensuality and of understanding, would be listed under the heading of static Platonism. On Husserl's relation to the transcendental deduction in the first edition of *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, cf. Iso Kern, *op. cit.*, p. 246. See also *ibid.*, pp. 248-249.

18. *Formale und transzendentale Logik, Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*, (Halle (Saale), Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1929), p 29.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

23. *Ibid*, p. 140.

24. The view that attributes to things outside consciousness the impact and affection of consciousness is a naturalization of consciousness. In other words, it is the integration of consciousness in a natural causal context. Cf. Kern, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 231-232.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

31. *Kr.d.r.V.*, A. pp. 103-104; p. 134.

32. *Formale und Transzendentale Logik*, p. 143.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 256-257.

34. *Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik*, ausgearbeitet und hrsg. von Ludwig Landgrebe (Prague, Academia Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1939), p. 188.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 188.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 307.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 311.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 304-305.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 112. On the consciousness of time, see *"Das Konstitutionsproblem und das Zeitbewusstsein"* in Boehm, *op. cit.*, p. 106 ff.

47. *Formale und Transzendentale Logik*, p. 79.

Chapter VI

THE BEGINNING AND THE GOAL

1

Intentionality as consciousness directed to a theme is not a sporadic act of consciousness. Awareness, as the essence of consciousness, is its intentionality. Hence the exploration of consciousness is the identification of its intentionality. From the perspective of intentionality we may distinguish between the directiveness itself and that to which it is directed - or between *noesis* and *noema*. The latter may change, but whatever appears in consciousness is fundamentally related to intentionality and its characteristic correlation.

The aspect of certainty or evidence is related to that basic structure, but it brings an additional aspect into prominence. Certainty as evidence is not only awareness of the fact that the act is taking place. It is certainty that the thematic assertion - not only the reflective one - as "intentionality of intentionality" is valid and apodictically so. Evidence is a phenomenon of self-awareness, but it is by the same token a *Gestalt* of self-consciousness and its theme. It is germane to the trend of Husserl's system that the centrality of the position of intentionality leads to a continuous exploration of the essence of evidence and its position. This fact makes manifest one of the points of difference between Husserl's and Kant's systems, despite some auxiliary relation between the chrono-logically later and chronologically earlier systems. We have already referred to the phenomenon of evidence in the context of the foundations of knowledge.

Husserl's *continued* interest in the phenomenon of evidence is demonstrated in the various explorations formulated in the development of his system. In the first place it can be said that the status of evidence is germane to Husserl's trend of thought and the structure of his philosophical system. If, in general terms, we take evidence to mean that which is actually present and conspicuous in the mind, consciousness or subject, as well as that which by its

presence immediately provides the ground for a position formulated in a proposition in the consciousness, or, in other words, a content or proposition whose very presence implies its validity, then the common between that phenomenon and Husserl's concern with it is quite clear. For a philosopher so much engaged in the analysis of contents which present themselves to consciousness - *Selbstgebung* - or those originally given to consciousness and thus given by consciousness, the reference to evidence and the historical investigation of it appear to be built into the structure of Husserl's thinking. Husserl is concerned with the issue of presence *in* consciousness and the certainty of its assertion; thus he is led to deal with the phenomenon of evidence.

Yet Husserl's consistent analysis of the phenomenon cannot obscure the fact that he makes various attempts to criticize reliance on evidence in the sense described above as the primary synthesis of the presence of content and the certainty concomitant with it. The analysis was formulated in different ways and ultimately brought about a change in Husserl's analysis of evidence, namely a transition from conceiving evidence as the ground of cognition to conceiving it as its aim.

2

In the *Ideen*, Husserl formulates a critical comment on the tendency towards reliance on evidence or the feelings of evidence (*Evidenzgefuhl*). The alleged feelings of evidence or of necessity in thinking are merely theoretically invented feelings. The feelings are to be analyzed by exploring the differentiations inherent in them, which had not been explicated in the prevailing tradition of appealing to and relying on evidence. The phenomenological analysis called *Sichklarmachen* (clarifying to oneself) has two parallel, mutually supporting directions: One is that of the process of making things intuitively present (*Veranschaulichung*) and the other is a heightening of the clarity of that which is already intuited (*Steigerung der Klarheit des schon Anschaulichen*).[1] The two steps are significant: The first indicates *Veranschaulichung* as the end of the process and is expressed in the continuous turning of contents into contents of *Anschauung*. We can assume at this point that *Anschauung*, and *Veranschaulichung* as a process leading to *Anschauung*, are the other side of the presence of the content. The implication is that knowledge refers to present contents; *Veranschaulichung* is taken as the medium and *Anschauung* as the locus of that presence. We do not know the table as a table nor number two as number two, unless they are present in our minds as contents; the position of presence and the level of *Anschauung* are mutually supporting. By the same token it is not enough to leave these contents in their locus as *Anschauungen*; we must be engaged in their continuous

explication in the direction of clarity. In the course of that process we entertain *Anschauungen* which are impure (*unreine Anschauungen*). We should not take the leap from the intuited presence of contents to their actual presence; the latter can be ascertained only through and after the intensification of clarity. Hence it is already at this point that we find a hint of an evidence which is to be continuously asserted and achieved. Evidence cannot be realized in already given intuited contents. It must be projected from the beginning of the cognitive process towards the to-be-achieved end.

3

Husserl adds some points which go beyond the positional aspect of evidence. Positively speaking, in the majority of cases that which is given to us is embraced by other contents or by what Husserl describes metaphorically as a ring of indeterminable determinability (*Hof von unbestimmbarer Bestimm-barkeit*). Hence the process of explication and clarification takes place on the background of different contents. On the one hand, clarification is an isolation of contents, but on the other, it is a continuous reference to the embracing contents with reference to which the isolation takes place. From the point of view of the phenomenology of evidence it can be said that Husserl cannot adhere to the view that there are certain propositions whose justification is immediately given. Such a view of evidence would entail a primary isolation of those propositions, a well as their primary clarity. Once isolated, propositions are in themselves achievements of the cognitive process. Clarity becomes the result of clarification. Evidence cannot be a groundwork for knowledge or its pre-suppositions.

A second comment on evidence refers to the distinction between general or generic essential differences which are immediately grasped, and the concrete realization of these differences in terms of data. The examples adduced by Husserl are significant. He refers to the distinction between colour and sound, or that between perception and will. We are directly or immediately aware of these differences as well as of the species among which they obtain - colour in general, sound in general. Yet this awareness is not an awareness of the concrete examples that can be classified according to the essential differences among the species. The process could be called not clarification but identification or realization; that is to say, that with respect to detailed facts or occurrences we apply the species and their essential characteristics in order to grasp the details, on the one hand, and give them concrescence (*Konkretion*), on the other.[2] Hence, the primary evidence exhibited in the cognition of essences or species cannot be self-supporting unless we supplement the apprehended species by the concrete data that fall within the scope of the essences. This in turn is a process of clarification, since we clarify the primary

essences by the data, and clarify the data by recognizing them as belonging to their respective essences. This particular correlation between essences and data becomes problematic in the sphere of cognition, but not in that of pure logic, for in the latter we are concerned solely with pure logical relations.[3]

What emerges from the difference between the sphere of cognition and the sphere of pure logical relations is that no proposition referring to a given appearance can be finally valid (*endgultig*).[4] Moreover, the analysis of cognitive acts in general and the distinction between the noetic and the noematic aspects calls essentially[5] for an equilibrium between the two aspects, even in terms of the intended evidence. In other words, in Husserl's own terms: The noematic aspect must be seen in the context as related to a fulfillment (*Erfullung*) and to the fulfillment of the intention.[6] Hence, the achievement of equilibrium - to say nothing of harmony between *noesis* and *noema* - cannot be assured at the beginning of the process or with the thesis only. We must see the broad theory of evidence as part of what Husserl calls the phenomenology of reason.[7] That phenomenology in turn refers not only to the different noetic acts but also to the correlates of noemata. The more the object is a conjunction of different thematic aspects, the more difficult it becomes to grasp the fulfillment of the acts by the objects. In addition, we must be aware of what may perhaps be called modal differences in terms of the position of the object, such as the difference between a possible object, a probable object and a doubtful one. Here, too, we notice the rather complicated interrelation between our assertions and the fulfilling objects.[8] These are only examples, previously dealt with, related to the impossibility of an immediacy of the cognitive acts in terms of their concomitant certainty. Certainty becomes problematic, and thus again -only - a possible *telos* of knowledge and is not a previously conceived and comprehended point of departure. Therefore, two additional steps are taken by Husserl which are already adumbrated in the system of the *Ideen* -both making prominent the complexity and diversity of the phenomenon of evidence as well as its systematic connotation as the end of cognition rather than its point of departure.

4

Husserl consistently adheres to the conception that evidence is both the criterion of truth and the explication of the position of true statements in consciousness. Turning to *Formale und Transzendentale Logik*, we find a repetition of the oscillation characteristic of Husserl's analysis.[9] Evidence is seen as the absolute apodicticity or absolute certainty that is as such used to counter all deceptions. Yet he adds that such an apodicticity is totally inconceivable outside a concrete context which has a unity of essence in relation to a subjective experience (*Erleben*), and which is removed from the

context of a particular experience (*Einzelerleben*).[10] Absolute apodicticity or certainty is, by definition, beyond the realm of subjective experience. Yet Husserl is aware that consciousness, even in its totality, has a component of subjectivity or of conviction about truth which cannot be disregarded even when we refer to or aim at absolute certainty. The very notion of certainty contains an element of conviction, and conviction is an attitude of the subject. The question that Husserl faces is whether or not it is possible to distinguish between the mode of being grounded in a subject without being exposed to the mode of *Erleben*. Husserl says that a proposition can be given in very different subjective modes of givenness (*Gegebenheitsweisen*). He goes on to say that one and the same proposition can appear both as a completely vague brainwave (*ein vollig vager Einfall*) and also as an entirely vague meaning of an assertion which one reads, understands or adopts credulously (*glaubig ubernimmt*).[11] To be sure, the idea to which Husserl continually refers is the idea of passing statements as imbued with the fullness of clarity. That state or stage is new evidence of the self-givenness of the things with which consciousness is concerned.[12] The position of new evidence implies that we entertain in our consciousness a state of affairs, while our intentionality was accompanied by an evidence which is now replaced by a new one. It becomes clear in the context that there are varieties of evidence which can be conceived as stages of evidence and, by the same token, as progressive steps of evidence. Evidence described by its definition as absolute certainty or apodicticity is deferred to the goal or end of the process. The striving for knowledge has not yet reached its goal. It keeps going from one clarity to another, while the ultimate goal is indeed described as *Endziel*. The nominal description of evidence related to one's holding of that which one thinks (*die Selbsthabe des Vermeinten*) is retained, but the cognitive position of that *Selbsthabe* is now pushed forward in the direction of the final goal of the striving for knowledge. This is a continuous process aiming at clarity.[13]

Husserl removes evidence from its position as a point of departure of the process of cognition and puts it in the position of its aim. Therefore, the various statements or propositions of contents meant by consciousness (*das Vermeinte*) cannot be gauged according to pre-established evidence. On the contrary, they are deferred to the ultimate stage: We cognitively evaluate the data of consciousness in relation to the end, not the beginning. To be sure, Husserl accepts the nominal and ideal description of evidence as clarity, but he distinguishes between clarity and absolute certainty. He sees the relationship by which absolute clarity can refer to absolute certainty in the sense that only when absolute clarity appears within the horizon of knowledge can absolute certainty be justified.

From the aspect of self-givenness it would indeed be difficult to distinguish between evidence which is objectively justified and evidence which is but the reverse of self-givenness. Clarity becomes the guiding principle of the meaning of evidence; different modes of evidence are to be gauged against the principle of clarity, not the other way round. Ultimately Husserl tries to effect an explicit synthesis between *Selbstgabe* and clarity, thus retaining the notion of consciousness or subject, since *Selbstgabe* obviously refers to the *Selbst* who is the subject. In order to overcome the continuous danger of subjectivity or, from the other pole, the lack of clarity that can be concomitant with mere subjectivity, Husserl must give prominence to perfect clarity which is the opposite of perfect unclarity.[14] Thus the gamut of knowledge is delineated, starting from a mode of consciousness which lacks full clarity to a mode of consciousness whose inherent quality is now clarity. We have even to reinforce that parallelism: The aim of full clarity is the end of cognition. We reach that end continuously in approximation. That end is not with us, but neither is there a totally opaque mode of consciousness which would be a rendering of the full unclarity in us. Both poles are established for the sake of describing the two opposite ends of the process - they are sort of "ideal types" of unclarity and clarity.

We are concerned here not only with the process leading towards or aiming at clarity, but also with the hierarchical structure inherent in that process. Because of that structure Husserl refers specifically in the plural to evidence and to truth.[15] In order to describe the initial position of that pluralistic structure, he must point to the individual status of the initial truth[16] to be achieved at the end of the asymptotic character of knowledge, to use a neo-Kantian expression. We shall see now that the introduction of this neo-Kantian term is not accidental. Indeed, looking at the *Cartesian Meditations* and then coming back to the *Ideen*, we shall notice the affinity between Husserl and Kant, at least in the interpretation of the evidence aim or as an Idea, in Kant's terminology.

5

The *Cartesian Meditations*, because of the direction to Descartes, are obviously germane to a further elaboration of the notion of evidence. Husserl reiterates his previous analysis. Yet we may start with a reference to his own description of evidence as experience (*Erfahrung*) of that which is and of that which is as it is (*Erfahrung von Seiendem und so-Seiendem*). Evidence as an experience or an experiencing is a mode of being seen (*zu Gesicht kommen*: obtain sight of) in the spiritual or mental sense of awareness.[17] The emphasis should be placed here not only on the transformations of experience - and seeing is a sort of experience - but on the primary synthesis of being and of

being of a particular kind. This statement is a paraphrase of two notions: existence and essence. To be aware of something as embodying that synthesis poses a complex task for knowledge. Thus we are brought back to the idea of perfect evidence, as well as the idea of the stages leading to it. For this reason Husserl superimposes on the notion of evidence the mode not only of apodicticity, but also of adequacy.[18] In the notion of adequate evidence there is, at least implicitly, an attempt to integrate into one concept two traditional descriptions or justifications of truth, that of a self-supporting proposition accompanied by conviction and certainty, and that of adequacy which refers to the relationship between a statement and a state of affairs. This is a nuance compared with the previous statements. Still, it points to the fact that Husserl, while attempting to maintain the notion of evidence, cannot leave it enclosed within the range of the immanent consciousness alone, in spite of the major direction towards the position of the subject as origin and ultimate resort.

In keeping with the view analyzed before, namely that of the modifications of evidence, it should be observed that, parallel to considering evidence as an experience, Husserl now posits experience as evidence when he explicitly says that experience in the ordinary sense is a particular evidence. All evidence is experience, and Husserl oscillates between the view of evidence as uniform and evidence as exhibiting different modes and transformations.[19] The notion of modifications of evidence takes on a particular meaning as "habitual and potential evidence." Inasmuch as evidence is an experience - and in evidence the full correlation between the experiencing subject and the experienced state of affairs is present - evidence opens for me an abiding possession (*eine bleibende Habe*). This abiding character of my awareness of knowledge finds one manifestation in the fact that I can always return to the reality that I have seen; I can always reconstruct the first evidence. The fact that I can reconstitute my first possession implies, from the point of view of the relationship or intentionality of the consciousness, a continuous range of possibilities. To refer to a fixed and abiding possession, from the point of view of consciousness, is the possibility or possibilities of reconstituting my first evidence.

On the one hand we can interpret this statement as an attempt to find the subjective correlate or replacement of the abiding possession, namely data of experience (*Erlebnistatsachen*) which are repeatable *ad infinitum*; on the other we can cognize a correlate of our subjective state of consciousness in the objective state of affairs. Here Husserl attempts, from the point of view of the position of evidence, to reach a synthesis between the immanence of consciousness and the correlation between consciousness and the state of affairs. This in turn is a re-rendering of the synthesis between apodicticity and adequacy. Thus our preceding evidence becomes repeatable, and hence habit-

ual and potential. What we attempt is to move from the evidence already in our possession, that we are still able to retain, to the evidence that becomes integrated in the process of our progressive knowledge.[20] Progress points to the goal, not to the starting point.

There are stages of evidence; Husserl must ultimately abandon the view that adherence to any particular evidence is epistemologically binding. More than anything else, the reality of the world is obvious. The question is about the reality of the world as an assertion of a position accompanied by evidence.[21] This statement calls for a clarification of the perpetual overcoming of the vagueness of the notion of the reality of the world. The existing world will continue to exist, but the explication will show that its reality is a correlate of consciousness and intentionality; it cannot be regarded outside the scope of either. If so, then our first evidence does not terminate the process of cognition; on the contrary, our horizon can be opened up by possible experiences. Husserl describes this aspect of the progression of knowledge as the presumption or presumptive horizon.[22] The presence of the horizon removes the primary statement accompanied by evidence, or self-givenness, from its initial position and lodges it in a horizon within which we move when we attempt to clarify - and thus both retain and elevate - the initial evidence.

By applying this dynamic concept of evidence, Husserl introduces the momentum of knowledge that leads to its continuous explication. Evidence is eventually removed from its absolute position as the beginning of knowledge to its new position as the idea that constantly furnishes guidance to all sciences and their striving for universality.[23] Using a Kantian expression, it can be said that Husserl, being engaged in the exploration of the constitution of knowledge, is ultimately led to the notion that a full constitution is a regulative principle which points to the direction but not to the achievement. Kant relates the notion of regulative principles to the notion of *progressus in indefinitum*.[24] To be sure, Kant refers to regulative principles in relation to empirically conditioned existence and knowledge of empirical data, and he continuously attempts to go beyond them. Husserl, hinting at regulative principles, posits them within the continuity from one mode of evidence to another, without accepting Kant's dichotomy between that which is sensuous and that which is beyond sensuality. This is so because he posits an all-embracing concept of a horizon of experience in which the present data and that which goes beyond them are contained. Within that horizon of experience the notions of actuality and transcendence ultimately find clarification. Yet Husserl comes close to Kant's view when he says that a world in itself is an infinite idea related to infinities of harmoniously combinable experiences. It is an idea which is the correlate of the idea of a perfect experiential evidence (*eine Korrelatidee zur Idee einer vollkommenen Erfahrungsevidenz*).[25] To make the

affinity between Kant and Husserl even clearer, we may cite the last sentence in this context, where Husserl describes this harmony - as well as the correlation between the world as an idea and the idea of experiential evidence - as a complete synthesis of possible experiences. And indeed, this is akin to Kant's view and to his terminology.

Yet, despite the wording, we cannot disregard a basic difference between Kant and Husserl, since Husserl is attempting to bring about a synthesis between evidence and state of affairs, that is to say, to constitute one comprehensive system in which consciousness and objects form a harmonious whole. This is so, because for Husserl, the constitution of knowlege is not an ordering or unification of data in Kant's sense; it is a continuous approximation of the basic correlation between intentionality and objects. This correlation becomes more and more transparent to the experiencing consciousness; it is not merely embodied in a structure of principles detached from that experiencing consciousness. Kant places the emphasis on the principles, while Husserl places the emphasis on evidence. Yet he removes evidence from its position underlying knowledge to the ever-removed and removable position of the *telos* of knowledge. Not only the world becomes an idea, but knowledge, too, becomes an idea. By the same token, both the idea of the world and the idea of knowledge are placed at the end of knowledge - they are of a teleological character. We can characterize this to-be-achieved correlation a system, but such a system is never merely an objective structure; it is a structure which is seen through consciousness or which finds its fulfillment (*Erfullung*) in the structure. The affinity between Kant and Husserl should not make us oblivious to the fact that the Cartesian element is retained by Husserl, while in Kant, Descartes' evidence as origin is turned into the notion of a focus. We come back to the *Ideen* and realize that, with the transformations undergone by Husserl's phenomenology, including the Cartesian *Leitmotif*, there is a discontinuity between the stages of development.

6

There is an affinity between Husserl's notion of the world as the ideatum and John Stuart Mill's notion of matter or world as the permanent possibility of sensations. The relationship to Kant's concept of idea emerges in Husserl's own presentation and calls for elaboration.

Husserl speaks about Kant's concept of idea as a very important concept; however, due to his own considerations and the aspect of essence with which he is concerned, he comes back to the root *eidos*.[26] In a more specific sense he refers to Kant's idea and relates it to what he calls "ideal limits" (*ideale Grenzen*).[27] These are ideal essences which, as a matter of principle

cannot be found in any sensuous intuition.[28] He refers to the absence of limit in the progress (*Grenzenlosigkeit im Fortgange*), and again the emphasis is on the process, not the achievement. He combines the notion of the horizon of experience with the notion of the continuous process. The stream of experience (*Erlebnisstrom*) as a unity cannot be viewed as a singular experience but, according to Husserl's own words, it must be conceived as an idea in Kant's sense. Since the reference is to the continuous process, no single experience can be viewed as self-sufficient or isolated from the whole context, though the context is never circumscribed and is continually growing and gaining in clarity. When Husserl speaks about ideation, there is even an etymological correlation between his viewing of ideation and the idea in Kant's sense: The idea is not presented as fully determined, but it is the focus of our continuous attempts to attain clarification and systematization.[29] To be sure, some of the notions or contents in Kant which are not lodged on the level of ideas appear on that level in Husserl, as for instance the notion of space and time. Husserl points out the affinity between Kant's pure intuition (*reine Anschauung*) and his own notion of ideation.

The integration of different notions on the level of immanence blurs the distinction between forms of sensuality, in Kant's sense, as related to pure intuition and ideas, again in Kant's sense, which refer to the end of the cognitive process. This aspect of Husserl's own interpretation of his affinity with Kant and the difference between his and Kant's systems, arises from the fact that the borderline of sensuality does not play the same role in Husserl that it plays in Kant. In other words, we find in Husserl a stronger version of the tendency towards immanence than the one we find in Kant. But precisely this point makes the affinity in terms of the notion of idea even more significant, since it can be said that within the context of immanence there is a growing trend towards apodicticity, adequacy, and, thus, evidence. Immanence is never closed, and thus it never reaches the summit of speculation in Husserl as it does, for instance, in Hegel. Husserl remains within the scope of the subject and thus cannot assume the notion or the idea of *Weltvernunft*.

What can be described as the open immanence characteristic of Husserl, in contrast to the closed immanence characteristic of Hegel, leads us to re-emphasize the affinity between Husserl and Kant. Kant describes the notion of idea in the following way: An idea is a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience; there is no object congruous with sense-experience.[30] The idea expresses only the systematic unity that is to serve as a role for the empirical employment of reason. As a rule only (*Richt-schnur*), no experience can even be adequate to an idea, nor can any object be congruous with an idea.[31] The systematic position of the idea in Kant as a

regulative principle is present in Husserl despite the differences. Husserl considers experience to be one of the modes of evidence within the context of the modifications or levels of evidence. For Kant the idea is a regulative principle serving on the one hand to describe the boundaries of experience and, on the other, to describe a focus directing knowledge to move forward within those boundaries in order to overcome their limitations, accompanied by awareness that it is never possible to overcome them totally. Kant is concerned with the question of how to explain the progressive character of knowledge while confining knowledge to experience. Hence he interprets transcendence as an idea. He turns the idea into the systematic principle that as such prompts knowledge to reach it. Knowledge is accompanied by awareness of the gap existing between that which is already known and that which should be attempted as a possible object of knowledge to be acquired. Husserl conceives of knowledge as one continuous process, without introducing into it the regulative principle that is, as it were, the immanent equivalent of transcendence. The motivating factor is not transcendence reformulated as an idea, but the immanent *nisus* towards clarity and apodicticity or full evidence. Husserl does not present the position of transcendence as an idea in order to explain the never-ending process of knowledge. He refers not to the gap between immanence and transcendence, but to the gap between imperfect and perfect evidence. Perfect evidence is a projected goal of the striving towards evidence; as a projected goal it is the aim of cognitive activity.[32]

In spite of these differences, Husserl deliberately returns to Kant's interpretation of the notion of idea by positing the idea not only as the regulative principle of cognition but also as its aim.

7

Husserl attempts to bring about a synthesis of different interpretations of certainty and evidence - for instance that between *certitudo absoluta* and *certitudo conditionata*. The given awareness of the knowing subject is a conditional one. It directs itself towards absolute certainty which lies within the horizon of the subject and is beyond the reach of the cognitive process. Since the process and its end remain within the sphere of consciousness, the safeguard of the certainty cannot lie within the object as an idea in Plato's sense. The essence of certainty lies within the scope of the subject, and the progress of consciousness is characteristic of the subject; indeed, it even belongs to its essence.

Husserl tries to establish the whole composed of self-evidence and its absoluteness and the whole of the certainty concerning the *Sosein* and the *Dasein* as one of the manifestations of the direction towards the totality of the

subject. Descartes' interpretation of "intuition" and the impact of *clara et distincta perception* enables Husserl to integrate into self-certainty the process of clarification which, in turn, makes it possible to point to a goal within the scope of self-awareness which becomes a clarity which does not overstep the sphere of the subject. It is appropriate to refer at this juncture to what Kant describes as "intuiting certainty," (*anschauende Gewissheit*), i.e., evidence as that kind of certainty is listed under the heading of apodictic proof.

Kant conceives of mathematics as a realm of synthesis containing the component of *Anschauung*. He refers that sort of certainty to mathematics, since mathematics is entitled to consider the general *in concreto*, that is to say, in a particular intuition. This sort of evidence does not apply to the discursive character of philosophy, since the synthesis is not characteristic of it. Where *Anschauung* is not present, evidence cannot be the mode of certainty. Through the concepts of understanding, reason refers to possible experience. Yet the field of experience is wholly accidental. Hence - we may conclude - certainty as evidence cannot be attributed to reason as such because there is no intuition related to it. Neither can it be attributed to the application of reason *qua* understanding (*Verstand*) to experience, since complete certainty cannot be seen in the context of the synthesis between concepts and the intuition to be applied to accidentality.

In Kant's interpretation transcendental philosophy is critique. In Husserl, it is a discernment of fundamental data and, therefore, has not only a transcendental direction but also an intuitive one. The fundamental data as such cannot be exhausted by their functional aspect. As fundamental they are grasped, and the goal of being aware of them is to arrive at the full evidence that is bound to be intuitive evidence, or evidence proper, since on that level the intuitive character is only a pleonasmic description.

In looking at this basic topic in the comparison between Husserl and Kant, we shall consider the nature of science and philosophy. Roman Ingarden's formulation about the highest possible clarification of the act of consciousness as *das intuitive Durchleben des Aktes*[33] is the guiding line of the subsequent discussion.

8

Let us sum up again the trend of Husserl's system. There are several reasons why he gives special attention to the problem of evidence in the context of the phenomenon of knowledge and the conviction of its validity. Evidence means - systematically, and we could say phenomenologically - the immanent certainty of the propositions asserted by the subject.

The subject asserts propositions but he is ultimately the tribunal in confirming that the assertion is true. Thus, in evidence, the subject is the initial beginner and the final authority. In evidence, reflection and self-reflection coincide. As the beginner, the subject is the agent; as the winding-up authority, he is the active meeting-ground of the self-awareness and its content. It is appropriate to observe that evidence has a juridical connotation. Self-evidence is a philosophical position, since it refers to the self, but aiming at the assertion of a state of affairs, which is placed beyond the egotistic boundaries of the self. Hence Husserl's system, because of his concern with the position and problem of the subject, is brought by its inner logic to deal extensively and intensively with evidence.[34] The common ground of the two systems can be described in a negative way: They both reject the empiricist approach. Consciousness is spontaneous and in Husserl's version a resource, too. The activity of consciousness is manifest in the acts of it. The difference between the two systems lies in the interpretation of consciousness. Kant deals with the acts as expressed in concepts and, along with them, in categorial statements. He refers to constructive acts *a priori* as expressed in the *a priori* apparatus. The *a priori* concepts are also tools for the construction of objects and thus of experience.

Husserl did not confine his analysis of consciousness to these acts. He explores the plentitude of consciousness. The concepts are grounded in the plentitude. Moreover, they carry in themselves the essence of acts, i.e., the intentionality. They apply to data because of their essence and not by way of a deduction, which by definition is a deliberate act for the sake of the application, that is to say, for the sake of moving from the sources and resources of consciousness to that which is given to it. Hence the duality in the meaning of experience in Kant: that which is given and that which is constructed. It is of the essence of objects in the strict sense of the term to be constructed. Kant deals with a stratum of concepts. Husserl deals with a continuity of acts and structures.

NOTES

1. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie*, hrsg. von Walter Biemel, Band III, *Husserliana*, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p. 47, p. 159.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 309.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 338-339.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 336.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*, p. 353.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 356.

9. *Formale und Transzendentale Logik - Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*. (Halle, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1929), p. 140.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 255-256.

16. *Cartesianische Meditationen*, pp. 52; transl. p. 12.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 57; transl. p. 18.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.* pp. 96-97; pp. 60-61.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 61; p. 21.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 62; p. 22.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 62; p. 23.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 92 ff; pp 57 ff.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 97; p. 62.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 50; p. 9.

26. The "regulative" role of the *eidos* in Husserlian phenomenology was discussed by A.-T. Tymieniecka, "Idea as the *a priori* in the phenomenological constitution," *Kantstudien*, Bd. 55, 1964, p. 368 ff.

27. *Ideen*, pp. 170-171.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 201-202.

29. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B. p. 383; transl. p. 318.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 649; p. 518.

31. On the same issue treated here, consult the chapter '*Immanenz und Transzendenz*' in· Rudolf Boehm: *Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phanomenologie*, Husserl-Studien (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p 141 ff.

32. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B. p. 762 ff; p. 590.

33. Roman Ingarden, *Uber die Gefahr einer Petitio Principii in der Erkenntnistheorie*, in *Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phano-menologische Forschung*, hrsg. von Edmund Husserl, IV (1921), p. 563.

34. On the whole issue consult: Emmanuel Levinas, *Theorie de l'intuition dans la phenomenologie de Husserl*, Vrin, Paris 1,
p. 963.

Chapter VII

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Science as knowledge referring to data and structuring them in interrelations is, according to Kant, a system. At the same time, science exhibits the characteristic feature of reason as the legislative faculty. These two aspects appear to be interrelated because science is grounded in reason. Reason is a system, though its employment is pure. It "can be conducted in accordance with principles of unity, the material being provided by *experience* alone.[1] The systematic aspect of science is due to its relation to reason; it cannot be due to its reference to data or experience. Hence Kant says that "...Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it regards all our knowledge as belonging to a possible system..."[2] We find no explicit exposition or justification for that statement which can be seen as an attempt to answer why reason by its very nature is systematic or architectonic. Architectonics is the art of constructing systems. It is a doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge and therefore necessarily forms part of the doctrine of method.[3] According to this statement, "architectonic" and "system" seem to be synonymous descriptions of the same aspect or feature of science or reason, science being the manifestation of reason.

Kant relates these various characterizations of system as grounded in "reason's legislative prescriptions."[4] If this is so, then the systematic character of science, generally speaking, would be a manifestation of reason, apparently by its very essence a unity which is expressed in its unifying function or functions, i.e. in categorial propositions, etc. The principles of reason cannot be sporadic because they are principles of one and the same faculty. Ultimately, in terms of science, these principles of unification are expressed in the categorial structure that functionally unifies the data and structurally makes the unity of reason manifest with respect to the data, and thus experience.

Science is knowledge grounded in reason referring to data. It cannot be a manifestation of reason alone, because of the component of data. "The determination of the limits of our reason cannot, therefore, be made save on a priori grounds."[5] Hence we face a knowledge of our ignorance, which is possible only through criticism of reason itself. Science presupposes the

self-knowledge of reason that as such is determined by the awareness that the necessary presence of data makes the positive direction of reason towards data possible; the negative awareness is an awareness of the limitations of pure reason. In this sense, reason is not only a systematic sum-total of principles; it is also intrinsically a self-awareness regarding its structure and possibilities and regarding its reference to data or to experience. The systematic or architectonic aspect of reason is thus accompanied by its reflective aspect. apparently there is no way to tell which of the two aspects of reason is primary, or whether they are both on the same level.

2

The dependence on reason of science as knowledge referring to data or to nature in general is more explicitly expressed as the dependence of nature on *a priori* laws. These laws refer to the unity of apperception, and without this *a priori* unity, no unity of experience is possible.[6] Thus, unity is imposed by reason on data to bring about their systematization. There are two aspects which must be emphasized here. One is the manifestation of the unity of reason in the various functions of unification, that is to say, that reason prescribes systematiz-ation to the data; the second is that reason regarding the data becomes manifest in the legislation of human reason. Since apperception is a basis for the lawfulness of all phenomena, it is, by the same token, the ground of the legislation referring to the phenomena. Legislation is a manifestation of the spontaneity of reason; in and through legislation spontaneity becomes systematized or structured. A distinction must be made between laws referring to nature in general and special laws. In order to assert the latter, we must resort to experience. Hence in science there are two levels of laws, the *a priori* ones and those related to experience and dependent to some extent on experience: "But it is the *a priori* laws that alone can instruct us in regard to experience in general, and as to what it is that can be known as an object of experience."[7] The systematic character of science, being a manifestation of the legislative essence of reason, is confined to the *a priori* aspect of science, thus opening up the possibility for the referential aspect of legislation via *a priori* concepts, though legislation as such does not prescribe that to which it refers. Kant probably had in mind legislation in the juridical realm, where it prescribes general or universal rules and does not emanate of itself the situation to which it applies or the empirical agents - human beings - who are in a sense mediators between the law and its realization or application.

The distinction between the unity of reason and the unity that is becoming manifest in science is expressed in the statement that the unity of reason "... is in itself *undetermined*, as regards the conditions under which, and the extent to which, the understanding ought to combine its concepts in systematic fashion.[8] The unity of reason, presupposed by understanding and guiding understanding in the direction of systematization, is not itself endowed with the conditions of its application. In this sense it is undetermined. The conditions, i.e., categories, are on the borderline between the inherent unity of reason and the data. Hence the explication of the conditions can be accomplished only within the limits of the awareness of the data on the one hand, and the guiding essence of reason as systematic legislation on the other.

3

Philosophy differs from science because it is the explication of the fundamental systematic character of reason as such, while science is the systematization of data. There are various ways of expressing this difference between science and philosophy, i.e., the difference between knowledge out of reason that is derived from concepts and the construction of concept. Philosophical knowledge is derived from concepts, and there is no room for construction - as explored before - within the realm of philosophy. Construction is synthesis: "To *construct* a concept means to exhibit *a priori* the intuition which corresponds to the concept. For the construction of a concept we therefore need a *non-empirical* intuition."[9] This necessary presence of intuition is the decisive factor in the distinction between mathematics and philosophy; hence the central issue of our discussion - *Anschauung* - is present also in the characterization of philosophy. Philosophy does not refer to intuition. Only quanta can be constructed and the concepts dealt with in philosophy are not quanta. We must qualify this statement by referring to Kant's saying that philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science which nowhere exists *in concreto*,[10] as if he were presenting the constitution of philosophy as science as a possible aim of philosophical thinking. But one may wonder whether this presentation of an ideal of philosophy, as it were, can be consistent with what philosophy is to Kant, i.e., prescribing systematic unity from the standpoint of the essential ends. The essential ends can be seen in the context of moral philosophy, since the highest ends are those of morality. They can be seen as related to man, who alone contains in himself the ultimate end of nature and the order of ends.[11] But it is rather obvious that these aspects of philosophy cannot be seen as architectonically systematized in science related to data. If there are two themes of philosophy, that of nature and that of freedom, Kant could not present philosophy as science, neither in terms of its apparatus - i.e., construction vs. concepts - nor in terms of the ultimate goal of philosophy. The description of that goal as "essential ends" introduces the aspect of ends, differing fundamentally from the component of data, that is the essential ingredient of science. One possible explanation of Kant's vacillation in terms of the employment of the notion of science vis-a-vis philosophy is that if the emphasis is laid on systematization as such, then philosophy as a system,

or as an attempt towards a system is science. But if the emphasis is laid on science as exhibiting legislation of reason in constructions, i.e., in laws, philosophy cannot be regarded as a science.

The introduction of the concept of "transcendental philosophy" is related to this issue, since transcendental philosophy deals with the system of concepts and principles that relates to objects in general. As such it is concerned with knowledge of nature, as it can be applied in experience. Transcendental philosophy would be the self-prescribed direction of reason vis-a-vis data. But even here transcendental philosophy cannot be considered to be a science in the sense of a synthesis or construction as presented by Kant. The distinction between the scholastic concept of philosophy and the cosmic one is no more than an extra emphasis on the essence of philosophy as the exploration of reason and its ends rather than as science.[12]

We shall now consider the change brought about by Husserl in the employment of the description "rigorous science," referring to philosophy as well as to the essence of the crisis in western science.

4

Kant's conception that science in the authentic sense of the term depends on the presence of mathematics[13] excludes the possibility of considering philosophy as science. Philosophy differs from mathematics and therefore cannot be viewed from the point of view of science, of which mathematics is an essential component. This is so, although function as the unity of the acts of bringing together various representations under one common representation is the manifestation of understanding and thus also of reason.[14] Yet the functional aspect of understanding and reason cannot overshadow the difference between mathematics and philosophy; that difference is also due to the synthesis characteristic of mathematics and thus of science, whereas synthesis is essentially absent in philosophy.

When we look at Husserl's programmatic statements on philosophy as science, we find that the distinction inherent in Kant is not maintained. Mathematical science is for Husserl science of nature; it is a technical marvel. Its purpose is to accomplish inductions conceived from the point of view of fruitfulness, probability and exactitude.[15] It should be stressed that the combination of the mathematical approach and the science of nature is not viewed here as a synthesis. It is considered from the point of view of its fruitfulness - which has a pragmatic connotation - and its exactitude - which may have a theoretical one. It is the presuppositions that are stressed; these are not judgments but data-principles. These differ in their position from what is

described as actual rationality, since they call for real insight, and that insight is lacking in the direction of rationality as shown in the mathematical science of nature. This absence is apparently due to the mathematical approach to nature, that differs from the approach to the data in consciousness. It is no accident that Husserl uses the term "science of the spirit,"[16] and philosophy is meant to be the fundamental science of the spirit. The concept of spirit is not explicated. It may have some of Hegel's connotations rather than Kant's, the more so since science is presented as standing for absolute or timeless values.[17] Here, too, the science of nature, being relative, cannot be presented as standing for absolute values. Hence Husserl attempts to combine the direction of science with the position of spirit and absolute values. Science gives rise to the need for a complete and absolute rationality. But only philosophy as science can fulfill that need.

An additional combination emerges, namely that of a true way to a scientific theory of reason which is, by the same token, an adequate psychology.[18] Obviously, in this context it is not empirical psychology that is intended. On the contrary, the criticism of naturalism is a criticism of the transfer of the tools of empirical science to the domain of psychology. But, by the same token, this is a criticism of Kant's interpretation of psychology which, as metaphysics of thinking nature, is rational knowledge. As such, it is an *a priori* approach which identifies the I as a thinking entity. Husserl does not see the position of psychology in the non-naturalistic sense as confined to the "I think," since he is concerned with the phenomenological grasp of essences which should be seen as decisive cognitions which as such can be seen as presenting philosophy as a rigorous science. In a broader sense we can say that, for Kant, rational psychology does not cease to be an identification of a function of "I think," while for Husserl, science and philosophy as science are seen as an intuition which grasps essence as essential being.

This direction - that of phenomenology and also that of philosophy or wisdom - calls for an intuitive exploration of the essences of things. Psychological knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term, that is to say, psychology as an empirical science, presupposes essential knowledge of the psychic. Hence philosophy is concerned with essences; but these are within the realm of subjectivity. Phenomenology can recognize only essences and essential relations with objective validity; these are data, not judgments. Because they are data, they are presuppositions and thus do not lead in the direction of functions basically expressed in propositions. Hence the phenomenology of consciousness is opposed to a natural science of consciousness. Again, the concern of phenomenology with "pure consciousness" is *not the* concern with the functional unification inherent in the I; it is aiming at the identification of true beginnings or origins. Husserl's concept of science

and, concurrently, his concept of philosophy, are an attempt to transplant the Platonic view of essences to the realm made central in the tradition that combines Descartes, Hume and Kant. It is not by chance that *theoria* is interpreted to be universal science, universal being related to the essences that although - or because - they are data, underlie all empirical approaches to nature or to that which is factually given. For Kant science is a manifestation of syntheses; it is thus a construction. For Husserl science is a discernment of essential data and, therefore, by definition, cannot be a construction. This is a restatement of several aspects of the two systems which we dealt with before.[19]

5

It must be emphasized that the notion of a rigorous science is maintained in Husserl's analysis of the crisis of the European sciences, though rigorous science is attributed to "universal transcendental philosophy," not to philosophy as such.[20] The affinity with Kant in the employment of the adjective "transcendental" is expressed in the view that Kant is on the way to this mode of philosophy, though the emphasis is perhaps laid more strongly on the Cartesian way of philosophy. Kant never permitted himself to enter the depths of the Cartesian investigation.[21] When transcendental philosophy is characterized as inquiring into the ultimate source of all the formations of knowledge, that source is not understood as reason in general, nor as presuppositions or statements, but as subjectivity or consciousness, which can be brought together under the heading of transcendental subjectivism.

Transcendental philosophy questions objective science as philosophy, since by adhering to the programmatic statement about philosophy as rigorous science, it is concerned with the subjective structure and the achievement of experiencing, or with the approach to prescientific life. Philosophy as a rigorous science is concurrently a radical inquiry and, as such, it comes back to the *radix*, that is to say, to subjectivity. It is possible that a more modified statement can be made concerning the relation between psychology and transcendental philosophy, since they are connected.[22] Kant finds no real use in psychology, since he understands psychology only in the limited and experiential sense of the term. Again, the attribute of "absolute" emerges in this context and is attributed to subjectivity. Though, as we have noticed, the emphasis is put on the affinity between transcendental psychology and transcendental philosophy, in a different context it is said that these are identical or that the pure psychologist is a transcendental philosopher.[23]

It is in this context that we must consider some critical statements referring to Kant. In the first place, Kant constructs a transcendental subjectivity - and obviously we should emphasize the word "constructs." We may wonder whether this presentation is warranted by Kant's statements, but perhaps we can understand Husserl's description by pointing out that the I or the "I think" in Kant is a sort of abstraction from the various representations. It is presented by him as accompanying representations, not as containing essential data in itself. Husserl criticizes Kant for not presenting subjectivity as a dimension of the living spirit. Hence Husserl comes back to the notion of spirit, which exists in itself, and for itself, and is self-sufficient. Spirit is apparently identical with subjectivity, having its own life, and thus essence or essences, and being the fertile ground for the discernment of essences in the Platonic sense. Kant's philosophy is not open to this direction because it does not consider the subjective realm as open to an intuitive approach or to intuition of ourselves. Kant does not transpose the results of his regressive procedure, that is to say, the procedure of coming back, by way of reflection, to the I; he does not transpose the results of that procedure into intuitive concepts.[24] Hence we may conclude that the intuitive approach, that for Kant is only a component in the synthesis, is for Husserl the ultimate approach and the ultimate cognition of that which is an essence or essences.

There is an additional point in Husserl's critical statements about Kant's transcendental philosophy, namely, that Kant gets involved in mythical concept formation.[25] This is so, apparently, because Kant does not open the way for intuitions to ourselves and presents concepts as standing alone, independent of acts of subjectivity. The concepts he identifies are therefore critically described as myth. They seem to be like fetishes (the term is used by himself) in Marx's sense as formations alienated from their origin or source. This rather strong criticism of Kant is systematically connected to Husserl's fundamental approach, according to which subjectivity must be seen in its wholeness, as the integration of acts and their formal expressions in concepts. If essence is a fundamental subject matter of philosophy or the phenomenological interpretation of philosophy, then the identification of essences as total configurations is only one of the expressions of the philosophical approach to its subject matter, i.e., to data as essences.

6

Hermann Cohen's interpretation of the position of psychology in the system may shed light on Kant's view and the difference between Kant and Husserl. Cohen observes that Plato is concerned with the psychology of representation (*Vorstellung*) in order to reach the level of pure thinking. But the creative power of thinking can be brought to the fore only by logic. We can add to this statement that the nature of thinking cannot be explored by any

approach which purports to contain the element of psychology or phenomenological psychology. Psychology, which Cohen gives a fundamental philosophical position, is an investigation of the unity of the consciousness of culture, not of the basic data of consciousness interpreted by Husserl as activity. Cohen does not present psychology as an empirical science. He attempts to integrate it into a philosophical system, but in a way he gives it that position by considering it as a *post-factum* realm established after the spheres of logic, morality and art have been investigated. The consciousness of culture leads to an exposition of the clashes and congruities between the three realms of consciousness, which are, as said before, knowledge, morality and art. Positing psychology in relation to these three thematic realms differs from positing psychology as identifying the absolute data of subjectivity. Psychology now belongs to philosophy but is not identical with it.[26]

We come back now to the one theme of our analysis, namely that in Husserl's relation to Kant we find a basic ambiguity. Though Husserl attempts to reformulate the direction of transcendental philosophy, he does so in order to point to the life of subjectivity, and therefore to objective intention-alities. Kant points to the syntheses underlying the various approaches to data, the latter being related to that which is given, not to that which is primarily present in consciousness.

7

The issue of the essence of reason as juxtaposed to the position of subject has axial significance in shaping the direction of the two systems. That position becomes important in the relation of freedom to the two interpretations of the position of reason and subject. In Kant - freedom is spontaneity. It becomes manifest in the legislative direction of reason. Hence, negatively, it amounts to independence, and positively, to the causality of the intelligible character. In the practical realm freedom is expressed as the independence of the will from any factor but the moral law. Husserl refers to the pure I and to the consciousness of the I as an infinite realm of infinite laws of essence. Any posited objectivity, even one's own personality, is constituted in the transcendental subjectivity. The I is not a focus of representation only, nor is it the intelligible cause of laws. It is a constituting fact endowed with its own life described as laws of essence. There is - though it is not explicated - a continuity from the transcendental I to the personality, and thus there is no chasm between the transcendental level and the level of the human personality, i.e., the empirical level. In contrast to the confinement to the empirical character of the person, the expressive or the integrated essence of the character

is emphasized. The continuity involved enables *vernunfttheoretische* insights into the essence of the personality because of the affinity between *Vernunft* on the level of the person's character and *Vernunft* on the level of the cognitive approach at large. *Vernunft* appears in this context, but it is identical with the subject in the comprehensive essence, not with reason as cause or legislative faculty.[27]

Without assuming a direct continuity between this interpretation of the position and the essence of the subject, we still may consider Heidegger's central conception, which is, to say the least, more related to Husserl than to Kant. "...We shall in future no longer speak of a subject, of a subjective sphere, but shall understand the being to whom intentional comportments belong as *Dasein*...on the basis of things that it itself is not."[28] Intentionality is here interpreted as an anchor for the subjects' relation to the world and the things embraced in it. It is not the subjective activity expressed in the continuity from the pure I to the personality. The step from Husserl's interpretation of the pure I to *Dasein* is obviously less of a leap than the step from spontaneity to *Dasein* in Kant's system.

Since freedom is only the other side of reason, in Kant's system the chasm between the intelligible and the empirical character continues to exist. It does not exist in Husserl's system, because intentionality is the dominant characteristic of subjectivity on its various levels. Consequently, according to Kant there is no synthesis within the realm of ethics, while according to Husserl synthesis is an inherent characteristic of subjectivity as such. It is inherent and is not a construction.

Hence the hard core of the difference between the two systems centers around the difference between synthesis and objective intentionality. As the motto of exegesis has it: Everything else is but a commentary.

NOTES

1. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B. p. 766; p. 592.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 502; p. 429.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 860; p. 653.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, p. 786; p. 605.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 263; p. 237.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 165; p. 173.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 693; p. 577.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 741; p. 577.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 866; p. 657.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 867; pp. 657-658.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 868 note; p. 658 note.

13. *Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft*, Akademie Ausgabe, B. IV, p. 470.

14. *Kr.d.r.V.*, B. p. 93; p. 105.

15. "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man," in Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. with an Introd. by Quentin Lauer, New York, Harper and Row, 1965, p. 186.

16. *Ibid.*

17. "Philosophy as Rigorous Science,", p 136.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

19. "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man," p. 169.

20. *Die Krisis*, etc. p. 103; trans. p. 99.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 99

22. *Ibid.*, p. 205.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 257, p. 399.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 115, 118.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

26. Herman Cohen, *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*, 2 Aufl., Berlin, Bruno Cassirer, 1914, p. 22, 17.

27. The reference is to a fragment in Husserl's archives as quoted in: Alois Roth, *Edmund Husserl's Ethische Untersuchungen, dargestellt anhand seiner Vorlesungs-manuskripte*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, p. 36.

28. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1982, p. 64.